Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons Supporting the Veracity of Christianity

Natural Theology

Arguments for Theism

Cosmological

Arguments from Causation

Kalam – Scientific and Philosophical

(P1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. This premise expresses a basic metaphysical principle: things do not simply pop into existence from nothing, without a cause. (1) To deny (P1) is to say that something can come from absolutely nothing. - "Nothing" is not a kind of something; it has no properties, no potentialities, and no causal powers. - If things could arise from nothing without a cause, there is no reason why anything and everything would not appear uncaused at any time. (2) Everyday experience and scientific practice presuppose causal regularity. - Science is built on the assumption that events have explanations...that there are causes and laws to be discovered. - No scientist treats a macroscopic object's sudden appearance from nothing as a normal, explanation-free occurrence. (3) Quantum mechanics does not refute the causal principle. - So-called "quantum fluctuations" occur in a rich physical reality: fields, laws, and a quantum vacuum with structure. - They are not events arising from absolute nothingness; they are described by precise equations and boundary conditions. (4) The alternative is more incredible than the premise. - Believing that a universe can appear uncaused from literally nothing is, as Craig notes, "worse than magic." At least in magic there is a magician and a hat; on this view there is not even that. Therefore, it is far more rational to affirm that whatever begins to exist has a cause than to deny this deeply rooted causal principle.

(P2) The universe began to exist. Scientific Argument: Modern evidence strongly supports a cosmic beginning. (1) The Second Law of Thermodynamics. - The universe is running down: usable energy is being irreversibly converted into unusable forms. - If the universe had existed for an infinite time in the past, it should already have reached "heat death" (maximum entropy) long ago. - The fact that the universe is still in a low-entropy, life-permitting state strongly implies a finite past. (2) The expansion of the universe. - General relativity (Einstein, 1915) allowed cosmologists to model the large-scale structure and history of the universe. - Solutions to Einstein's equations (Friedmann, Lemaître) predicted an expanding universe. - Hubble's observations (1920s) of the redshift of distant galaxies empirically confirmed cosmic expansion. - Run the expansion backwards, and the distances between all points shrink toward a state of arbitrarily high density...a beginning of the universe. (3) The Borde–Guth–Vilenkin (BGV) theorem. - Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin (2003) proved that any universe which has, on average, been expanding throughout its history cannot be past-eternal, but must have a past boundary. - This applies not only to standard Big Bang cosmology but also to a wide range of inflationary and multiverse models. - As Vilenkin remarks: "All the evidence we have says that the universe had a beginning." (4) Failed attempts to avoid a beginning. - Steady-state, oscillating, and certain cyclic models have faced serious theoretical and observational problems. - Contemporary cosmology has largely given up the hope of a simple, past-eternal model that fits the data and escapes the BGV-type results. Taken together, thermodynamics, cosmic expansion, and modern cosmology provide strong evidence that the universe began to exist a finite time ago. See also: • Natural Theology: Cosmic Fine-Tuning

(P3) The universe began to exist. Philosophical Argument: Impossibility of an infinite regress of past events. (1) Actual infinites lead to absurdities in the real world. - An "actual infinite" is a completed totality with infinitely many members (not just a process that could keep going). - Hilbert's Hotel (Craig's standard illustration) shows the paradoxes of an actually infinite number of concrete things: • A hotel with infinitely many occupied rooms can still take infinitely many new guests while never becoming "full." • Subtracting equal finite quantities from the same infinite set yields contradictory results (e.g., ∞ − ∞ can give different answers). - These paradoxes suggest that an actual infinite collection of concrete objects cannot exist in reality; infinities belong in mathematics, not in the structure of the physical past. (2) An infinite temporal regress cannot be traversed. - The present moment has been reached. - If the number of prior events were actually infinite, it would be impossible to "traverse" an infinite sequence event by event to arrive at now. - No matter how far back you go, there would always be infinitely many events still left to occur before reaching the present, which is absurd. (3) The difference between a potential and an actual infinite. - A "potential infinite" (like counting numbers) can always be extended but is never complete. - The past, if it is real and completed, would be an actual infinite collection of completed events, not a mere potential infinite. - The philosophical problems attach to actual infinites of concrete things, which is exactly what an eternal past would require. (4) Therefore, the past cannot be infinite. - The philosophical arguments reinforce what the scientific evidence already indicates: the series of past events must have a beginning. See also: • Natural Theology: Contingency Argument

(C1) If whatever begins to exist has a cause (P1), and the universe began to exist (P2–P3), then the universe has a cause beyond itself. (1) The Kalam syllogism: - (P1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. - (P2) The universe began to exist. - (C1) Therefore, the universe has a cause. (2) The universe cannot be the cause of itself. - For the universe to cause itself, it would have to exist before it existed, which is incoherent. - The cause must be "outside" or beyond the totality of space, time, matter, and energy that makes up the universe. (3) The causal principle applies to the beginning of the universe. - The claim is not that "every event inside the universe" has a cause and then we illegitimately extend this to the universe itself. - Rather, we apply the metaphysical principle directly: anything that begins to exist...whether inside or beyond the universe...requires a cause. Thus, from (P1) and (P2–P3), it logically follows that the universe has a transcendent cause.

(P5) The cause of the universe must be timeless (without the universe), spaceless, immaterial, enormously powerful, and plausibly personal. (1) Timeless and spaceless. - Space and time themselves begin at the origin of the universe on standard cosmology. - Therefore, the cause of the universe cannot be located in space and time; it must be beyond them. (2) Immaterial and non-physical. - Physical reality (matter/energy and fields) begins with the universe. - The cause cannot be another physical system inside the same space-time; it must be non-physical...an immaterial reality. (3) Enormously powerful. - The cause produces all matter, energy, space, and time from non-being (no pre-existing material). - Whatever has this kind of creative causal power is unimaginably powerful. (4) Plausibly personal (agent cause). - A timeless, changeless cause producing a temporal effect (the universe) suggests a free, personal choice rather than a mechanically necessary, impersonal process. - If the cause were a timeless, impersonal set of conditions, then its effect (the universe) would be timelessly present as well; it would not "begin" at a finite time. - By contrast, a personal agent can freely choose to bring about a new effect without prior determining conditions, explaining why the universe has a temporal beginning. (5) Only two kinds of candidates fit: abstract objects or an unembodied mind. - Abstract objects (like numbers) are causally inert; they do not cause anything. - The remaining live option for a timeless, spaceless, immaterial, powerful cause is something like a mind, a personal agent. Therefore, the cause of the universe is best understood as a powerful, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, personal Creator...what classical theism calls God.

(C2) Therefore, on the combined scientific and philosophical evidence, the best explanation of the universe's beginning is that it was caused to exist by a transcendent, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, enormously powerful, personal Creator...God.

William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2000. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008. A. Borde, A. H. Guth, and A. Vilenkin, "Inflationary Spacetimes Are Not Past-Complete," Physical Review Letters 90, no. 15 (2003): 151301.
+ Quantum physics shows particles popping in and out of existence in a vacuum, so things really can come from nothing without a cause.
1. The quantum vacuum is not "nothing." So-called "vacuum fluctuations" occur in a sea of quantum fields governed by physical laws. This is a highly structured physical reality, not absolute nothingness. 2. Quantum events still presuppose a physical framework. Quantum processes assume: - A space-time background. - Quantum fields and laws. - Boundary conditions and prior states. This is far from the idea of a universe arising from the absence of anything whatsoever. 3. Indeterminism is not non-causality. Many interpretations of quantum mechanics are indeterministic in that they do not fix single outcomes with certainty; but this does not mean there are no causes or underlying conditions. 4. The Kalam concerns the origin of the whole system. Even if some events within the universe are probabilistic, that does not show that the universe itself could come into being from absolutely nothing without a cause. See also: • Natural Theology: Contingency Argument
+ Some cosmological models avoid a beginning. Maybe the universe or multiverse is eternal after all, so it doesn't need a cause.
1. The BGV theorem covers many proposed models. Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin showed that any universe that has, on average, been expanding is geodesically past-incomplete...it must have a past boundary. 2. Many specific eternal models face serious problems. Steady-state and simple oscillating models conflict with observational data (cosmic microwave background, large-scale structure) or with entropy considerations. 3. Philosophical arguments weigh against an infinite past. Even if some mathematical model formally extends the past to infinity, the metaphysical problems with an actual infinite sequence of concrete events remain. 4. The burden of proof is on the eternalist. Given strong scientific and philosophical evidence for a beginning, merely suggesting that "some future theory might avoid it" is speculative. We should reason from the best evidence we currently have. See also: • Natural Theology: Cosmic Fine-Tuning
+ At best, Kalam shows that the universe has a cause. It doesn't show that this cause is God, or anything like the God of the Bible.
1. The nature of the cause is constrained by the argument. From the premises, the cause must be: - Timeless (without the universe's time). - Spaceless (without physical space). - Immaterial and non-physical. - Enormously powerful (creating all matter, energy, space, and time). - Plausibly personal (capable of free choice). 2. These attributes are strongly theistic. A timeless, spaceless, immaterial, immensely powerful, personal Creator is very close to what classical theism means by "God." 3. Kalam is one part of a cumulative case. Other arguments (from fine-tuning, moral values, consciousness, the resurrection) fill in further attributes (goodness, knowledge, moral authority, self-revelation in Christ). Kalam does not need to prove every divine attribute by itself to be evidentially powerful. 4. "Not the whole God" does not mean "not God at all." That an argument establishes only some divine attributes is no objection; it still significantly raises the probability of theism over naturalism. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument
+ Mathematicians work with actual infinities all the time. Hilbert's Hotel is just a strange example, not a real problem, so the philosophical case against an infinite past fails.
1. Infinities in mathematics vs. infinities in reality. Set theory allows consistent manipulation of infinite sets as abstract objects. The question is whether such entities can be instantiated as collections of concrete things in the real world. 2. Hilbert's Hotel highlights the problem of actualized infinites of concrete objects. The bizarre properties (e.g., full yet can take more guests, contradictory subtraction results) suggest that the idea of a completed infinite collection of real, causally related events is metaphysically suspect. 3. The past, if infinite, would be a completed actual infinite of events. We are not merely saying "you can always imagine adding another event"; we are saying that actually infinitely many events have occurred. That is the problematic scenario. 4. Philosophical arguments aim at metaphysical possibility, not mathematical consistency. Even if the mathematics of infinity is consistent, it does not follow that reality can instantiate an actual infinite history of concrete events without paradox. See also: • Natural Theology: Contingency Argument
+ Causation only makes sense within time and space. At the Big Bang, time itself begins, so it's meaningless to ask for a cause 'before' the universe existed.
1. The cause need not be 'before' in a temporal sense. On the Kalam, the cause of the universe is logically prior, not temporally earlier. When time begins, the cause exists timelessly "with" the first temporal moment. 2. Causal priority can be simultaneous with its effect. Even in ordinary experience, some causes and effects are simultaneous (e.g., the weight of a book causing the indentation in a cushion). The cause of the universe can be causally prior without being temporally prior. 3. The argument is metaphysical, not merely physical. Saying "physics can't describe 'before' the Big Bang" does not mean that nothing can be said. Metaphysics can legitimately ask why there is a temporal universe at all, rather than nothing. 4. To deny the very applicability of causation at the origin is ad hoc. We use causation to explain change and beginnings everywhere else. To declare that this principle simply stops applying at the most significant beginning of all (the universe) looks like special pleading to avoid a theistic conclusion. See also: • Natural Theology: Cosmic Fine-Tuning
+ If everything needs a cause, then what caused God? Isn't God just an uncaused exception?
1. The argument does not say "everything has a cause." Kalam's first premise is: - "Whatever begins to exist has a cause," not - "Everything that exists has a cause." If something is beginningless...if it never began to exist...then it does not fall under the scope of the premise. 2. The universe began to exist; God (on theism) did not. The scientific and philosophical arguments in this syllogism specifically target the universe's having a beginning. God, as traditionally conceived, is eternal and without beginning. So: - The universe does begin to exist → needs a cause. - God does not begin to exist → does not need a cause. 3. The argument actually pushes us toward a necessary, uncaused reality. If: - An infinite regress of causes is impossible, and - Whatever begins to exist needs a cause, then we must arrive at some first, uncaused cause that did not begin to exist. Otherwise, explanation never really gets off the ground. 4. "What caused God?" misunderstands explanatory stopping points. Every worldview has to terminate explanation somewhere: - The naturalist often stops with a brute, unexplained universe or multiverse. - The theist stops with a necessary, eternal, uncaused Creator. Kalam argues that a timeless, spaceless, immaterial, powerful, personal cause is a far better stopping point than a brute, contingent physical universe. 5. An uncaused, necessary being is not an arbitrary exception. The principle is applied consistently: - Things that begin need causes. - A reality that is metaphysically necessary and beginningless (by nature does not begin) does not. God is not a randomly exempted item in a class; He is in a different category...necessary, eternal being...than the contingent, temporal universe He causes. See also: • Natural Theology: Contingency • Natural Theology: Moral Argument

Leibniz’ Contingency Argument

(P1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. This premise is a version of the principle of sufficient reason: reality is not a collection of utterly brute facts with no explanation at all. (1) Two basic types of explanation. - Necessary existence: Some things, if they exist, exist by the necessity of their own nature. It is impossible for them not to exist. - Contingent existence: Other things exist, but they could have failed to exist; they depend on something outside themselves. (2) Many philosophers and mathematicians regard abstract objects (numbers, sets) as necessary beings. - If such entities exist, they are not caused by anything else; they exist by their own nature. - Their explanation lies in their necessity, not in a prior cause. (3) Ordinary objects clearly exist contingently. - You, your parents, the earth, stars, and galaxies: none had to exist. - They came into existence and could have failed to exist; their existence calls for an external explanation. (4) “Just there, and that’s all” is not a genuine alternative. - If we found a sphere in the woods, we would naturally seek an explanation for it. - Increasing the size of the sphere (to a house, planet, or even the whole universe) does not remove the need for an explanation. - Our explanatory practices and rational intuitions strongly favor the idea that existing things have explanations. Therefore, it is reasonable to affirm that everything that exists has an explanation...either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause.

(P2) The universe is a contingent reality: it does not exist by a necessity of its own nature. (1) The universe is the totality of space-time, matter, and energy. - “Universe” here means all physical reality: all space, all time, all matter and energy, and the laws that govern them. (2) The universe could have been otherwise, or not existed at all. - It is logically possible that there be no physical universe. - It is also possible that the universe have different laws, constants, particle content, and initial conditions. - What is logically or metaphysically contingent does not exist by a necessity of its own nature. (3) Scientific evidence suggests physical reality had a beginning and specific initial conditions. - Modern cosmology (e.g., Big Bang, BGV theorem) points to a cosmic beginning and finely conditioned initial state. - A beginning and fine-tuned parameters fit better with contingency than with metaphysical necessity. (4) Our best modal intuitions treat the universe as contingent. - We can coherently conceive of different physical worlds or of no physical world at all. - Nothing in the nature of quarks, fields, or spacetime geometry demands that “this universe, exactly as it is” must exist. Therefore, the universe does not exist by the necessity of its own nature; it is a contingent reality.

(P3) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary, non-physical, eternal, immaterial cause...what we call God. (1) The explanation of a contingent universe cannot be another contingent physical totality. - The universe is defined as the whole of space-time and physical reality. - Its explanation therefore cannot be some further physical thing “outside” it; any such thing would simply be part of the same totality. (2) The cause must be beyond space and time. - Space and time are part of the universe; the cause of the universe’s existence must be independent of them. - So the explanation of the universe must be non-spatial, non-temporal (timeless or eternal in the relevant sense). (3) The cause must be non-physical and immaterial. - Physical reality is exactly what is being explained. - Thus, the ultimate explanation cannot be another physical system; it must be non-physical and immaterial. (4) The cause must be metaphysically necessary. - Since the universe is contingent, its explanation...per (P1)...must be either: • In the necessity of its own nature, or • In an external cause. - If the universe’s explanation is in an external cause, that cause itself cannot be contingent in the same way, or we simply push the question back. - Ultimately we must arrive at a being that exists by a necessity of its own nature: a necessarily existing, uncaused reality. (5) The only plausible candidate is something like a mind, a personal being. - Abstract objects, if they exist, are necessary and immaterial, but causally inert; they cannot bring a universe into existence. - A necessarily existing, immaterial, timeless, powerful cause capable of producing a contingent universe is best understood as a personal, rational agent. This is what classical theism means by “God”: a necessary, eternal, immaterial, personal Creator of all contingent reality.

(P4) The universe exists (and is not nothing). (1) The existence of the universe is a datum of experience. - We are directly aware of ourselves and the world around us. - Denying the universe’s existence is self-defeating; it uses the very existence of a thinker and thoughts to doubt that there is anything. (2) The question is not whether the universe exists, but why it exists. - The argument grants the obvious: the universe is real. - It asks a deeper, metaphysical question: what explains the existence of this contingent reality rather than nothing? Therefore, we have a contingent universe that clearly exists and calls for an explanation.

(C) Therefore, the best explanation for the existence of the contingent universe is a necessarily existing, eternal, immaterial, non-physical, extremely powerful, personal being...God.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Ariew and Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Reasonablefaith.org. “Leibniz’s Cosmological Argument and the PSR.” https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/leibnizs-cosmological-argument-and-the-psr Alexander Pruss, "The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument," in Craig and Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell, 2009), ch. 2. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008.
+ Maybe the universe is just a brute fact. It exists with no explanation, and that’s the end of the story.
1. Brute-fact stopping points are arbitrary. Saying “that’s just the way it is” about the universe abandons the demand for explanation at the very point where the question is most natural and important. 2. We would not accept this move for smaller cases. If we found a large, shiny sphere in the woods, we would not be satisfied with “it just exists without explanation.” Increasing the size of the sphere to encompass the entire universe does not change that explanatory demand. 3. Theism offers a deeper, non-arbitrary stopping point. On theism, explanation terminates, not in a contingent physical reality, but in a necessary being whose nature explains His existence. - Necessary being: exists by its very nature, cannot fail to exist. - Contingent universe: could have failed to exist, and so cries out for explanation. 4. Science and rational inquiry assume that things have explanations. The success of science and ordinary reasoning is built on the expectation that things have causes, reasons, or grounds. Declaring the universe an unexplained brute fact cuts against the grain of this entire enterprise. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument – Scientific and Philosophical Support
+ If everything that exists needs an explanation, then God needs an explanation too. If God doesn’t, why does the universe?
1. The principle is not “everything has an explanation in a prior cause.” Leibniz’s premise is more nuanced: - Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either • in the necessity of its own nature, or • in an external cause. God, if He exists, is proposed as a necessary being, not as a contingent being that needs a prior cause. 2. The universe is contingent; God is not. The argument gives reasons to think: - The universe does not exist by a necessity of its own nature; it could have failed to exist. - Therefore, its explanation must lie in something outside itself. - By contrast, God is conceived as a being whose non-existence is impossible (a necessary being). 3. Necessary beings explain themselves by their own nature. If a necessary being exists, it does not need an external cause; its explanation is that it cannot not exist. That is a different kind of explanation than the kind we seek for contingent things. 4. Every worldview has a terminus of explanation. - The naturalist often stops with a brute, unexplained universe (contingent physical reality). - The theist stops with an uncaused, necessary being whose nature explains His existence. The question is which stopping point is more reasonable. The contingency argument claims that a necessary, self-explaining being is a deeper, less arbitrary terminus than a contingent brute physical universe. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument – Scientific and Philosophical Support
+ The claim that ‘everything has an explanation’ is just the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which many philosophers reject as too strong or even false.
1. The version used here is modest and carefully qualified. The argument does not claim that every truth or every fact has a deterministic explanation. It focuses on existence claims: - Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. 2. The principle fits ordinary and scientific reasoning. We naturally and scientifically assume that: - Objects and events do not pop into existence without any reason. - There are underlying grounds for why reality is the way it is, rather than some other way or nothing at all. 3. Rejecting the principle here is often ad hoc. Many who appeal to “brute facts” still rely on explanatory principles everywhere else (science, history, daily life), but carve out an exception at the level of the universe to avoid a theistic conclusion. 4. The theist’s use of the principle is self-consistent. The principle leads us from contingent things to a necessary being whose existence is explained by His own nature. This is not a bare assertion, but a worked-out metaphysical framework that explains why there is a world at all.
+ Perhaps the universe itself is a necessary being. Then it wouldn’t need an external explanation.
1. A necessary being could not have failed to exist or been different in any fundamental respect. If the universe is necessary in the strong metaphysical sense, then: - It would be impossible for there to be no physical reality. - It would be impossible for the laws, constants, or basic structure of the universe to be otherwise. 2. But the universe looks deeply contingent. - We can coherently conceive of no physical universe at all. - We can conceive of different laws of nature, different constants, different initial conditions. - Modern physics models a range of possible cosmologies and parameter values, suggesting that the actual universe is one among many possible configurations. 3. Scientific evidence of a beginning reinforces contingency. If the universe began to exist a finite time ago, with very specific initial conditions, that beginning looks more like a contingent fact than a necessary truth. 4. “The universe is necessary” often functions as a bare assertion. Usually no positive argument is given for the universe’s metaphysical necessity; it is simply asserted to avoid a transcendent cause. By contrast, the contingency argument offers reasons to regard the universe as non-necessary. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument – Scientific and Philosophical Support • Natural Theology: Cosmic Fine-Tuning
+ If necessary, immaterial beings exist, such as numbers or sets, maybe one of those – or something like them – explains the universe, not God.
1. Abstract objects are causally inert on standard views. On the usual Platonist picture: - Numbers, sets, and other abstracta do not stand in causal relations. - They do not produce events or bring things into existence. - They simply exist (if they exist at all). 2. The universe’s explanation must be a causal explanation. We are asking: - Why does a contingent physical universe exist rather than nothing? - This calls for a cause or ground that can bring about or sustain the existence of the universe. 3. A personal, necessary mind can be causally active. A necessarily existing, immaterial mind is: - Metaphysically necessary (explaining its own existence), - Capable of intentional, causal activity (explaining the coming-to-be of contingent reality). 4. Theism gives a unified explanation. The theistic God is: - Necessary, eternal, immaterial, non-physical, and transcendent, - Yet also personal, rational, and causally powerful. This makes God an excellent candidate for the explanatory role that abstract objects are structurally unfit to play. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument – Scientific and Philosophical Support • Natural Theology: Moral Argument

Teleological

Arguments from Design

Cosmic Fine-Tuning

(P1) The fundamental constants and quantities of the universe are finely tuned for the existence of physical, interactive life. Fine-tuning describes the extreme sensitivity of life-permitting conditions to the numerical values of basic physical constants and initial conditions. (1) Fundamental constants and quantities. - Examples include: • The gravitational constant (G). • The cosmological constant (Λ) governing the expansion rate of the universe. • The ratio of the strengths of fundamental forces. • The distribution of mass and energy in the early universe. - These values are not determined by the known laws of nature; they are inputs to those laws. (2) Incredibly narrow life-permitting ranges. - If G differed by about 1 part in 10^60, no stars or planets could form; the universe would either disperse too rapidly or collapse into a single mass. - If Λ differed by about 1 part in 10^120, the universe would expand too quickly or too slowly for galaxies and chemistry to form. - If the initial distribution of mass–energy in the early universe were not even to about 1 part in 10^(10^123), the universe would be hostile to life of any kind. (3) These are razor-thin intervals in a vast space of possible values. - Imagine a dial for each parameter, divided into an enormous number of possible settings. - The life-permitting settings occupy an unimaginably tiny region compared to the total range of possibilities. - Shifting any of several constants or initial conditions by a “hair’s breadth” (in relative terms) leads to a life-prohibiting universe. (4) The fine-tuning is general and systematic. - It is not a single lucky coincidence; many independent constants and quantities must be simultaneously set within narrow life-permitting windows. - Physicists of diverse worldviews (theistic and non-theistic) acknowledge the reality and striking character of this fine-tuning. Therefore, our universe exhibits highly precise, multi-parameter fine-tuning for the possibility of physical, interactive life.

(P2) The fine-tuning of the universe is not plausibly due to physical necessity. (1) The laws of nature do not fix the relevant values. - Current fundamental theories treat constants (like G, Λ, particle masses, coupling constants) as free parameters. - The equations describe how things behave given certain values; they do not dictate that those values must be what they are. (2) Life-prohibiting universes appear completely possible physically and mathematically. - The same equations allow a vast range of values for these parameters; most such values yield universes without stable stars, chemistry, or complex structures. - Nothing in our best physics implies that only life-permitting universes are possible. (3) No independent argument shows that a life-permitting universe is necessary. - To claim “the universe had to be life-permitting” requires strong evidence that alternative values are impossible. - Instead, the scientific consensus is that different values are entirely compatible with the basic framework of our theories. (4) Appeals to an unknown future “theory of everything” are speculative. - It is conjectural to suppose that some future theory will uniquely fix all constants in a life-permitting way. - Even if such a theory existed, one could still ask: • Why that theory, with that structure and those constraints, rather than some other? • Why a theory that yields a life-permitting universe instead of countless life-prohibiting ones? Therefore, it is highly implausible that the fine-tuning of the universe is explained by physical necessity alone.

(P3) The fine-tuning of the universe is not plausibly due to chance, even given multiverse proposals. (1) The probabilities against fine-tuning by blind chance are astronomically small. - The life-permitting intervals for key constants and initial conditions are tiny compared to the range of possible values. - When many independent parameters must simultaneously fall into their narrow windows, the joint probability under “blind chance” becomes vanishingly small. (2) A single-universe chance hypothesis makes fine-tuning wildly surprising. - On a single-universe picture with no further structure, it is far more likely that the constants and initial conditions would fall into a life-prohibiting range. - The fact that we observe a richly life-permitting universe is thus highly unexpected under pure chance. (3) Multiverse proposals are highly speculative and face serious challenges. - There is currently no direct empirical evidence for a vast ensemble of other universes. - Most multiverse models rely on a “universe generator” with its own deep laws and conditions, which itself would appear to require fine-tuning. - Simply pushing fine-tuning back one level (to the generator or meta-laws) does not remove the need for explanation. (4) The “Boltzmann brain” problem undermines many multiverse accounts. - In a sufficiently large multiverse, small local fluctuations of order (e.g., a single self-aware “brain” surrounded by chaos) are vastly more probable than a whole, large, orderly, life-permitting universe like ours. - If our existence were a random sample from a multiverse, we should expect to find ourselves as isolated minimal observers in a small patch of order, not as embodied beings in a vast, stable, lawful cosmos with billions of other observers. (5) Chance plus selection effect (anthropic reasoning) is not enough. - The anthropic principle (“we can only observe a universe compatible with our existence”) is true but trivial if left by itself. - It tells us that observers will only find themselves in life-permitting universes; it does not explain why there is a finely tuned, life-permitting universe (or multiverse) at all, rather than only life-prohibiting reality. Therefore, whether in a single-universe or multiverse setting, blind chance does not provide a satisfying or plausible explanation of cosmic fine-tuning.

(P4) If a complex, highly improbable feature of the universe is not due to physical necessity or chance, then the best explanation is intelligent design. (1) Inference to the best explanation is a standard form of reasoning. - In science and everyday life, we often infer intelligent agency when we encounter: • High improbability under chance, • Combined with an independently recognizable pattern or function. - Examples: information in a message, complex machines, finely calibrated systems for specific goals. (2) Fine-tuning has the right structure for a design inference. - It is incredibly improbable on blind chance or unknown necessity. - It is precisely the sort of arrangement one would expect if a powerful, intelligent agent intended a universe capable of supporting life. (3) Design has strong explanatory power and scope. - A designing mind can directly choose and set the values of constants and initial conditions to achieve a life-permitting universe. - This single hypothesis accounts for a broad range of fine-tuning facts more naturally and simply than competing explanations. (4) A designing intelligence behind the universe must be transcendent. - The designer would have to stand beyond the physical universe (since the universe’s basic parameters themselves are what are being explained). - Thus the fine-tuning argument points to a powerful, intelligent, non-physical cause of the universe’s basic structure. Therefore, given the data of fine-tuning and the failure of necessity and chance, the best explanation is that the universe’s life-permitting structure is due to intelligent design.

(C) Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe for life is best explained by a transcendent, intelligent Designer...an extremely powerful, non-physical mind, which is what classical theism calls God.

William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008. Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why Is the Universe Just Right for Life? New York: Mariner Books, 2008. Martin Rees, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
+ We shouldn’t be surprised the universe is life-permitting; if it weren’t, we wouldn’t be here to notice it. So fine-tuning needs no further explanation.
1. The anthropic principle describes a selection effect; it does not explain the underlying fine-tuning. It is true that observers can only exist in life-permitting regions of reality. But that only explains why any observers we find will be in such regions, not why such finely tuned regions exist at all. 2. An analogy: the firing squad. If someone survives being shot at by 100 expert marksmen at close range, it is trivially true that “if they hadn’t missed, you wouldn’t be here to notice.” But that does not remove the need for an explanation of why they all missed. - In the same way, “otherwise we wouldn’t be here” does not remove the need to explain the extraordinary fact that the universe’s parameters all fall in narrow, life-permitting ranges. 3. The surprising thing is not that we observe a life-permitting universe, but that a life-permitting universe exists at all. Given the enormous number of life-prohibiting possibilities, a life-permitting universe is highly unexpected on chance and far less surprising on design. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument
+ We don’t yet know the final laws of physics. A future theory of everything might show that the constants and quantities had to have these life-permitting values.
1. This is speculative and currently unsupported by evidence. There is, at present, no specific, well-confirmed theory that uniquely yields the observed constants and initial conditions as the only physical possibility. 2. Many candidate theories allow a landscape of possibilities. Proposed unification frameworks (such as certain versions of string theory) often allow a large “landscape” of possible low-level constants and vacuum states, not a single inevitable set. 3. Even a theory that fixes the constants would raise a deeper question. If some final theory forced life-permitting values, one could still ask: - Why that theory, with that mathematical structure and constraints, rather than some other? - Why a theory that logically entails a life-permitting universe, rather than one that entails a sterile universe? 4. Appeals to unknown future physics can be made for almost anything. Saying “future science will explain this without design” is not an explanation; it is a promissory note. We should reason from the evidence we have, not from speculative hopes that someday it might disappear. See also: • Natural Theology: Contingency Argument
+ If there are countless universes with different constants and quantities, it’s not surprising that at least one is life-permitting. We just happen to live in that one.
1. There is no direct empirical evidence for a vast multiverse. Many multiverse scenarios are speculative extrapolations from existing theories; they are not directly observed, detected, or measured. 2. The multiverse-generating mechanism itself seems to require fine-tuning. Whatever physics underwrites the production of multiple universes (inflation, landscape, etc.): - Must have exactly the right structure and parameter ranges to produce life-permitting universes at all. - Thus, the problem of fine-tuning is pushed back one level, not removed. 3. The Boltzmann brain problem undercuts the explanatory power of many multiverse models. In large multiverses, small local pockets of order (like fleeting, disembodied observers “Boltzmann brains”) are far more probable than full-scale, stable, galaxy-filled universes. - If we are a random sample of observers from the multiverse, we should expect to be isolated, minimal observers in a small patch of order. - But we observe a vast, stable, highly ordered universe with many other observers...exactly what is least expected on many multiverse models. 4. Design may also naturally give rise to a multiverse. Even if a multiverse exists, it might itself be the product of a higher-level Designer who intends that some universes be life-permitting. The multiverse hypothesis does not exclude design; it can simply become part of a design plan. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument • Natural Theology: Contingency Argument
+ We shouldn’t assume that life has to be like us. Perhaps some radically different form of life could exist even if the constants and quantities were very different.
1. Fine-tuning is about physical, interactive life of any kind, not just human or carbon-based life. The argument focuses on the conditions for: - Stable, long-lived energy sources (like stars). - Complex chemistry and information-bearing structures. - Non-trivial interactions over time in a stable environment. 2. Many constant changes eliminate structure and complexity altogether. Altering key constants often yields: - Universes with no stable atoms. - Universes that expand or collapse so rapidly that no galaxies or chemistry can form. - Universes with only trivial particles and no complex structures at all. In such worlds, not just “our kind” of life, but any physical, interactive life appears impossible. 3. The fine-tuning literature already accounts for a wide space of possibilities. Physicists and philosophers exploring fine-tuning do not simply assume only one life-form; they examine structural conditions for complexity and information processing broadly. - The conclusion remains: most parameter settings produce universes without the basic ingredients needed for any kind of life we can meaningfully conceive.
+ Appealing to a Designer is not scientific. Science looks for natural explanations, so the fine-tuning argument illegitimately invokes a supernatural cause.
1. The fine-tuning argument is a philosophical inference using scientific data. The argument: - Takes fine-tuning as given by physics and cosmology. - Asks what best explains that fact at a metaphysical level. It is a work of natural theology, not a lab experiment, and so it is not constrained by methodological naturalism in the same way as physics lab work. 2. Science itself often infers unobservable causes. Scientific reasoning routinely posits: - Entities and processes not directly observed (e.g., quarks, early universe conditions, other regions of spacetime). - What matters is explanatory power, coherence, and fit with the data...not whether the cause is “natural” in a narrow sense. 3. Design hypotheses can have testable implications. A design hypothesis may: - Lead us to expect certain global features (like overall simplicity of laws, intelligibility, or fine-tuning) that non-design hypotheses do not predict as strongly. - Be supported in a cumulative case with other lines of evidence (moral, historical, existential). 4. Methodological limits of science do not imply metaphysical limits on reality. Even if scientific practice restricts itself to natural causes for pragmatic reasons, it does not follow that reality itself contains no non-physical causes or that we cannot infer them philosophically. See also: • Natural Theology: Kalam Cosmological Argument • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument

Applicability of Mathematics

(P1) If God does not exist, the applicability of mathematics to the physical world is just a happy coincidence. On naturalism, mathematical entities (numbers, sets, functions, equations) are non-physical and causally inert. They cannot cause anything in the physical world. So if there is no divine mind ordering reality, the fact that the physical universe behaves in precise accordance with abstract mathematics is, at best, an unexplained coincidence.

(P2) The applicability of mathematics to the physical world is not just a happy coincidence. Mathematics does not merely organize data after the fact; it successfully predicts new phenomena (e.g., planets, radio waves, the Higgs boson) using highly abstract structures (imaginary numbers, higher-dimensional spaces, etc.). As Eugene Wigner put it, the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” is so striking that he called it a “miracle which we neither understand nor deserve.”

(C1) Therefore, God exists.

Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences,” Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13 (1960): 1–14. William Lane Craig, “God and the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics,” ReasonableFaith.org. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/god-and-the-unreasonable-effectiveness-of-mathematics/
+ It is not surprising that mathematics applies. The physical world just happens to have a mathematical structure, so of course mathematics describes it. No God needed.
1. This assumes, rather than explains, the mathematical structure of the world. - Saying “the world just has a mathematical structure” simply restates the phenomenon to be explained. It does not tell us why the universe, down to its fundamental laws, is so deeply and elegantly structured in a way that can be captured by human mathematics. 2. Much of the mathematics used in physics goes beyond what is physically realizable. - Modern physics relies on highly abstract mathematics such as imaginary numbers, complex-valued wave functions, and infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Physical reality cannot literally have the structure described by many of these mathematical objects, yet they are indispensable for accurately describing and predicting physical phenomena. 3. The depth and elegance of the fit still cries out for an explanation. - Not only is the world describable mathematically; it is describable by remarkably simple, elegant equations (e.g., Maxwell’s equations, Einstein’s field equations). On theism, this is expected: a rational God chooses to create an ordered universe according to a rational, mathematical plan. On bare naturalism, this striking fit remains a brute, unexplained fact.
+ Mathematics is a human invention or useful fiction. We created mathematical systems that fit the world, so it is no surprise they “work.”
1. Our best scientific practice treats mathematics as discovered, not merely invented. - Scientists routinely speak as if they are discovering mathematical structures already “out there,” not arbitrarily making them up. For example, Einstein used mathematical theories developed decades earlier and found that they unexpectedly described the structure of space-time. That looks more like discovery than free invention. 2. Abstract mathematics often proves effective in ways no one anticipated. - Many mathematical theories were developed with no application in mind (e.g., non-Euclidean geometry, group theory, complex analysis). Yet later they turned out to be essential for physics (relativity, particle physics, quantum theory). This surprising, long-delayed applicability is hard to explain if math is just a convenient human fiction tailored to fit the data. 3. Fictional entities do not usually make precise, novel predictions. - Pure inventions or fictions do not typically yield highly precise, testable predictions about the physical world, like the existence and location of a new planet or particle (e.g., Neptune, the Higgs boson). The uncanny success of abstract mathematics in predicting new physical realities is much more naturally explained if there is a deep, mind-based harmony between the mathematical order in God’s mind and the created world.
+ We can explain applicability through mathematical Platonism. Mathematical objects exist in an abstract realm, and the physical world simply instantiates that structure. No need to bring God into it.
1. Platonism still leaves the key connection unexplained. - On Platonism, mathematical entities (numbers, sets, functions) exist in a timeless, non-physical realm. But why should a contingent, physical universe line up so precisely with that realm? Why should the laws of nature mirror specific parts of the Platonic realm rather than countless others? Platonism affirms the existence of mathematics; it does not by itself explain its tight fit with the physical world. 2. Platonism cannot explain why we can know and use this abstract realm. - If mathematical objects exist in a separate, non-empirical realm, why should finite, embodied creatures like us have reliable access to that realm and be able to apply it so effectively to physical reality? On theism, both our minds and the mathematical order of the universe come from the same divine mind, which naturally explains the match. 3. Theism unifies what Platonism leaves disconnected. - Theism can affirm the reality and necessity of mathematical truths (as ideas in the mind of God) while also explaining why the physical universe is structured according to them: God freely chooses to create a world that reflects His rational nature. Thus, the applicability of mathematics is not a cosmic coincidence, but the outworking of a single, personal source.
+ Even if the argument works, it does not prove that the designer is the God of the Bible.
This is correct, and it is not what the argument is intended to do. The applicability-of-mathematics argument is part of natural theology: it aims to show that there is a rational, transcendent mind behind the mathematical order of the universe, not to establish every detail of Christian doctrine. Still, if the argument is sound, it has important implications: - It rules out strict atheism and naturalism, according to which the deep harmony between abstract mathematics, the human mind, and the physical world is ultimately groundless and accidental. - It fits naturally with the biblical picture of a God who creates “by wisdom” and orders the cosmos in a way that can be understood (at least in part) by creatures made in His image.

Moral & Rational

Arguments from Morality & Reason

The Moral Argument

(P1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. (1) “Objective” moral values and duties. - A moral value is objective if it is true or false independently of what any individual or culture thinks. - A duty is objective if we are really obligated to do (or not do) something, whether we feel like it or not. - Example: “Torturing children for fun is wrong” is taken to be objectively wrong for everyone, everywhere, whether or not anyone believes it. (2) Without God, there is no adequate foundation for objective moral values. - On atheism, reality at bottom is just matter, energy, and blind physical processes. - There is no personal, moral standard “above” human beings; there is only: • What helps survival or reproduction, • What individuals or societies happen to approve or disapprove of. - In such a world, judgments like “kindness is good” or “racism is evil” cannot be grounded in anything beyond human opinion or feeling. (3) Without God, there is no adequate foundation for objective moral duties. - Duties are owed to persons; moral obligations are like commands or requirements placed on us. - If there is no divine Lawgiver, then: • Who or what imposes moral obligations on us? • Why are we really bound to act in one way rather than another? - On a naturalistic view where humans are highly evolved animals, our behaviors are more like instinctive patterns, not morally required or forbidden actions. (4) A God-centered account offers a natural foundation. - God’s unchanging, perfectly good nature provides an objective standard of moral value. - God’s commands, flowing from His nature (e.g., “love your neighbor as yourself”), ground moral duties: what we truly ought to do. Therefore, if there is no God...no transcendent, perfectly good personal Lawgiver...then there is no solid basis for objective moral values or duties; morality collapses into subjectivity or convention.

(P2) Objective moral values and duties do exist; some things are really good or evil, right or wrong, independent of human opinion. (1) Our moral experience presents moral facts as objective. - We experience certain actions (e.g., child abuse, genocide, racism, terrorism) as truly wrong, not merely “unpopular” or “personally distasteful.” - Likewise, we recognize virtues like generosity, self-sacrifice, and fairness as truly good, not just personally or culturally preferred. (2) To deny objective morality is extremely counterintuitive. - Saying “there is nothing really wrong with torturing infants for fun” or “rape and racial genocide are not objectively evil” conflicts with our deepest moral intuitions. - The person who claims “morality is just preference” still protests, “That’s not fair! That’s unjust!”...implicitly affirming objective moral standards. (3) Moral realism is analogous to realism about the external world. - Just as our sense experience gives us strong prima facie grounds to believe in a physical world, our moral experience gives us strong grounds to believe in objective moral norms. - To treat all moral experience as completely illusory requires powerful defeaters, which are lacking. (4) Widespread moral disagreement does not overturn objectivity. - People disagree about many things (science, history, politics), but we do not infer that there is no objective truth in those domains. - Disagreement often concerns facts, application, or background beliefs, not whether there is any objective right answer at all. Therefore, it is far more reasonable to affirm than to deny that some moral values and duties are objectively real and binding.

(C) Therefore, God exists: the reality of objective moral values and duties points to a transcendent, perfectly good Lawgiver and moral standard.

William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity. New York: HarperOne, 2001.
+ People who don’t believe in God can still be good, kind, and moral. So God isn’t needed for morality.
1. The argument is about the foundation of morality, not about belief in God. The moral argument does not say: - “You can’t behave morally unless you believe in God,” but rather: - “If God does not exist, there is no adequate basis for objective moral values and duties.” 2. Atheists and theists alike can recognize and follow the moral law. - On the Christian view, God has written the moral law on human hearts (Romans 2:14–15). - So non-believers can: • Know moral truths, • Act morally (often admirably so), even if they reject God’s existence. 3. The question is: what best explains the existence and authority of the moral law? - The theist says: God’s morally perfect nature and commands. - The atheist has no comparable grounding: morality on naturalism tends to reduce to: • Evolutionary advantage, • Social convention, • Personal or cultural preference. 4. “Can be good without believing in God” is consistent with, and even expected on, the moral argument. - The claim “you can be good without believing in God” is therefore a misunderstanding; the real issue is whether objective good and evil can exist without God.
+ Euthyphro Dilemma: If things are good just because God wills them, morality is arbitrary. If God wills them because they’re already good, then goodness is independent of God. Either way, God isn’t the ground of morality.
1. The moral argument proposes a third option. The Christian view (following Craig and others) is: - Moral values are grounded in God’s nature, not in arbitrary divine commands or in a standard external to God. 2. God’s nature is the standard of goodness. - God is essentially loving, just, kind, holy. - These are not arbitrary traits God could have lacked; they belong to His very being. - Moral values reflect aspects of God’s nature; moral duties arise from God’s commands, which express that nature. 3. God’s commands are neither arbitrary nor independent of Him. - God does not simply declare cruelty “good” on a whim; such a command would contradict His own essentially loving character. - Nor does He consult a moral standard outside Himself; rather, His good nature is the standard. 4. Analogy: a live performance and a recording. - As Craig notes, a live musical performance is the standard by which recordings are judged. - The better a recording matches the original, the higher its fidelity. - Similarly, human moral actions are good insofar as they reflect and align with God’s moral character. Thus the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma; the moral argument grounds goodness in God’s necessary nature, avoiding arbitrariness and independence alike.
+ Our moral beliefs and behaviors are products of evolution and social conditioning. We don’t need God to explain morality.
1. Evolutionary and social accounts are about moral psychology, not moral ontology. - They may explain how we come to hold certain moral beliefs (causal history), - But they do not tell us whether those beliefs are true or what makes them true. 2. On naturalism, evolution selects for survival, not for moral truth. - Traits and beliefs that aid survival and reproduction are favored, regardless of their truth. - This undercuts confidence that our moral beliefs track objective moral facts, if such facts exist. 3. Explaining the origin of a belief does not invalidate its truth. - There may be an evolutionary story behind our belief that pain is bad, but that does not show that pain is not really bad. - Likewise, a theist can happily affirm that God used evolutionary and social processes as instruments to bring about our knowledge of moral truths. 4. A theistic framework can accommodate these insights. - God can design humans so that: • Our evolved moral intuitions align (imperfectly but significantly) with objective moral values, • Our social practices reinforce genuine moral norms. Thus, evolution and social conditioning may describe mechanisms, but they do not provide a deep metaphysical foundation for the truth and authority of morality without God. See also: • Natural Theology: Cosmic Fine-Tuning
+ Maybe objective moral truths just exist as brute facts, without God. We can have objective morality on atheism via moral realism.
1. Atheistic moral realism posits “oughts” that just float in the universe with no lawgiver. On this view: - There really are objective moral facts (e.g., “You ought not torture children”), - But they are not grounded in any mind, person, authority, or will. They simply exist as brute, impersonal features of reality, and yet somehow bind us. 2. This makes moral obligations strangely “queer” and metaphysically puzzling. To use J. L. Mackie’s term, such moral facts are “queer”: - They are unlike anything else we know in a naturalistic universe. - They are: • Non-physical, • Non-empirical, • Yet supposed to have built-in “ought-to-be-doneness” attached to them. Concrete example: - On atheistic moral realism, it is just a brute, unexplained fact of the universe that: • “Cruelty for its own sake is wrong,” • “You are obligated to love your neighbor,” - These truths “hover” over us and somehow impose obligations, even though there is: • No commander, • No legislator, • No one who has the right to demand our obedience. 3. Duties without a personal source are especially odd. Obligations normally arise in a personal context: - A teacher assigns homework. - A government enacts laws. - A parent commands a child. In each case: - A person (or personal authority) stands behind the duty. But on atheistic moral realism: - “Do not rape” is an objective duty that no person invented or commanded. - It is not anyone’s will; it is just a free-floating obligation built into the fabric of the universe. This is like saying: - “The number 7 requires you not to rape,” - Or, “The moral property of Wrongness itself demands your obedience,” which is metaphysically bizarre. 4. The view treats moral rules like un-caused Platonic traffic laws. Imagine: - There are traffic laws that actually bind you, - But there is no legislature, no governor, no police, no community that enacted them. They are just written into reality, demanding obedience, even though: - No one authored them, - No one has any authority to impose them. Atheistic moral realism says our deepest moral obligations are like that. 5. It creates an explanatory gap: why should these impersonal facts have authority over us? On atheism: - You are a highly evolved animal, a collection of particles. - Somewhere “out there” are non-physical normative facts (e.g., “Kindness is good,” “You ought to be just”). Why do those abstract, impersonal facts have legitimate authority over: - Your will, - Your choices, - Your life plans? There is no answer beyond “they just do,” which looks uncomfortably like superstition in reverse: - Instead of a personal Lawgiver, we have magical, impersonal “oughts” that command without a commander. 6. Theism gives a much more natural home for objective morality. On theism: - Moral values are grounded in God’s necessarily good character. - Moral duties are grounded in God’s authoritative commands. Thus: - “Do not rape” is not a random, free-floating fact, - It is the will of a perfectly good, personal Creator who has rightful authority over us as our Maker. This: - Preserves moral objectivity, - Avoids bizarre, causally inert “oughts” floating in a godless universe, - And explains why moral facts have genuine authority. Summary: Atheistic moral realism is logically possible, but it comes at the cost of positing highly unusual, unexplained, impersonal “oughts” that somehow bind us. By contrast, grounding morality in a necessarily good, personal God is far less ad hoc and fits our moral experience...of law, authority, guilt, and praise...much more naturally.
+ Religious people have done terrible things, and some religious texts contain troubling commands. Doesn’t this undermine the claim that God grounds morality?
1. Misuse of religion is consistent with an objective moral standard. - The fact that people commit atrocities in the name of God does not show that there is no God or no objective morality. - If anything, we judge such acts as truly wrong, which presupposes a moral standard by which to condemn them. 2. The moral argument is about God’s nature, not about every religious tradition or interpretation. - The core claim: if a perfectly good God exists, His nature is the standard of moral value. - Human religious beliefs and practices can: • Distort or misinterpret that standard, • Fall short of it, • Or even contradict it. 3. Critiquing immoral religious behavior often assumes objective moral standards. - When someone says, “Those religious wars were evil” or “that religious practice is unjust,” they are appealing to objective moral norms. - The question then becomes: which worldview best explains the existence of such norms? 4. Difficult texts and historical misdeeds invite careful theological and ethical analysis, not denial of all moral grounding in God. - Christian philosophers and theologians offer detailed treatments of: • Problematic Old Testament passages, • Historical abuses done in Christ’s name. - These complex issues, while serious, do not refute the basic moral argument’s claim that objective morality points to God. See also: • CO / Problematic Biblical Verses

Free-Thinking Argument

(P1) If robust naturalism is true, then God or things like God do not exist. Robust naturalism is the view that only physical things exist...no God, no immaterial souls, no abstract minds. Reality is exhausted by space-time, matter/energy, and the laws of nature.

(P2) If God or things like God do not exist, then humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense. On a purely naturalistic picture, all human thoughts are the result of prior physical causes (e.g., brain chemistry, genetics, environment). This yields at best determinism (or indeterministic randomness), not genuine libertarian freedom to choose between alternatives in our thinking.

(P3) If humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense, then humanity is never epistemically responsible. To be epistemically responsible...to be genuinely praiseworthy or blameworthy for what we believe...we must have some control over our thinking: we must be able to assess reasons, weigh evidence, and choose between competing beliefs. If our beliefs are entirely fixed by non-rational, prior physical causes, we are not truly responsible for holding them.

(P4) Humanity is occasionally epistemically responsible. In ordinary life we routinely treat people (including ourselves) as genuinely responsible for at least some of their beliefs...e.g., for ignoring evidence, being intellectually dishonest, or carefully weighing arguments. Our practices of rational praise and blame presuppose that people sometimes can freely choose how to respond to reasons.

(C1) Therefore, humanity freely thinks in the libertarian sense. (from P3 and P4, modus tollens)

(C2) Therefore, God or things like God exist. (from P1 and P2 and C1)

(C3) Therefore, robust naturalism is false. (from P1 and C2, modus tollens)

(P5) The biblical account of reality is one possible explanation for the existence of God, things like God, and the libertarian freedom of humanity.

(P6) If the biblical account provides a better explanation of these facts than alternative accounts, then it is reasonable to accept it as the best explanation.

(C4) Therefore, if the biblical account provides the best explanation, it is reasonable to accept it. (from P5 and P6, abduction to the best explanation)

Stratton, Timothy A., and J. P. Moreland. “An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument.” Religions 13, no. 10 (2022): 988. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13100988
+ We don’t need libertarian free will for rational responsibility; compatibilist freedom under natural laws is enough.
1. Compatibilism redefines freedom in a weaker sense. - On compatibilism, you are “free” as long as you act according to your strongest desires, even if those desires are fully determined by prior causes. But this is not the robust, “could have done otherwise” freedom the argument is about. Libertarian freedom says that, given exactly the same past and laws of nature, you still genuinely could have chosen a different belief or response to reasons. 2. If all your beliefs are fully determined by non-rational causes, rational control is an illusion. - If naturalism is true and every belief you hold is the unavoidable result of prior physical states, then you never truly choose beliefs because of what you judge to be the best reasons. You only feel like you are reasoning freely, while in reality your mental life is fixed by factors beyond your control. 3. Epistemic praise and blame presuppose libertarian-like control. - We hold people epistemically responsible when we think they could have investigated more carefully, examined their biases, or changed their mind in light of evidence. This fits libertarian freedom naturally, but undercuts itself on a strictly deterministic, compatibilist naturalism.
+ Neuroscience shows our thoughts are just brain events. There’s no immaterial soul or libertarian freedom needed.
1. Correlation is not identity. - The fact that certain brain states correlate with certain thoughts does not show that thoughts are nothing but brain states. It only shows a close connection between mind and brain...a connection perfectly compatible with a soul or immaterial aspect of the person working through the brain. 2. Physical descriptions leave out the normative, rational aspect of thought. - Brain science can describe spikes, voltages, and chemical releases, but it does not capture the aboutness and rightness/wrongness of beliefs (e.g., “2+2=4 is true,” “torturing innocents is wrong”). These are normative, semantic features that go beyond mere physics. 3. If our thoughts are fully determined by non-rational physical causes, their reliability is undermined. - On strict physicalism, your belief in physicalism itself is produced by the same blind processes as any other belief. That undercuts your confidence that the belief is true rather than just a useful byproduct of survival. A theistic view with libertarian freedom allows that we can genuinely align our beliefs with reasons and truth, not just neurochemistry.
+ Even if our thinking is caused by the brain, we can still talk about epistemic responsibility in terms of social practices and internal coherence.
1. Redefining responsibility in pragmatic terms dodges the core issue. - Saying “we call people responsible when they respond in certain ways” only describes our social practice; it doesn’t show that people really could have done otherwise in their thinking. The argument is about genuine responsibility, not just useful labels. 2. Without libertarian control, ‘ought’ collapses into ‘is’. - If every belief you form is completely fixed by prior physical conditions, then strictly speaking you never ought to have believed differently...because you could not have. Terms like “should have checked the evidence” lose their literal meaning and become mere expressions of preference or social disapproval. 3. Naturalism’s own defense presupposes the kind of responsibility it denies. - When a naturalist argues for naturalism and against theism, they expect you to weigh reasons and choose the better view. But if their worldview is true and no one ever has libertarian control over beliefs, then even their own belief in naturalism is just the inevitable outcome of physical processes, not a rationally chosen conclusion.
+ Even if the argument shows robust naturalism is false, it doesn’t prove that Christianity...or the biblical God...is true.
This is correct, and it is not what the argument is designed to do. The Free-Thinking Argument aims to show: - That libertarian free thought exists. - That this is incompatible with robust naturalism. - That therefore some kind of God or God-like reality exists. It does not, by itself, identify which theistic worldview is true. However, it does have important implications: - It undermines strict naturalism as a complete account of reality. - It opens the door to worldviews that include an immaterial, rational source of our freedom and reason. From there, further arguments and evidence (historical, moral, cosmological, biblical) can be brought in to compare different theistic options. The biblical account is one such candidate, and if it offers the best overall explanation of: - God’s existence, - the existence of souls or immaterial minds, - and genuine libertarian freedom, then, as P5–P6 state, it is reasonable to accept it as the best explanation.

Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN)

(P1) If naturalism and unguided evolution are both true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable. On naturalism, humans are the result of unguided evolutionary processes aimed at survival and reproduction, not at producing true beliefs as such. Evolution selects for behavior that enhances fitness, whether or not the underlying beliefs are true.

(P2) If the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable, then we have a defeater for trusting the deliverances of those faculties. If you have good reason to doubt that your thinking is generally truth-tracking, then you also have good reason to doubt the beliefs produced by that thinking...including your belief in naturalism and evolution themselves.

(P3) If we have a defeater for trusting our cognitive faculties, then we have a defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including belief in naturalism and unguided evolution. Belief in naturalism and in the truth of evolutionary theory is itself formed by our cognitive faculties. So if those faculties are undercut, these beliefs are undercut as well.

(P4) Therefore, if naturalism and unguided evolution are both true, we have a defeater for believing that naturalism and unguided evolution are true. (from P1–P3)

(C1) Therefore, naturalism is self-defeating and cannot be rationally affirmed together with unguided evolution.

(P5) Theism offers a better explanation of the reliability of our cognitive faculties than naturalism with unguided evolution. On theism, a rational God creates humans in His image with cognitive faculties designed for truth, not merely for survival. This gives us a positive reason to trust our minds as generally reliable.

(C2) Therefore, the reliability of our cognitive faculties provides evidence in favor of theism over naturalism.

Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
+ Evolution selects for reliable cognitive faculties because having true beliefs usually helps an organism survive and reproduce.
1. Behavior, not belief content, is what evolution ‘sees’. - Natural selection operates on behavior and physiology, not directly on the truth of beliefs. What matters for survival is how an organism acts, not whether its inner representations of the world are true. 2. Many false-belief systems can still produce adaptive behavior. - Plantinga’s point is that there are countless possible combinations of false beliefs and desires that would yield the same survival-enhancing behavior. For example, a hominid who runs from tigers because he believes “I must always be moving fast to earn the sun god’s approval” will behave in a survival-promoting way, even though his beliefs are mostly false. 3. Evolution alone does not make high reliability probable. - Because adaptive behavior can be generated by many wildly false belief-desire pairs, we cannot simply assume that unguided evolution strongly favors truth over falsehood. At best, evolution might favor systems that are locally useful for survival in certain environments, not globally truth-tracking across abstract domains (metaphysics, mathematics, theology, long-range science, etc.).
+ Even if evolution doesn’t guarantee perfect reliability, it could still make it likely that our faculties are mostly reliable, and that’s enough.
1. The EAAN targets the probability of ‘sufficient reliability’ under naturalism. - Plantinga’s argument does not require our faculties to be perfect. It asks whether, given naturalism and unguided evolution, it is probable enough that our cognitive faculties are reliable in the sense needed for science, philosophy, and ordinary reasoning. 2. Under naturalism, this probability is hard to justify. - If evolution is blind to truth as such and only tracks fitness, then there is no strong reason to think that the resulting cognitive systems will be broadly reliable beyond the narrow tasks of staying alive and reproducing. Our sophisticated theoretical reasoning (about quantum physics, abstract logic, metaphysics, ethics, etc.) goes far beyond what is strictly needed for survival. 3. A low or inscrutable probability still generates a defeater. - If, given naturalism and evolution, you should regard the reliability of your cognitive faculties as low or at best inscrutable, then you have a reason to withhold trust from the deliverances of those faculties...including your belief that naturalism and evolution are true. That is enough for the argument’s self-defeat conclusion.
+ If evolution undercuts trust in our cognitive faculties, then theists who accept evolution are also undermining their own beliefs.
1. The key problem is the combination of naturalism with unguided evolution. - The EAAN specifically targets the conjunction: naturalism and unguided evolution. On theism, evolution can be understood as a tool that God uses providentially. In that case, our cognitive faculties can be both shaped by evolutionary processes and also aimed at truth by a rational Designer. 2. Theism provides a positive reason to expect reliability. - If God is good and rational, and He intends creatures to know Him and the world, then it is expected that He would create beings with cognitive faculties generally aimed at truth. Evolutionary mechanisms can be part of this design plan. 3. Naturalism lacks this truth-aiming intention. - On robust naturalism, there is no personal mind planning for truth-tracking faculties...only blind processes that care about survival outcomes. That is why the naturalist, not the theist, faces the special problem of an undercutting defeater for trusting reason.
+ At best the EAAN pushes us toward global skepticism, not toward God. Why think theism is the solution?
1. The EAAN is primarily an internal critique of naturalism. - The main conclusion is that naturalism combined with unguided evolution is self-defeating: it undercuts any rational ground for believing itself. That is an important result, even before we compare alternative worldviews. 2. Our deep commitment to trusting reason points beyond naturalism. - In practice, we cannot live as if our cognitive faculties are radically unreliable. We rely on memory, perception, logic, and inference in every domain of life. If naturalism makes such trust irrational, that is a powerful reason to look for a worldview that better supports reason. 3. Theism offers a natural fit between God, mind, and world. - On theism, a rational God creates: - a rationally ordered world, - finite minds in His image, - and a fit between those minds and the world, so that truth is knowable. - This provides a positive explanatory framework in which our trust in reason makes sense, rather than being a lucky cosmic accident. The EAAN, therefore, clears the ground by undermining naturalism and simultaneously highlights the explanatory power of a theistic picture of reality.

Modal Ontological (Maximal Greatness)

(P1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists. A "maximally great being" is one that has maximal excellence (omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, etc.) in every possible world. In other words, if such a being exists, it exists necessarily and cannot fail to exist.

(P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. In modal logic, "possibly exists" means "exists in at least one possible world" (a complete way reality could have been).

(P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. By definition, a maximally great being has necessary existence. If such a being exists in any possible world, it must exist in all possible worlds (it cannot be "contingent").

(P4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. The actual world is one of the possible worlds. If a being exists in every possible world, it exists in this one too.

(P5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. If such a being exists in our world, then it simply exists...God is real.

(C1) Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Alvin Plantinga (ed.), The Ontological Argument. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. Anselm of Canterbury. Proslogion. Translated by Clement C. J. Webb. In The Devotions of St. Anselm. 1903.
+ The argument just defines God into existence by using fancy modal logic.
1. Not every definition yields a real thing. - Simply defining something does not make it real. The ontological argument does not say, "By definition God exists," and stop there. Rather, it asks whether the existence of a certain kind of being (a maximally great, necessarily existent being) is possible. 2. The key issue is whether God's existence is possible, not actual. - If the idea of a maximally great being is coherent (not contradictory), then it is possible such a being exists. But on standard modal principles, once you grant that such a necessarily existent being is possible, it follows that it is actual. The argument trades on the special nature of necessary existence, not on a mere definition trick. 3. Parody "arguments" (islands, pizzas, unicorns) fail because their concepts don't support maximal greatness. - Consider a "maximally great island": you could always add more palm trees, more waterfalls, more beaches. There is no obvious intrinsic maximum of island-greatness. The same goes for a "maximally great pizza" (you can always add more toppings, more cheese, etc.) or a "maximally great unicorn" (you can always imagine a slightly faster, more beautiful, more powerful unicorn). These are all contingent, finite objects whose properties admit of open-ended improvement. - By contrast, the properties attributed to a maximally great being...omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection...are by their nature absolute and non-gradual. There is no "one notch greater" than knowing all truths, having all power logically possible, or being morally perfect. These are true maxima. 4. Only the theistic concept is suited to necessary existence. - Islands, pizzas, and unicorns, even in parody form, are the kinds of things that could exist in some worlds and not in others. It is part of our understanding of them that they are contingent and dependent. A "necessarily existent island" or "necessarily existent pizza" is a category mistake, not a serious philosophical concept. - The concept of a maximally great being, however, includes necessary existence as part of its greatness. If such a being is even possible, it cannot exist in just one world by accident; it must exist in all possible worlds. That is why the modal ontological argument targets God specifically, and why the parody objects fail as true parallels.
+ If you can argue for a maximally great good being, you could just as easily argue for a maximally great evil being.
1. Maximal greatness includes moral perfection, not moral evil. - By definition, a maximally great being has maximal excellence in every possible world, which includes maximal moral goodness. A "maximally evil" being would lack the moral perfection that is part of maximal greatness and thus would not be maximally great. 2. Moral evil is a privation, not a greatness-making property. - Traditionally, evil is understood as a corruption or lack of good, not as a positive excellence. Traits like justice, love, wisdom, and holiness are perfections; cruelty, malice, and injustice are defects. So you cannot construct a parallel argument by simply switching out goodness for evil without changing the very idea of "greatness." 3. The concept of a necessarily and maximally evil being is incoherent. - A necessarily evil being would be one that is evil in every possible world. But if such a being is also omniscient and omnipotent, it could recognize the good and have the power to choose it. A will that is necessarily and maximally opposed to all good is not a coherent perfection in the way that maximal goodness is.
+ P1 assumes that it is possible a maximally great being exists. But maybe God is impossible due to hidden contradictions.
1. The question becomes: is the concept of God coherent? - The argument forces the debate onto whether the very idea of a maximally great being (omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, necessarily existent) is internally consistent. If critics claim it is impossible, they need to show an actual contradiction, not just say "I don't like it." 2. Many alleged contradictions have been carefully answered in the literature. - Philosophers have proposed various challenges (e.g., paradoxes about omnipotence, foreknowledge, or freedom), but Christian philosophers have developed detailed responses showing these are not genuine contradictions. Unless an actual inconsistency is demonstrated, it is reasonable to treat God's existence as at least possible. 3. The argument is a powerful "if-then" tool. - Even if someone is unsure about P1, the ontological argument still shows: if God's existence is even possible, then God exists necessarily. That is a striking result, and it means that those who think God's existence is even possibly true are logically committed to His actual existence.
+ At best this argument shows some "maximally great being" exists, not that it is the God of the Bible.
This is correct, and it is not what the ontological argument is meant to do by itself. Properly understood, it aims to establish that: - There exists a necessarily existent, personal being with maximal greatness (omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection) in every possible world. This already rules out: - Atheism and robust naturalism. - Finite or morally imperfect "gods." From there, further arguments (cosmological, moral, historical) and evidence from revelation can be used to identify this maximally great being more specifically with the God revealed in Scripture. The ontological argument is one important piece of a larger cumulative case.

Five Ways

Arguments from Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

First Way – From Motion/Change

(P1) Things in the world are in motion (undergoing change). By “motion,” Aquinas means change in a broad sense (e.g., from potential to actual): local motion, growth, decay, heating, cooling, etc. Our everyday experience and all of natural science presuppose that real change occurs.

(P2) Whatever is moved (changed) is moved by another. A thing cannot be actually changing in respect of some feature while remaining purely potential in that same respect, all by itself. For example, a piece of wood does not go from cold to hot by itself; it is heated by something already hot. Change from potentiality to actuality requires something already actual as its cause.

(P3) There cannot be an infinite regress of essentially ordered movers (causes of motion). In a here-and-now (essential) causal series...like a hand moving a stick moving a stone...the intermediate movers have causal power only by being moved/actualized by something prior in the series. If there were no first actualizer in such a series, there would be no motion at all, just as a train of cars cannot move without some engine.

(C1) Therefore, there exists a first unmoved mover: something that causes motion (change) in others without itself being moved (changed) by another in the same way.

(C2) This first unmoved mover is what we call God.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 (“Whether God exists?”) – First Way. Edward Feser, Aquinas. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.
+ Modern physics already explains motion and change (e.g., with laws of motion and energy). Aquinas’ argument is outdated.
1. Aquinas is giving a metaphysical explanation, not a competing physical theory. - Physics describes how motion and change occur in terms of laws, forces, and fields. Aquinas is asking a deeper question: why is there any actualization of potentials at all, here and now, rather than everything remaining merely potential? 2. Laws of nature are not self-explanatory. - Saying “things move according to the laws of physics” does not explain why there are such laws, why they hold now, or why the underlying powers and potentials are being actualized rather than remaining dormant. Aquinas is looking for a first actualizer that makes all ongoing change possible. 3. The First Way is compatible with whatever physics discovers. - Whether reality is described in terms of Newtonian mechanics, relativity, or quantum field theory, there is still a real distinction between potential and actual, and still chains of dependent, here-and-now actualizations. The argument does not depend on medieval science; it depends on the metaphysical structure of change itself.
+ Maybe there is just an infinite chain of things moving other things. Why must there be a first unmoved mover?
1. Aquinas targets ‘essential’ (here-and-now) dependence, not merely a past series. - Aquinas is not primarily arguing that the universe must have had a temporal beginning. Rather, he is focusing on present, simultaneous dependence: here and now, many things are being actualized by others in an ordered series. 2. An essentially ordered series cannot regress infinitely in dependence. - In a series like hand–stick–stone, the stick moves the stone only because the hand is moving the stick. If you remove the hand, the stick has no independent power to move the stone. If every member of the series were only a “borrowed” mover, with no first source, nothing would move at all. 3. A first mover is needed as the source of actual causal power. - The first unmoved mover is not just the temporally first cause long ago; it is the present, sustaining source of motion and change. An infinite regress of borrowed movers, with no ultimate source, would be like an endless series of extension cords plugged into one another with no appliance ever plugged into the wall...no real power would ever flow.
+ At most, this gives some abstract ‘first mover,’ not the personal God of Christianity.
1. Aquinas himself goes on to derive divine attributes from the First Way’s conclusion. - In the Summa, Aquinas does not stop at “there is an unmoved mover.” He argues that this being must be purely actual (with no unrealized potentials), immutable, eternal, immaterial, absolutely simple, and the cause of all other beings. From there, he argues it must also be intelligent, good, and ultimately personal. 2. A purely actual first mover already excludes many non-theistic options. - A being that is the first unmoved mover and purely actual cannot be a finite, composite, changeable, or morally imperfect “god” alongside others. It is the unique, ultimate source of all actuality in everything else. 3. The Five Ways together are part of a larger, cumulative case. - The First Way on its own is not meant to prove every detail of Christian doctrine. Rather, it contributes one powerful strand: from change to a purely actual source of all motion. Other arguments (from contingency, degrees of perfection, finality, revelation, and history) fill out the picture and connect this first mover to the God revealed in Scripture.

Second Way – From Efficient Cause

(P1) In the world of sense, we find an order of efficient causes. By an “efficient cause,” Aquinas means that which brings something into being or sustains it (e.g., a builder causing a house, fire causing heat, parents causing a child). Our experience and all of science presuppose that things have causes.

(P2) Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. If something caused itself to exist, it would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible. A cause must be distinct from its effect at least in the order of explanation: the effect depends on the cause, not vice versa.

(P3) There cannot be an infinite regress of essentially ordered efficient causes. In an essentially ordered series of causes (here-and-now dependence), intermediate causes have causal power only because they receive it from prior causes. If there were no first cause in such a series, there would be no causal activity at all, like a series of gears with no primary driving gear.

(C1) Therefore, there must be a first efficient cause that is not itself caused by anything else.

(C2) This first uncaused cause is what we call God.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 (“Whether God exists?”) – Second Way. Edward Feser, Aquinas. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, “Being and Goodness,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Kretzmann and Stump. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
+ Maybe there is just an infinite chain of causes. Why must there be a first, uncaused cause?
1. Aquinas distinguishes between accidental and essential causal series. - An accidental series is like father–son–grandson: once the son exists, the father can die and the son can still beget children. The earlier cause need not still be acting. - An essential series is like hand–stick–stone: the stick moves the stone only because the hand is currently moving the stick. Remove the hand, and the stick has no power to move anything. 2. The Second Way focuses on essential, here-and-now dependence. - Aquinas argues that with respect to the existence and activity of things right now, there is an essentially ordered series of causes. Each finite cause has its causal power only in a derivative, received way. 3. An infinite regress of essentially ordered causes would leave nothing actually causing. - If every member of the series only had causal power on loan from a prior member, and there were no first source, then no member would truly have causal power, and no effects would occur. A first uncaused cause is needed as the ultimate source of causal efficacy.
+ Quantum physics suggests that some events (like particle decays) happen without causes. Doesn’t that undermine the Second Way?
1. ‘Uncaused’ in quantum mechanics is a technical, not absolute, claim. - When physicists say an event is “uncaused,” they usually mean it is not determined by prior states in a classical, predictable way, not that it has literally no cause or explanation whatsoever. 2. Quantum events still presuppose an underlying causal structure. - Quantum processes occur within a framework of quantum fields, laws, boundary conditions, and conserved quantities. They do not occur in an absolute void. Aquinas’ principle concerns the more basic metaphysical idea that potentialities become actual only through some actual cause. 3. The Second Way is compatible with indeterministic physical models. - Even if some events are probabilistic rather than strictly determined, the existence of the fields, laws, and powers that give rise to such events still calls for a sustaining cause. The argument does not depend on a strictly deterministic physics.
+ Suppose there is a first uncaused cause. Why identify it with the God of classical theism rather than some impersonal force?
1. An uncaused cause of all finite beings must be necessary and non-dependent. - The first cause cannot itself be contingent or dependent on anything else, or it would not be truly first. It must exist of itself (be a necessary being), and this already sets it apart from all finite, changeable things. 2. Aquinas argues that the first cause must also be simple, immaterial, and intelligent. - A first cause of all finite beings cannot be composed of parts (which would require causes to combine them), cannot be material in the usual sense (since matter is characterized by potentiality and limitation), and must be the source of all order and intelligibility in the world. From this, Aquinas concludes that the first cause is an intelligent, willing agent, not a blind “thing.” 3. The Second Way is a step in identifying the God of classical theism. - On its own, the Second Way does not prove every divine attribute or the truth of Christianity, but it points us toward a unique, uncaused, necessary source of all finite reality. In Aquinas’ larger project, the Five Ways together, plus further analysis, build toward the God of classical theism.
+ The Second Way relies on outdated Aristotelian metaphysics (causes, substances, etc.). Modern science has moved beyond that.
1. Aquinas’ causal principles are philosophical, not scientific hypotheses. - The claim that nothing can cause itself, and that essentially ordered causal chains require a first cause, is a metaphysical claim about dependence and explanation. It is not a law of physics competing with scientific theories. 2. Modern science still presupposes causal notions. - Even when speaking in terms of fields, interactions, and laws, science assumes that certain states of affairs bring about others. You do not escape metaphysics by doing physics; you simply rely on it implicitly. 3. The question “why is there any caused reality at all?” remains. - Regardless of which physical model we adopt (classical, relativistic, quantum), we can still ask: why do any contingent, caused beings exist and continue to exist at all? The Second Way argues that the best explanation is a first, uncaused cause that sustains everything else.

Third Way – From Contingency

(P1) There are contingent beings in the world...things that can exist and can fail to exist. A contingent being is one that does not have to exist; it begins to exist and can cease to exist (e.g., people, animals, stars, planets). We observe that such things come into being and pass away, and so their existence is not necessary.

(P2) If everything were contingent, then at some time nothing would have existed. If every being could fail to exist, then there is no guarantee that something or other would always exist. Given enough “time” or possibilities, there would be a state of affairs in which nothing at all existed.

(P3) If at some time nothing existed, then nothing would exist now. From absolute nothingness, nothing comes. If there were ever a total absence of being, nothing could begin to exist, because there would be nothing with the power to bring anything into existence.

(P4) But something does exist now (including ourselves and the world around us). Our present existence is undeniable. It follows that it cannot be the case that only contingent beings have ever existed.

(C1) Therefore, not all beings are contingent; there must exist at least one necessary being that cannot fail to exist.

(P5) A necessary being either has the cause of its necessity in itself or from another. Either the necessary being’s existence is explained by its own nature (it exists “of itself”), or it is necessary because something else makes it so.

(P6) There cannot be an infinite regress of necessary beings whose necessity is caused by another. An endless chain of beings whose necessary existence is borrowed from earlier beings would never explain why there is any necessary existence at all. There must be a necessary being that has the cause of its necessity in itself and does not derive it from another.

(C2) Therefore, there exists a necessary being that has its necessity in itself and is the cause of the existence of all contingent beings.

(C3) This necessary being is what we call God.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 (“Whether God exists?”) – Third Way. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017.
+ Why can’t the universe itself be the necessary being? Maybe the cosmos just exists necessarily.
1. The observable universe looks contingent, not necessary. - The universe begins, changes, and could have been otherwise (different laws, constants, contents). These are marks of contingency. A necessary being, by contrast, cannot begin, end, or exist in a radically different way. 2. Necessary existence is not just “existing for a long time.” - To be necessary is to exist in all possible circumstances, with no dependence on anything else. Our universe appears finely tuned and law-bound in specific ways that could have failed to obtain. That strongly suggests dependence, not self-explanatory necessity. 3. Aquinas’ argument targets being as such, not just the visible cosmos. - The Third Way is not merely asking why this universe exists, but why any contingent reality exists at all. Saying “the universe just is” does not explain why contingent being exists rather than nothing; it simply pushes the question back a step without answering it.
+ The argument assumes a time when nothing existed. But maybe matter or energy has always existed, so the scenario of ‘nothing’ never happened.
1. The Third Way is not mainly about time, but about dependence. - Aquinas’ point is not “long ago there was nothing,” but that if everything that exists could have failed to exist, then there is no sufficient reason why anything exists at all, now or ever. The issue is metaphysical contingency, not just temporal beginnings. 2. An eternal series of contingent beings is still contingent as a whole. - Even if there were an infinite past with no first moment, an eternal succession of things that each might not have existed would still call for an explanation: why does such a contingent series exist at all, rather than nothing? 3. A necessary being explains why there is always something rather than nothing. - If a necessary being exists, its existence is not conditional or temporary. It is, by nature, “always there” (in whatever sense of “always” applies to a necessary being) and can sustain the existence of contingent beings, whether or not the universe has a beginning in time.
+ The argument seems to assume that every fact must have an explanation (a Principle of Sufficient Reason). But maybe some things, like the existence of the universe, are just brute facts.
1. Denying explanation at the deepest level is a high price to pay. - To say “there just are contingent things, with no reason at all” abandons the very drive toward explanation that undergirds science and rational inquiry. It treats the most fundamental question (“Why anything rather than nothing?”) as uniquely exempt from explanation. 2. The contingency intuition is extremely strong and widely shared. - When we encounter things that begin, change, or could have been otherwise, we naturally seek a cause or reason. The Third Way systematizes this basic intuition. Rejecting it at the foundational level looks ad hoc: we use explanatory principles everywhere else, but suspend them precisely where they challenge naturalism. 3. A necessary being offers a deep and unifying explanation. - Postulating a necessary being that explains the existence of all contingent beings gives us a coherent stopping point in our search for reasons. It does not multiply unexplained brute facts; it reduces them by rooting contingent reality in something self-explanatory.
+ Even if there is a necessary being, that doesn’t prove it is the God of Christianity.
This is correct, and it is not what the Third Way is intended to show on its own. The argument aims to establish the existence of: - At least one necessary being - That exists of itself (not by another) - And causes or explains the existence of all contingent beings From there, Aquinas and other classical theists argue that such a being must be: - Simple (without parts), immutable, eternal, immaterial - The source of all perfections found in creatures - Intellective and volitional (having intellect and will) Those further steps, combined with other arguments (from morality, consciousness, revelation, and history), help identify this necessary being more specifically with the God of the Bible. The Third Way supplies one crucial piece of that cumulative case: that contingent reality depends ultimately on a necessary, self-existent source.

Fourth Way – From Degrees of Perfection

(P1) Among things, we find degrees of perfection (more or less good, true, noble, etc.). We naturally compare things in terms of value and excellence: some actions are better than others; some people are wiser, more just, or more loving than others; some beings have fuller reality or goodness than others (e.g., a rational person vs. a rock).

(P2) Degrees of a quality (like goodness or truth) are understood by comparison to a maximum or standard of that quality. When we say one thing is “hotter” or “colder,” “truer” or “better,” we implicitly measure it against some maximum or fullest instance. Aquinas (drawing on Aristotle) holds that gradations in a transcendental property (goodness, truth, nobility) imply a reference to something that possesses that property fully or maximally.

(P3) Therefore, if there are degrees of goodness, truth, and nobility in things, there must be something that is maximally good, maximally true, and maximally noble. This “maximum” is not just a useful fiction or idealization, but a real standard in terms of which all lesser participations in goodness and truth are measured and made intelligible.

(P4) What is maximally true and good is the cause of all that is true and good in other things. Aquinas argues that in any genus, the maximum is the cause of the others in that genus (e.g., the hottest thing is the cause of heat in other things). By analogy, the supreme source of goodness and truth causes and sustains all finite instances of goodness and truth.

(C1) Therefore, there exists something that is the maximum and source of all perfections such as goodness, truth, and nobility in things.

(C2) This maximally perfect being is what we call God.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 (“Whether God exists?”) – Fourth Way. Edward Feser, Aquinas. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.
+ We can talk about “more” or “less” good, true, or noble without there being a real, existing maximum. It’s just a way of speaking.
1. Comparisons presuppose some standard, even if implicit. - Saying “A is better than B” is not like saying “I prefer A to B.” It implies that A more fully realizes some standard of goodness than B does. Aquinas takes seriously that when we talk about degrees of transcendental properties (goodness, truth, nobility), we are implicitly referencing something like a standard or measure. 2. The question is whether that standard is merely conceptual or also real. - We might treat “perfect goodness” as a mere idealization in our minds, but Aquinas argues that finite, imperfect instances of a perfection are best explained as participating in or imitating a most perfect source in reality, not merely in thought. 3. A purely subjective standard does not fit how we treat value judgments. - Our moral and value judgments typically aim at something objective (e.g., that justice and love are really better than cruelty and hatred). If all standards are just subjective constructs, then the language of “more perfect” loses its deeper, objective force.
+ Just because you can have a maximum in some cases (like temperature) doesn’t mean there is a maximum for every quality, especially something abstract like goodness.
1. Aquinas uses physical examples as analogies, not strict models. - When Aquinas mentions things like heat having a “hottest,” he is illustrating a general metaphysical pattern: degrees of a perfection point to a source in which that perfection is found in the highest way. The core idea is not tied to chemistry or thermodynamics. 2. Some properties are by nature gradable toward an intrinsic maximum. - For many perfections (e.g., knowledge, power, moral goodness), we can meaningfully talk about “more” or “less” in a way that suggests a conceivable completion or fullness of that quality. Infinite wisdom or perfect goodness are natural limiting cases of the scales we already use. 3. The argument concerns transcendental perfections, not arbitrary predicates. - Aquinas is not claiming there is a “maximum number of leaves” or “maximum height” in the same sense. He is focusing on perfections that are convertible with being itself...goodness, truth, nobility of being...which are naturally linked to the very nature of reality and thus to a highest instance.
+ This looks like a sneaky ontological argument: moving from a concept of maximal goodness to the existence of a maximally good being.
1. The starting point is empirical, not purely conceptual. - Unlike a pure ontological argument, the Fourth Way begins with observed facts about the world: we actually encounter things that are more or less good, true, and noble. It is an argument from experience, not merely from a definition. 2. The move is from finite instances to a real explanatory source. - Aquinas is reasoning: given that such perfections are instantiated to varying degrees, the best explanation is that there is a supreme source in which they exist fully and from which they flow, rather than that they are brute, scattered features of an ultimately value-neutral reality. 3. It fits within Aquinas’ broader metaphysical framework. - In Aquinas’ thought, goodness and being are closely related (to be is to be good in some way). Degrees of goodness thus reflect degrees of participation in being itself. A most perfect being, then, is also the most fully real and the source of all other beings...a conclusion that overlaps with, but is not identical to, an ontological-style argument.
+ Even if there is a maximally perfect being, this doesn’t show that it is the God of the Bible.
This is correct, and it is not what the Fourth Way is meant to establish on its own. The argument aims to show that: - There is a supreme source of all perfections found in creatures (goodness, truth, nobility). - This source exists in a wholly maximal way...without defect or limitation. From there, Aquinas and other classical theists argue that such a being must: - Be identical with its own goodness and being (absolutely simple). - Be immutable, eternal, and immaterial. - Possess intellect and will (since goodness and truth are intimately tied to knowledge and love). Those further steps, together with other arguments (cosmological, moral, teleological, historical), help identify this maximally perfect source with the God revealed in Scripture. The Fourth Way contributes the specific insight that the value-structure of reality...its gradations of goodness and truth...points to a supreme, perfect foundation in God.

Fifth Way – From Finality / Teleology

(P1) Non-rational things in nature regularly act for an end (toward goals or purposes). Aquinas notes that natural objects and processes...like acorns becoming oak trees, hearts pumping blood, planets following stable paths, and physical laws yielding orderly outcomes...consistently behave in ways that tend toward certain effects rather than others. They exhibit regular, goal-directed behavior.

(P2) Whatever lacks knowledge cannot direct itself to an end unless it is directed by something with knowledge and intelligence. An arrow does not fly toward a target by itself; it is aimed by an archer. Likewise, entities that have no awareness or understanding (e.g., physical particles, plants, organs) cannot by themselves “aim” at ends. Their consistent tendency toward certain outcomes calls for explanation in terms of an ordering intelligence.

(C1) Therefore, natural things that lack knowledge and yet act for an end must be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence.

(C2) This intelligent director of nature is what we call God.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3 (“Whether God exists?”) – Fifth Way. Edward Feser, Aquinas. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017.
+ This sounds like William Paley’s watchmaker argument. Modern evolutionary biology has already answered that kind of design argument.
1. Aquinas’ Fifth Way is not the same as Paley’s argument from complex organs. - Paley focused on the intricate structure of particular biological systems (like the eye) and argued by analogy to human artifacts. Aquinas is instead interested in the universal fact that non-rational things act in regular, goal-directed ways according to stable laws. 2. The Fifth Way is about final causes built into nature itself. - Aquinas is not merely pointing to complex “designs” and saying “this looks designed.” He is arguing that the very fact that things reliably behave “for an end” (acorns reliably become oaks, electrons reliably behave in lawlike ways, etc.) presupposes an ordering intellect behind the system as a whole. 3. Evolution presupposes, rather than removes, the relevant teleology. - Evolutionary processes themselves rely on deeply structured biological and physical regularities (genetic replication, natural selection, environmental constraints). These regularities are part of the teleological order Aquinas is highlighting. Explaining some biological patterns by evolution does not explain why the larger natural order exhibits the directedness that makes evolution possible.
+ We don’t need God to explain why things behave in regular ways; that’s just what the laws of nature say. They do the explaining.
1. Laws describe regularities; they don’t explain why they exist or hold. - Saying “objects fall because of gravity” or “electrons behave this way because of quantum laws” tells us how things behave, not why there are such lawlike tendencies at all, or why they are ordered toward specific ends rather than chaos. 2. The very existence of stable, mathematically expressible laws is part of what needs explanation. - The fact that the universe is not a random chaos of events, but a deeply ordered system where entities consistently “aim” at certain effects (e.g., stable orbits, reliable chemical reactions), fits naturally with Aquinas’ claim that an intelligent cause orders things to their ends. 3. The Fifth Way is compatible with and deeper than scientific laws. - Aquinas is not proposing a rival to physics or chemistry. He is offering a metaphysical explanation of why there is a teleological order that physics can successfully describe in the first place. Laws are the “how”; the Fifth Way addresses the “why” of that lawful, end-directed structure.
+ Nature includes randomness, chaos, and failures (e.g., genetic defects, natural disasters). Doesn’t that undercut the idea that everything is ordered toward an end by an intelligent designer?
1. The existence of chance events presupposes an ordered background. - “Random” or “chaotic” in science typically means “unpredictable within a given model,” not “lawless at the deepest level.” Chance events still occur within a larger framework of stable laws and tendencies...the very framework the Fifth Way is about. 2. Teleology is about general tendencies, not perfection in every case. - Saying an acorn is directed toward becoming an oak does not mean every acorn succeeds (some are eaten, rot, or fail). Likewise, organs can malfunction, and natural processes can misfire, without negating the general, goal-directed pattern they usually display. 3. The problem of natural evil is a separate question. - The Fifth Way aims to show that there is an ordering intelligence behind the teleological structure of nature. Questions about why God allows defects, suffering, or natural disasters belong to the problem of evil, which must be addressed by additional theological and philosophical considerations, not by denying the underlying order the argument focuses on.
+ Even if there is some intelligence behind nature, that doesn’t mean it is the personal God of Christianity.
This is correct, and Aquinas would agree that the Fifth Way by itself does not establish every attribute of the Christian God. What it does aim to show is that: - There is an intelligent cause that orders non-rational nature to its ends. - This intelligence operates at the most fundamental level of reality, not as a tinkering “god of the gaps.” From there, Aquinas and other classical theists argue further that: - The intelligent director of all natural ends must be simple, necessary, eternal, and immaterial. - Such a being must have intellect and will in the highest, most perfect way. - Combined with other arguments (from motion, causation, contingency, moral law, and revelation), this intelligent source is best identified with the God revealed in Scripture. Thus the Fifth Way contributes a specific insight: the pervasive goal-directedness of nature is not an accident, but points beyond the cosmos to a supreme ordering Mind.

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Resurrection of Jesus

Evidence for the Resurrection of Christ

Three Facts Argument (Craig)

(P1) Fact 1: Jesus’ tomb was discovered empty shortly after His crucifixion. Multiple early, independent sources report that Jesus’ tomb was found empty. The earliest Christian preaching in Jerusalem presupposes that the body was no longer in the grave. Women are presented as the first discoverers of the empty tomb, which is an unlikely fabrication in a first-century Jewish context where female testimony carried low legal weight. In addition, the earliest Jewish polemic (“the disciples stole the body”) presupposes that the tomb was, in fact, empty, rather than still containing Jesus’ corpse.

(P2) Fact 2: Various individuals and groups experienced appearances of Jesus alive after His death. The early creed cited by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7 (usually dated within a few years of the crucifixion) lists appearances to Peter, the Twelve, more than 500 at one time, James, “all the apostles,” and Paul himself. The Gospels independently attest to appearances in different locations and settings (e.g., in Jerusalem, on the road to Emmaus, by the Sea of Galilee). Critical scholars across the spectrum generally agree that these individuals and groups had real experiences which they took to be encounters with the risen Jesus.

(P3) Fact 3: The original disciples came to be firmly and sincerely convinced that God had raised Jesus bodily from the dead. After Jesus’ crucifixion, the disciples were discouraged, fearful, and in hiding. As first-century Jews, they did not expect a crucified Messiah, nor did they expect an isolated resurrection within history. Yet very soon they began boldly proclaiming that God had raised Jesus from the dead and had exalted Him as Lord. Many of them willingly endured persecution, suffering, and for some, martyrdom, without historical evidence of recanting. In addition, skeptics and opponents such as James (Jesus’ brother) and Paul (a persecutor of Christians) were transformed into convinced proclaimers of the risen Christ.

(P4) No naturalistic hypothesis (conspiracy, apparent death, hallucination, displaced body, or legend) adequately explains these three facts taken together. Through the history of scholarship, a range of naturalistic explanations have been proposed: that the disciples stole the body, that Jesus only appeared to die, that the appearances were hallucinations or visions, that the body was moved or misplaced, or that resurrection stories arose as legend. Each of these theories faces serious difficulties when judged against the empty tomb, the broad pattern of appearances, and the radical, early, resurrection-centered conviction of the disciples. Contemporary specialists rarely defend these hypotheses as fully adequate explanations of the core historical data.

(C) Therefore, the best explanation of the empty tomb, the post-mortem appearances, and the disciples’ sincere, early belief is that God raised Jesus bodily from the dead.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024.
+ Maybe the disciples stole Jesus’ body and knowingly lied about the resurrection.
See argument: Contra Conspiracy Hypothesis. In brief, this view conflicts with first-century Jewish expectations, fails to account for the disciples’ willingness to suffer and die for their message, and does not fit the psychologically realistic and often embarrassing nature of the early testimonies.
+ Maybe Jesus never truly died but merely swooned and later revived in the tomb.
See argument: Contra Apparent Death Hypothesis. Historically and medically, Roman crucifixion procedures, Jesus’ severe scourging and spear wound, and the conditions of burial make survival extremely implausible. Even if He had survived, a half-dead, badly injured man would not plausibly generate belief in a glorious, victorious resurrection.
+ Maybe the disciples and others simply hallucinated or had visionary experiences of Jesus.
See argument: Contra Hallucination Hypothesis. The resurrection appearances are multiple, involve groups and skeptics, occur in various places and times, and are tightly linked with the claim that the tomb was empty. This pattern does not match what we know of hallucinations, which are typically private, individual, and do not explain a missing body.
+ Maybe Jesus’ body was moved to another location, and the empty tomb was a misunderstanding.
See argument: Contra Displaced Body Hypothesis. Jewish burial customs, Joseph of Arimathea’s role, and the location of alternative burial sites make this unlikely. If the body had simply been relocated, the authorities or Joseph himself could have corrected the disciples once resurrection was preached, by producing or identifying the corpse.
+ Maybe the resurrection accounts slowly developed as legends over time.
See argument: Contra Legend Hypothesis. The core resurrection proclamation appears in very early traditions (such as the 1 Corinthians 15 creed), within a short time after the events and while many eyewitnesses were still alive. The Gospels show restraint compared to later apocryphal writings and preserve embarrassing, non-idealized features, which do not fit well with a late, purely legendary development.

Minimal Facts Argument (Habermas)

(P1) Fact 1: Jesus of Nazareth died by Roman crucifixion. Across the theological spectrum, critical scholars agree that Jesus’ death by crucifixion under Pontius Pilate is one of the best-established facts of ancient history. It is attested by multiple independent New Testament sources (the Gospels, Paul, Hebrews), by early Christian creeds, and by non-Christian writers such as Tacitus and Josephus. Crucifixion was a brutal Roman execution reserved for serious offenders; Roman executioners were professionals, and there is no serious scholarly movement arguing that Jesus survived the crucifixion intact.

(P2) Fact 2: Jesus’ disciples and other early followers had experiences that they sincerely believed were appearances of the risen Jesus. The early creed preserved in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7, which most scholars date to within a few years of the crucifixion, lists appearances of the risen Jesus to Peter, the Twelve, more than five hundred at once, James, and “all the apostles,” as well as to Paul. These experiences are independently echoed in the Gospel narratives and Acts. Even many skeptical scholars concede that the disciples and others had real experiences which they interpreted as encounters with the risen Jesus, whatever the ultimate explanation of those experiences may be.

(P3) Fact 3: The tomb in which Jesus was buried was found empty shortly after His death. Multiple, early, and independent traditions report that Jesus’ tomb was discovered empty by a group of His women followers. The early Jerusalem preaching in Acts presupposes that the body was no longer in the grave; otherwise, the authorities or opponents could have simply pointed to the occupied tomb. Women are presented as the first discoverers, an unlikely invention in a first-century Jewish context where female testimony had low legal standing. Moreover, the earliest Jewish polemic against the Christians (that the disciples stole the body) implicitly grants that the tomb was, in fact, empty rather than still containing Jesus’ corpse.

(P4) Fact 4: The proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection began very early, in Jerusalem, and in a context hostile to the message. Scholars widely agree that belief in Jesus’ resurrection was not a late, slowly developing legend. The 1 Corinthians 15 creed and other early formulas show that the resurrection message was already central in the earliest Christian communities. Acts portrays the apostles preaching the resurrection in Jerusalem itself, the city where Jesus had been executed and buried, within a short time after the events. This is the last place one would choose to launch a resurrection hoax if the body were still in the tomb or if the basic facts were easily falsifiable by hostile witnesses.

(P5) Fact 5: James, the brother of Jesus, who had been skeptical during Jesus’ ministry, became a believer and a leader in the early church after an experience he took to be an appearance of the risen Jesus. The Gospels indicate that Jesus’ own brothers, including James, were not believers during His public ministry and in some cases thought Him unbalanced. Yet 1 Corinthians 15:7 cites a specific post-resurrection appearance “to James,” and Acts and Galatians portray James as a central leader of the Jerusalem church. This dramatic shift in James’s stance...from skeptic to pillar of the movement centered on his crucified brother...is acknowledged across scholarly lines and calls for explanation.

(P6) Fact 6: Saul of Tarsus (Paul), a fierce persecutor of the early Christian movement, converted after an experience he interpreted as an appearance of the risen Jesus, radically changing his life and message. By his own admission in multiple independent sources (his letters and Acts), Paul began as a zealous opponent of the Christian movement, seeking to destroy it. He then underwent a sudden, dramatic conversion which he consistently attributes to an encounter with the risen Christ. He became Christianity’s most energetic missionary, enduring persecution, hardship, and ultimately martyrdom for the message he had once tried to eradicate. This radical reversal...from persecutor to apostle...is one of the most widely accepted facts in New Testament scholarship.

(P7) No naturalistic hypothesis (such as conspiracy, apparent death, hallucination, displaced body, or legend) adequately explains all six of these facts together in a simple, coherent way. Through the history of scholarship, a range of naturalistic explanations has been proposed: that the disciples stole the body and lied (conspiracy), that Jesus only appeared to die and later revived (apparent death), that the experiences were hallucinations or subjective visions, that the body was moved or misplaced (displaced body), or that resurrection stories gradually developed as legend. Each of these theories faces serious difficulties when measured against the full set of six facts: (1) They struggle to account simultaneously for the empty tomb, the variety and number of appearances, the very early Jerusalem-centered proclamation, and the radical conversions of both James and Paul. (2) They often focus on one fact (e.g., the appearances) while ignoring or downplaying others (e.g., the empty tomb, early hostile context, or the pre-conversion skepticism of James and Paul). (3) Contemporary specialists very rarely defend any single naturalistic theory as a complete and satisfactory explanation of the core historical data. Many admit that the best naturalistic accounts are at best partial and strained. By contrast, the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead straightforwardly explains why the tomb was empty, why so many different people and groups reported appearances, why the resurrection was proclaimed so early and boldly, and why former skeptics and enemies like James and Paul were transformed.

(C) Therefore, the best explanation of these six well-supported historical facts is that God raised Jesus bodily from the dead.

Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004. Gary R. Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What Are Critical Scholars Saying?” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 2 (2005): 135–153. Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
+ Maybe the disciples stole Jesus’ body and knowingly lied about the resurrection.
See argument: Contra Conspiracy Hypothesis. In brief, this view clashes with the disciples’ known cowardice before the crucifixion and their later willingness to suffer and die for their proclamation. It also fails to explain the conversion of former skeptics and enemies like James and Paul, who were not part of the inner group and who gained no worldly advantage from joining a persecuted movement. A conspiracy of liars does not plausibly produce such widespread, costly conviction across multiple, independent witnesses.
+ Maybe Jesus never truly died but merely swooned and later revived in the tomb.
See argument: Contra Apparent Death Hypothesis. Historically and medically, Roman crucifixion procedures, Jesus’ severe flogging and spear wound, and the burial conditions make survival extremely implausible. Even if Jesus had somehow revived, a barely alive, grievously injured man would not plausibly convince His followers that He had triumphed over death and been exalted as Lord of all, nor would such a scenario explain the empty tomb and the radical conversions of James and Paul.
+ Maybe the disciples and others simply hallucinated or had visionary experiences of Jesus.
See argument: Contra Hallucination Hypothesis. The resurrection appearances are multiple, involve both individuals and groups, and include former skeptics and enemies (James and Paul) in different places and circumstances. Hallucinations are typically private, not shared by groups, and do not explain an empty tomb. Nor do they naturally generate a sustained, early, public proclamation of bodily resurrection in a hostile environment. The hallucination hypothesis does not adequately cover all six facts together.
+ Maybe Jesus’ body was moved to another location, and the empty tomb was a misunderstanding.
See argument: Contra Displaced Body Hypothesis. Jewish burial customs, Joseph of Arimathea’s known role, and the location of the tomb near Jerusalem make casual relocation unlikely. If the body had simply been moved, the authorities or Joseph could have corrected the disciples’ message once they began preaching the resurrection in Jerusalem, by producing or identifying the corpse. This theory also has nothing to say about the wide pattern of post-mortem appearances or the conversions of James and Paul.
+ Maybe the resurrection accounts slowly developed as legends over time.
See argument: Contra Legend Hypothesis. The core resurrection proclamation is embedded in very early tradition (such as the 1 Corinthians 15 creed), arising within a few years of the events and during the lifetimes of many eyewitnesses, both friend and foe. The early, sudden conversion of James and Paul is tightly connected to what they took to be appearances of the risen Jesus, not to a slow legendary process. The legend hypothesis cannot account for the early dating, the empty tomb, the hostile setting in Jerusalem, and the radical transformations of key individuals all at once.

Maximal Facts Argument

(P1) The New Testament documents are multiple, early, independent, and generally reliable historical sources about Jesus and the earliest Christian movement. On a “maximal data” approach, we do not artificially restrict ourselves to a handful of widely conceded facts; rather, we assess the New Testament writings as we would other ancient historical sources. The Gospels and Acts show: (1) multiple authors drawing on distinct sources and traditions, (2) early composition within living memory of the events, (3) familiarity with first-century Palestinian geography, customs, and politics, and (4) undesigned coincidences between different books that mutually confirm their historical character. This justifies treating them as broadly trustworthy witnesses, not as late, legendary compilations whose details must be discarded in advance. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P2) Taken as generally reliable, these sources support a rich cluster of historical facts about Jesus’ death, burial, empty tomb, and post-mortem appearances. Among the facts supported by the Gospels, Acts, and Paul’s letters are: (a) Jesus’ public ministry, arrest, and condemnation under Pontius Pilate; (b) His brutal scourging and crucifixion, leading to His death; (c) His burial in a specific rock-hewn tomb belonging to Joseph of Arimathea; (d) the discovery of His tomb empty early on the first day of the week by a group of His female followers; (e) multiple, extended, sensory encounters with Jesus alive again, at different times and places, involving different individuals and groups (including meals, conversations, and physical contact); (f) the transformation of the disciples from fearful and despondent to bold public witnesses; and (g) the conversions of prominent skeptics and opponents such as James and Paul, grounded in what they took to be encounters with the risen Christ. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

(P3) These facts are supported not only by Christian testimony but also by undesigned coincidences, external corroboration, and hostile or neutral sources that confirm key points. Undesigned coincidences...subtle interlocking details between different New Testament documents...show that the authors are independently reporting a shared underlying reality rather than colluding in fiction. For example, incidental details in one Gospel explain obscure statements in another without apparent design. In addition, non-Christian sources (such as Tacitus, Josephus in at least some textual layers, and early hostile traditions) affirm that Jesus was crucified under Pilate, that His followers quickly proclaimed His resurrection, and that the movement spread despite persecution. Jewish polemic presupposes that the tomb was empty, accusing the disciples of stealing the body rather than simply pointing to a known, occupied grave. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P4) No naturalistic explanation (fraud, apparent death, hallucination, displaced body, legend, or any combination thereof) adequately accounts for this broad, interconnected body of evidence when the New Testament is treated with ordinary historical seriousness. When the full range of data is considered...Jesus’ known death by crucifixion, specific tomb burial, empty tomb discovered by named individuals, numerous multi-sensory appearances over forty days, the radical and immediate transformation of the disciples, the conversions of James and Paul, the detailed and realistic character of the narratives, and the deep internal coherence across independent documents...naturalistic theories repeatedly fail. Each tends to explain at best one or two elements while contradicting others or requiring ad hoc additions. A conspiracy cannot plausibly sustain decades of suffering and martyrdom; a swoon does not fit Roman execution practices or inspire worship of a glorified, death-conquering Lord; hallucinations do not produce an empty tomb, coordinated group appearances, and conversions of enemies; displaced body and legend theories conflict with early, structured tradition and eyewitness-rooted testimony. Combining them only multiplies speculative assumptions without yielding a simple, unified account. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Contra Conspiracy Hypothesis (Stolen-Body Theory) • CE / Resurrection: Contra Apparent Death Hypothesis (Swoon Theory) • CE / Resurrection: Contra Hallucination Hypothesis • CE / Resurrection: Contra Displaced Body Hypothesis • CE / Resurrection: Contra Legend Hypothesis

(P5) If God exists and has reason to vindicate Jesus’ claims and mission, then a bodily resurrection fits naturally as a divine action in history and provides a powerful, unified explanation of all the maximal facts. Philosophical arguments for the existence of God (cosmological, teleological, moral, and more) make divine action a live explanatory option. On that background, the hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead is not an arbitrary miracle claim but a theologically fitting act: it vindicates Jesus’ messianic claims, confirms His teaching, and inaugurates the new covenant and the hope of final resurrection. This single hypothesis straightforwardly explains the empty tomb, the varied and persistent appearances, the transformation of frightened disciples into bold witnesses, the conversions of skeptics and opponents, and the rise and spread of the early Christian movement centered on the proclamation that “God has Him from the dead.” See also: • Natural Theology Arguments

(C) Therefore, when we consider the maximal range of well-supported historical data and treat the New Testament documents as generally reliable sources, the best explanation is that God raised Jesus bodily from the dead.

Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection,” in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Lydia McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017. Lydia McGrew, The Mirror or the Mask: Liberating the Gospels from Literary Devices. DeWard, 2019.
+ The maximal facts argument simply grants that the New Testament is generally reliable, which is exactly what skeptics dispute. This stacks the deck in favor of resurrection.
1. The reliability claim is argued for, not merely assumed. Defenders of the maximal facts approach (such as Lydia and Tim McGrew) present detailed positive arguments for the historical trustworthiness of the New Testament: undesigned coincidences, accurate incidental details, correct geographical and cultural references, and coherence with external evidence. The argument invites us to treat these documents by the same standards we use for other ancient sources. 2. General reliability does not mean inerrancy or perfection. The maximal approach does not require that every verse be error-free to use the documents historically. Historians routinely regard ancient works as generally reliable while allowing for minor mistakes or uncertainties. The question is whether the New Testament, overall, has the marks of honest reporting about real events...and the McGrews argue that it does. 3. Skeptics are free to challenge particular details, but must then offer an alternative explanation of the cumulative pattern. Even if someone disputes one or two elements, the larger body of interlocking facts, supported by multiple lines of evidence, still stands in need of explanation. The maximal facts approach is powerful precisely because it does not rest on a single verse or isolated claim but on a broad, interconnected network of data. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ People in the ancient world were generally superstitious and uncritical. We should not put much stock in their miracle reports, including resurrection claims.
1. The New Testament authors often show critical awareness of alternative explanations. The Gospels and Acts mention attempts to explain away miracles (e.g., accusations of demonic power, claims that the disciples stole the body, doubts within the ranks of the disciples themselves). They record skepticism and verification behaviors (touching, eating, extended conversations) rather than blind acceptance. 2. Intellectual ability and critical reasoning are not modern inventions. Ancient historians, philosophers, and legal writers display sophisticated reasoning and awareness of human error. First-century Jews and Greeks knew that dead people stay dead; that is why resurrection, when claimed, was so controversial. The very scandal of the resurrection message argues against a background of uncritical gullibility. 3. Credulity in some areas does not invalidate all testimony. Modern people can be gullible too, yet we still rely on eyewitness reports in courts, journalism, and everyday life. The question is not whether ancient people ever believed foolish things, but whether specific witnesses in specific contexts give us good reason to trust them about specific events...especially when multiple, independent, mutually reinforcing testimonies are available. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses
+ The Gospel accounts of the resurrection contain apparent contradictions. If they cannot even agree on basic details, we should not build a maximal argument on them.
1. Many alleged contradictions dissolve on closer examination. Differences in emphasis, compression, or selection of details can look like contradictions at first glance but can often be plausibly harmonized. Defenders of the McGrews’ approach offer specific case studies showing how various accounts fit together like different camera angles on the same events. 2. Variation in secondary details is exactly what we expect from independent witnesses. In ordinary historical and legal contexts, slight divergences in detail are a mark of genuine, independent testimony, not collusion. A perfectly uniform set of stories would raise suspicion of fabrication. The Gospels’ differences, set against their deep underlying agreement, look more like authentic multiple attestation than like sloppy legend. 3. The core claims remain stable and mutually reinforcing. All four Gospels attest to Jesus’ crucifixion under Pilate, His burial, the empty tomb discovered on the first day of the week, and subsequent appearances to followers. The maximal facts argument focuses on this robust center of agreement, supported by multiple authors and traditions, not on every disputed peripheral detail. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ Appealing to a miracle to explain a large collection of facts is still a ‘God of the gaps’ move, just with more gaps described in detail.
1. The maximal facts argument appeals to explanatory power, not to ignorance. “God of the gaps” arguments say, “We do not know how this happened, therefore God did it.” By contrast, the maximal facts approach compares specific naturalistic hypotheses with the resurrection hypothesis and asks which best explains the positive evidence we have. It is a competition of explanations, not a retreat into mystery. 2. The resurrection hypothesis makes positive, testable predictions about the kind of evidence we should expect. If God raised Jesus, we would anticipate an empty tomb, persistent and transformative appearances, early and bold proclamation centered on resurrection, and documents that bear marks of honest testimony. That is exactly the pattern we find. This is not plugging God into a gap but recognizing a theistic explanation that fits the evidence better than its rivals. 3. The argument is framed within a broader theistic context. If we already have independent reasons to believe that God exists, then divine action is not an ad hoc way to patch holes, but a live explanatory option. The resurrection is then assessed as a particular historical claim about what this God has done, rather than as a last-ditch resort when natural causes fail. See also: • Natural Theology Arguments
+ Because the maximal facts argument is cumulative, a skeptic can always resist it by denying enough individual premises or casting doubt on enough details.
1. Logical possibility of resistance is different from rational plausibility. In principle, anyone can deny any premise. The important question is whether such denials are well-motivated and supported by evidence, or whether they are ad hoc moves to avoid an unwelcome conclusion. A cumulative case gains force when each individual premise is independently credible and the overall pattern is hard to dismiss without special pleading. 2. The facts used in the maximal case are diverse and mutually reinforcing. The argument does not lean on a single fragile point. Archaeological realism, undesigned coincidences, early creedal material, external references, internal coherence, and psychological transformation all converge. To dismantle the case, one must undermine many different kinds of evidence, which is far more difficult than raising doubts about a single datum. 3. Cumulative reasoning is standard and appropriate in historical and legal contexts. Courts, historians, and everyday reasoning often rely on the convergence of many small indicators rather than on a single overwhelming proof. The maximal facts argument applies this ordinary pattern of reasoning to the question of Jesus’ resurrection, inviting fair-minded evaluation rather than demanding blind acceptance. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

Contra Conspiracy Hypothesis (Stolen-Body Theory)

(P1) The conspiracy hypothesis claims that the disciples knowingly lied by stealing Jesus’ body and fabricating resurrection appearances. According to this view, the core witnesses to the resurrection did not sincerely believe that God had raised Jesus. Instead, they deliberately removed His corpse from the tomb and then proclaimed that He had risen, inventing stories of appearances they knew were false. The hypothesis thus rests on intentional deception by the earliest Christian leaders about the central claim of their faith.

(P2) First-century Jewish expectations and the disciples’ post-crucifixion condition make such a deliberate resurrection hoax highly implausible. As first-century Jews, the disciples did not expect a crucified and cursed Messiah to be vindicated by resurrection within history. A shameful Roman execution signaled divine rejection, not victory. Their belief in resurrection concerned a general raising of the dead at the end of the age, not an isolated event involving the Messiah. After Jesus’ death, they were discouraged, fearful, and in hiding. Under these conditions, the intentional creation of a radical, theologically novel resurrection hoax is historically and psychologically unlikely.

(P3) The disciples’ sustained willingness to suffer and die for the resurrection message strongly supports their sincerity rather than a conscious lie. From the earliest centuries, Christian sources and external testimony converge in depicting the apostles as facing persecution, imprisonment, hardship, and, in several cases, martyrdom for proclaiming the risen Christ. People will sometimes die for beliefs that are false but sincerely held; it is far more difficult to explain a group of conspirators enduring severe suffering for a claim they themselves invented and knew to be false, especially over many years and across diverse regions, without evidence of recantation that exposes the plot.

(P4) The character of the early resurrection testimony fits honest, sometimes embarrassing witness, not a carefully crafted piece of propaganda. The Gospels and early preaching include numerous features that are awkward or counterproductive if the aim were to promote a calculated hoax: women as the first discoverers of the empty tomb; the cowardice, doubts, and failures of leading disciples (including Peter’s denial); and the slowness of the apostles themselves to believe the resurrection reports. Such elements are more naturally explained as the candid memory of a community preserving what actually happened, rather than as the polished product of a conspiracy seeking power or prestige.

(C) Therefore, the conspiracy / stolen-body hypothesis is not a credible explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the rise of the disciples’ resurrection-centered faith.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004.
+ Religious leaders sometimes lie for power, wealth, or influence. The apostles could have done the same.
1. The apostles’ historical pattern is one of sacrifice and loss, not worldly gain. The earliest Christian witnesses face hostility and hardship: imprisonment, beatings, exile, and often death. They do not acquire palaces, armies, or political office. Their ministry involves physical danger, poverty, and service, which is the opposite of what religious frauds typically seek if their goal is power or luxury. 2. The message they preached is not tailored for easy popularity. The proclamation of a crucified Messiah was a “stumbling block” to Jews and “foolishness” to many Gentiles. The call to repentance, self-denial, sexual purity, and love of enemies is demanding and costly. If they were inventing a religion for self-advantage, they chose an unusually offensive and sacrificial message. 3. Dying for a known lie across an entire core group is psychologically implausible. Individuals sometimes persist in lies when they benefit, but a whole inner circle continuing to affirm what they know is false, over many years and under persecution, without credible evidence of any leader exposing the fraud to save himself, is extremely difficult to explain. The pattern of their lives fits sincerity far better than calculated deception.
+ Perhaps the disciples, in grief and panic, stole the body first, and only later rationalized and solidified a resurrection story around what they had done.
1. Their theological expectations do not naturally lead to inventing a bodily resurrection. As Jews, the disciples expected a powerful, triumphant Messiah and a general resurrection at the end of history. After a shameful crucifixion, the more natural response would have been to admit they were mistaken about Jesus or to honor Him as a martyred prophet, not to claim that He had already been bodily raised in the middle of history. 2. The narrative of the disciples after the crucifixion is one of fear and retreat, not bold planning. The earliest accounts depict the disciples as scattered, hiding, and afraid. Organizing a tomb robbery under the watch of hostile religious authorities and, possibly, Roman guards would require courage and coordination these same sources say they lacked at that point. 3. A rash act does not explain decades of unified, costly proclamation. Even if some impulsive theft had occurred, it does not explain why, over time, none of the core participants confessed the original deed, even under pressure. The long-term, consistent, and public preaching of the resurrection across different regions is better accounted for by genuine conviction rather than a story invented after an ill-considered theft.
+ Other religious movements may have originated in deception or fraud. Christianity could simply be another example.
1. Pointing to possible fraud elsewhere does not establish fraud here. The fact that some leaders in history have lied does not show that the apostles did. One must examine the specific historical context, evidence, and character of the early Christian movement, rather than assuming guilt by analogy. 2. The apostolic pattern differs from classic cases of exploitative founders. Known charlatans often accumulate wealth, control, and moral exceptions for themselves. By contrast, the apostles preach humility, personal holiness, and sacrificial love, and they live under these demands themselves, even at great personal cost. Their own conduct argues against a cynical, self-serving plot. 3. The resurrection claim is anchored in public events in a hostile environment. The disciples proclaim the resurrection in Jerusalem, where Jesus had been publicly executed and where authorities were strongly motivated to suppress the movement. Fraudulent claims about a missing body and public appearances would have been easier to expose there than in some distant, inaccessible place. The survival and growth of the movement in that setting favors sincerity, not invention.
+ Instead of a calculated plot, the disciples might have gradually convinced themselves of a story they originally knew was doubtful, blurring the line between lie and belief.
1. This shifts the explanation away from true conspiracy to something like legend or psychological error. If the disciples no longer knowingly lie but sincerely misremember or reinterpret events, that is no longer the conspiracy hypothesis. It becomes closer to the legend hypothesis or a kind of psychological theory of self-deception, which must be evaluated on its own merits. 2. The time frame for such drift is too short given the early, fixed core of the resurrection proclamation. Key resurrection traditions, such as the creed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7, arise within a few years of the events, already listing a structured set of appearances and proclaiming bodily resurrection. This does not look like a slow, hazy evolution of memory decades later; it looks like a quick, confident, and widely shared claim. 3. Group self-deception does not explain the empty tomb and the convergence of independent witnesses. To maintain that all core witnesses gradually talked themselves into believing a resurrection that never happened, while also explaining away the empty tomb and the variety of appearance traditions, requires a complex and speculative psychological story. A straightforward reading...that they testified to what they took to be real encounters with the risen Jesus...is simpler and fits better with the data.
+ Perhaps a small subgroup faked the empty tomb while others, not part of the deception, had real visions or experiences they took as confirmation.
1. This multiplies ad hoc elements and splits the explanation without textual support. Now we must posit at least two kinds of actors: deliberate deceivers who manipulate the tomb and sincere experiencers who are unaware of the deception, plus a process by which all of this coheres into a unified proclamation. The historical sources, however, present the apostolic group as united in testimony, not divided into liars and dupes. 2. Early proclamation tightly interweaves the empty tomb and bodily appearances. The New Testament preaching and narratives link the empty tomb and the appearances into a single theological claim: “He is not here; He has risen.” They do not suggest that some leaders focused solely on a missing body while others independently had unrelated visionary experiences. The story is woven together from the start. 3. Combining partial fraud with partial hallucination or error is less plausible than a single, coherent explanation. A hybrid theory that invokes some conspirators, some hallucinations, and some misunderstandings quickly becomes complex and speculative. The unifying explanation that the disciples encountered the risen Jesus and reported what they believed they had experienced is historically simpler and more satisfying than a patchwork of partial frauds and partial psychological phenomena.

Contra Apparent Death Hypothesis (Swoon Theory)

(P1) Given Roman execution practices and Jesus’ recorded condition, survival of crucifixion and burial is historically and medically implausible. Roman soldiers were professional executioners whose duty was to ensure that crucified victims were dead before removal from the cross. Jesus was severely scourged, nailed to the cross, left to asphyxiate, and then pierced in the side, which the Gospel of John reports as producing a flow of blood and water. Even many critical scholars concede that, in light of these factors, Jesus truly died on the cross rather than merely appearing to die.

(P2) Even if Jesus had somehow survived crucifixion, His post-crucifixion condition would not have generated belief in a glorious, victorious resurrection. A man who had barely escaped death by crucifixion would have been gravely wounded, weak, and in need of urgent medical care. Limping out of a tomb, bleeding and traumatized, He would have elicited pity and the hope of recovery, not the conviction that He had conquered death in a transformed, immortal state. The disciples’ proclamation that Jesus was the risen Lord and conqueror of death does not match what a half-dead survivor would reasonably inspire.

(P3) Logistical and environmental factors surrounding Jesus’ burial further undermine the survival scenario. The burial accounts describe Jesus being wrapped in linen, laid in a rock-hewn tomb, and the entrance being closed with a heavy stone. In at least some accounts, guards are posted. A man in Jesus’ condition would have had to regain consciousness unaided, free Himself from grave clothes, move the stone from the inside, possibly evade or overpower guards, and then travel to meet His followers...all without medical treatment, food, or water in a short span of time. This combination of feats strains plausibility given His prior torture and execution.

(P4) Because of these difficulties, the apparent death hypothesis is almost universally rejected by contemporary New Testament historians and medical commentators on crucifixion. While the swoon theory enjoyed some popularity in earlier centuries, modern discussions of Roman crucifixion procedures, combined with historical-critical studies of the passion narratives, have led most scholars...across a broad spectrum of views on the resurrection...to dismiss it as a viable explanation. It is seen as ad hoc, medically implausible, and out of step with what we know about Roman executions and burial practices.

(C) Therefore, the apparent death / swoon hypothesis is not a credible explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the disciples’ robust belief that Jesus had been bodily raised from the dead.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004.
+ Roman soldiers sometimes made mistakes. It is possible they thought Jesus was dead when in fact He was only unconscious.
1. Professional executioners had strong practical incentives to ensure death. Roman soldiers tasked with crucifixion had extensive experience and were subject to severe penalties if a condemned criminal survived. Their job was not to guess but to make certain the execution was complete. It is historically unlikely that they would remove a victim they merely suspected to be dead. 2. The reported spear thrust provides an additional check on Jesus’ death. The Gospel of John describes a soldier piercing Jesus’ side with a spear, producing a flow of blood and water...a detail often interpreted as consistent with a fatal wound to the chest cavity. Even if one questions John’s theological motives, the inclusion of such a specific, bodily detail is aimed at underlining that Jesus was truly dead, not merely unconscious. 3. A rare theoretical possibility does not outweigh the combined force of the historical and medical evidence. While absolute logical impossibility is not claimed, the historical question is what is most probable given Roman practice, the nature of crucifixion, and the specific narrative details. On that level, survival is extremely unlikely and not a reasonable basis for explaining the origin of the Easter faith.
+ People have been known to survive extreme injuries and recover unexpectedly. Jesus could have been one such extraordinary case.
1. Extraordinary modern recoveries typically involve medical care and supportive conditions. Survivors of severe trauma today usually benefit from surgery, transfusions, sterile environments, and intensive aftercare. Jesus, by contrast, would have been left in a cold, dark tomb, wrapped in linen, without food, water, or medical attention. 2. The scenario requires not just survival but extraordinary physical capability soon afterward. The apparent death hypothesis asks us to believe that Jesus, after surviving scourging, crucifixion, and a spear wound, not only revived but had enough strength to free Himself from grave clothes, move a heavy stone, potentially evade guards, and then travel to meet and speak with His followers. This is far more demanding than merely “hanging on” in a hospital bed. 3. Even an astonishing survival would not produce the specific resurrection belief we see. At most, such a recovery would support the conclusion that Jesus, though gravely injured, was still mortal and had narrowly escaped death. It would not naturally lead monotheistic Jews to proclaim that He had been raised in glory, conquered death, and inaugurated the general resurrection ahead of time.
+ The cool air and quiet of the tomb could have functioned like a primitive intensive care setting, helping Jesus slowly revive rather than die.
1. The tomb environment lacks the essentials needed for recovery. A rock-hewn tomb provides no medical equipment, no antiseptics, no attendants, and no ready access to food or water. For a man with deep lacerations, nailed extremities, and a spear wound, such an environment would more likely hasten death through shock, blood loss, and infection than facilitate recovery. 2. The physical obstacles remain formidable even if revival occurred. Jesus would still face the problem of moving the blocking stone from inside, managing His grave clothes, and exiting without assistance. If guards were present, He would also need to escape without being apprehended. The tomb’s “quiet” does not remove these concrete difficulties. 3. The theory still does not account for the nature of the disciples’ testimony. The disciples do not simply report seeing a weak, recuperating Jesus; they testify to a risen Lord who appears and disappears, is no longer subject to death, and is exalted by God. A scenario of gradual revival in a tomb cannot naturally be stretched to fit these robust resurrection claims without becoming highly speculative.
+ If Jesus had survived and appeared to His followers in any condition, their emotional attachment could have led them to interpret this as proof that He had risen.
1. The disciples were not expecting a resurrection of this kind. First-century Jewish disciples did not anticipate that their Messiah would be crucified and then individually raised from the dead before the end of the world. After the crucifixion, they are portrayed as demoralized, not as eagerly waiting for Jesus to reappear any way He could. 2. The resurrection claim goes far beyond “He’s alive after all.” The early Christian message is not simply that Jesus somehow survived; it is that God raised Him from the dead, vindicated Him as Lord, and inaugurated the eschatological resurrection in His person. This is a bold theological claim that outstrips mere survival and reflects a conviction that death itself has been decisively overcome. 3. Emotional attachment cannot generate the objective signs claimed, such as the empty tomb and multiple, transformative appearances. Even if strong attachment made the disciples more open to positive interpretations, it does not in itself create an empty tomb, nor does it explain the breadth and character of the appearance traditions, including appearances to skeptics like James and an enemy like Paul.
+ Even if the swoon theory is unlikely, it is still a natural explanation and should be preferred over a miraculous resurrection.
1. An explanation’s mere “naturalness” does not automatically make it the best explanation. Historians aim for explanations that are not only natural but also coherent, simple, and well-supported by the data. A highly contrived natural hypothesis that stretches or ignores the evidence is not automatically superior to a simpler, better-fitting theistic explanation, especially if the existence of God is already supported by independent arguments. 2. The swoon theory is both ad hoc and in tension with multiple lines of evidence. To sustain it, one must posit a long chain of unlikely events: mistaken death pronouncement, survival of extreme trauma without care, escape from a sealed tomb, evasion of guards, rapid physical recovery, and then successful persuasion of followers that He is the conqueror of death. This complexity and improbability work against its being the best-fit explanation. 3. If God exists, a resurrection is not inherently less reasonable than an extremely improbable natural accident. If it is even possible that God exists, then a miracle such as the resurrection is also possible. In that context, historians are justified in considering whether God’s raising Jesus from the dead provides a more unified and less ad hoc explanation of the empty tomb, the appearances, and the disciples’ transformed conviction than the swoon theory does.

Contra Displaced Body Hypothesis

(P1) The displaced body hypothesis claims that Jesus’ body was moved from the original tomb to another location, leading to an honestly mistaken belief in resurrection. On this view, Jesus was initially placed in a convenient, temporary tomb (such as Joseph of Arimathea’s) and later transferred to a different burial place...perhaps a common grave. When some of Jesus’ followers found the first tomb empty and did not know about the transfer, they concluded that God had raised Him from the dead. The hypothesis thus seeks to explain the empty tomb without fraud or miracle, by appeal to an unpublicized relocation of the corpse.

(P2) Jewish burial customs and the specific details of Jesus’ burial make such a quiet, unofficial relocation unlikely. Jewish burial practice in the first century generally discouraged moving a body after interment, except for transferring remains to a family tomb. The Gospels emphasize that Jesus was buried in a new rock-hewn tomb owned by Joseph of Arimathea, which suggests a deliberate and honorable burial, not an improvised, temporary arrangement. If the intention had been to place Jesus in a common grave for criminals, such a grave was likely already available near the execution site, making a detour through Joseph’s tomb unnecessary and implausible as a mere stopgap.

(P3) If Jesus’ body had been relocated, those responsible (especially Joseph or the authorities) could have easily corrected the disciples’ supposed mistake once resurrection was publicly proclaimed. The early Christian message that “God has raised Jesus” was first preached in Jerusalem, the very city where Jesus had been buried. If the body had simply been moved to another known location, Joseph of Arimathea, Jesus’ family, or the Jewish and Roman authorities could, in principle, have identified the new burial site or produced the body. This would have decisively refuted the resurrection proclamation and undercut the nascent Christian movement. The absence of any such counter-demonstration is difficult to reconcile with a simple, known relocation theory.

(P4) The displaced body hypothesis does not account for the breadth and character of the resurrection appearances and the disciples’ transformed conviction. Even if the body had been moved and the first disciples mistakenly assumed resurrection, this would not explain why multiple individuals and groups...some of them initially skeptical...came to have powerful experiences they took to be encounters with the risen Jesus. Nor does it explain why these experiences led to a stable, bold proclamation of bodily resurrection, rather than to confusion and eventual correction once the true location of the body became known or remained discoverable in the surrounding community.

(P5) Because it is speculative, weakly attested, and fails to explain the core data, the displaced body hypothesis has little support among contemporary resurrection scholars. Modern historical and theological discussions of the resurrection rarely rely on the displaced body theory. It lacks direct textual or archaeological support, conflicts with known burial customs, and leaves the appearance traditions and the disciples’ transformed worldview largely untouched. As a result, it is generally regarded as an ad hoc attempt to preserve a purely natural explanation of the empty tomb rather than as a well-grounded historical hypothesis.

(C) Therefore, the displaced body hypothesis is not a plausible or comprehensive explanation of the empty tomb, the resurrection appearances, or the origin of the early Christian resurrection faith.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004.
+ Because of time pressure before the Sabbath, Joseph could have used his tomb only temporarily, intending to move Jesus’ body later.
1. The burial narratives emphasize deliberate honor, not a casual stopgap. The Gospels portray Joseph of Arimathea as intentionally giving Jesus a dignified burial in his own new tomb, with care taken in wrapping the body and sealing the entrance. This suggests a settled arrangement rather than a hurried, makeshift solution that was always meant to be reversed. 2. A common grave for criminals would have been immediately available if desired. If the goal was simply to dispose of the body quickly in view of the Sabbath, burial in a nearby common grave would have been sufficient from the start. Diverting the body into a private, honorific tomb, only to move it again later, introduces an unnecessary and unexplained extra step. 3. The hypothesis requires significant actions by Joseph that the sources neither mention nor imply. The texts never hint that Joseph later planned to remove the body. Introducing this intention is speculative and not grounded in explicit evidence, weakening the displaced body scenario as a historical explanation.
+ Perhaps Jewish law allowed enough flexibility that moving Jesus’ body later would not have been unusual or problematic.
1. The general presumption in Jewish practice was to respect the finality of burial. While there were circumstances under which remains could be transferred (for example, to a family tomb after the flesh had decayed), Jewish tradition did not treat post-burial movement of bodies as a trivial matter. It was typically regulated and tied to family or ritual considerations. 2. The displaced body hypothesis requires a casual, unannounced move rather than a customary, family-based transfer. The theory envisions Joseph or others secretly relocating Jesus’ body in a way that left the disciples completely ignorant. This is different from known, regulated practices and would be at odds with the public significance of Jesus’ execution and burial. 3. Even if movement were theoretically permitted, that does not show it actually happened in this case. Appealing to legal possibility is not the same as providing historical evidence. The question is not whether it could have been allowed in principle, but whether there are good reasons to think it actually occurred. The sources are silent on such a move, and the overall context does not make it likely.
+ The Jewish or Roman authorities might have removed Jesus’ body from Joseph’s tomb to prevent it from becoming a shrine and simply not informed His followers.
1. Such an action would likely have created records or at least strong, consistent counter-traditions. If the authorities had taken the unusual step of relocating a high-profile crucifixion victim’s body, there would have been an obvious interest in appealing to this fact once the resurrection was publicly preached. Yet we do not find a trace of a clear, alternative burial story from official sources in the early record. 2. The simplest way to suppress the resurrection claim would have been to produce the body. When the disciples proclaimed that God raised Jesus and that His tomb was empty, authorities could have countered by publicizing the new burial location or producing the remains, especially if they themselves had ordered the transfer. The absence of such a response argues against the idea that they had control of a relocated corpse. 3. The earliest Jewish explanation assumes the body is missing, not safely relocated. According to the Gospel of Matthew, the Jewish response was to claim that the disciples stole the body. While this source is Christian, the polemic it records presupposes that Jesus’ body was not available to be displayed. A simple, official relocation would have provided a more powerful counter than alleging theft.
+ The followers of Jesus might have gone to the wrong tomb, found it empty, and mistakenly believed it was His.
1. The burial accounts suggest clear, specific knowledge of the tomb’s location. The Gospels describe some of Jesus’ followers, including women who had witnessed the burial, later returning to the same tomb. Joseph of Arimathea’s involvement and the reference to a particular new tomb cut in rock indicate that this was an identifiable place, not a vague or anonymous grave among many. 2. The “wrong tomb” idea does not fit the ongoing controversy in Jerusalem. If the early Christians were simply mistaken about the tomb, the authorities or local residents could have indicated the correct location and shown that Jesus’ body was still there. Instead, the polemic assumes an empty tomb problem, not a “you have the wrong address” misunderstanding. 3. Misidentification does not explain the structured appearance traditions and conversions of skeptics. Even if a wrong-tomb error occurred, it would not by itself generate the multiple, coordinated reports of post-mortem appearances to named individuals and groups, including former opponents like Paul. The hypothesis thus fails to account for major parts of the data and functions more as a partial excuse than a full explanation.
+ Although the displaced body theory is speculative, it keeps the explanation natural. A speculative natural explanation is still better than invoking a miracle.
1. Historical explanations are evaluated by fit with the evidence, not by “naturalness” alone. While historians typically look for natural causes, an explanation that is weakly supported, highly conjectural, and leaves major facts unexplained is not automatically superior just because it avoids the supernatural. Explanatory power, coherence, and plausibility all matter. 2. The displaced body theory is both ad hoc and incomplete. It relies on an unrecorded body transfer for which we have no direct evidence, clashes with burial customs, and fails to address the appearance traditions and radical transformation of the disciples. As such, it does not offer a comprehensive account of the resurrection data. 3. If independent reasons make belief in God reasonable, a miraculous explanation can be the best overall account. If arguments from cosmology, morality, fine-tuning, and so on render theism plausible, then God’s raising Jesus from the dead is not an arbitrary add-on but a theologically meaningful act. In that context, a resurrection may provide a simpler and more unifying explanation of the empty tomb and appearances than a highly speculative natural scenario like the displaced body hypothesis.

Contra Hallucination Hypothesis

(P1) The resurrection appearances exhibit a pattern (multiple, varied, group, and to skeptics) that does not fit what is known about hallucinations or private visions. The earliest sources report that Jesus appeared on multiple occasions, in different locations, to a range of people: individual disciples, small groups, and “more than five hundred” at one time. Some of these were former skeptics or opponents (James, the brother of Jesus, and Paul). Hallucinations and similar visionary experiences are typically private, individual, and idiosyncratic; there is no established psychological parallel to large, coordinated, multi-person experiences of the same figure across diverse contexts.

(P2) Hallucinations or visions by themselves would not naturally lead first-century Jews to proclaim a bodily resurrection with an empty tomb. In the ancient Jewish worldview, visions of the deceased were generally taken as evidence that the person was dead and in the afterlife, not as proof that the person had been bodily raised. At most, private experiences of Jesus after His death could have been interpreted as confirming His vindication in heaven. They would not by themselves explain the strong claim that His grave was empty and that God had already raised Him bodily from the dead within history.

(P3) The hallucination hypothesis fails to explain the empty tomb and the early, unified proclamation of physical resurrection in the very city of Jesus’ execution. Even if one granted that some disciples had subjective experiences of Jesus, this would not remove His body from the grave. The empty tomb tradition is early, multiple, and implied even by Jewish polemic that accuses the disciples of theft. Moreover, the earliest Christian preaching in Jerusalem centrally proclaims that God raised Jesus and that His tomb was empty. A theory limited to hallucinations or visions leaves this physical side of the evidence unexplained or treats it as a later, ad hoc addition.

(P4) Because of these problems, many scholars (including critical ones) acknowledge that simple hallucination theories cannot by themselves account for the core resurrection data. Even some non-Christian or skeptical New Testament scholars admit that the disciples and others had powerful experiences they took to be encounters with the risen Christ, and that the hallucination hypothesis faces serious difficulties in explaining the full pattern. The combination of group appearances, transformation of former skeptics, the role of the empty tomb, and the early, concrete resurrection proclamation makes a pure hallucination theory inadequate for explaining the historical origins of the Easter faith.

(C) Therefore, the hallucination hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation of the resurrection appearances, the empty tomb, or the disciples’ robust belief that Jesus had been bodily raised from the dead.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004. Gary Habermas, “Explaining Away Jesus’ Resurrection: The Recent Revival of Hallucination Theories,” Christian Research Journal 23, no. 4 (2001).
+ The disciples loved Jesus and were emotionally devastated by His death. Intense grief and religious expectation can lead to hallucinations or visionary experiences.
1. The disciples were not expecting an individual resurrection of this kind. First-century Jews anticipated a general resurrection at the end of the age, not the isolated resurrection of the Messiah in the middle of history, especially after a shameful crucifixion. Far from expecting Jesus to rise, they are depicted as confused and unbelieving when confronted with early reports of the empty tomb and appearances. 2. Emotional grief does not explain group experiences and appearances to skeptics. Grief-related hallucinations are typically private and limited to those who loved the deceased. Yet the early tradition includes group appearances and appearances to individuals like James and Paul, who were not in a state of bereaved devotion to Jesus at the time. This pattern goes beyond what grief alone would predict. 3. Intense feelings do not by themselves remove a body from a tomb or create a durable, public proclamation. Even if some disciples had visionary experiences under emotional strain, that would not empty the tomb or explain why, very soon afterward, they confidently preached the bodily resurrection of Jesus in Jerusalem, appealing to public facts rather than purely private experiences.
+ Psychological phenomena like group hysteria or suggestion can lead multiple people to report similar visionary experiences. The group appearances could be explained this way.
1. Clinical hallucinations remain essentially individual events. In psychological case studies, hallucinations are inner experiences in one person’s mind. “Shared” experiences of this sort usually reduce to individuals influencing each other’s interpretations, not literally seeing the same external figure in a coordinated way. There is no well-documented case of hundreds of people hallucinating the same detailed, physical figure at the same time and place. 2. The resurrection appearances are diverse in time, place, audience, and mood. The sources present appearances in different locations (Jerusalem, Galilee, the road to Damascus), to different groups and individuals, and in a range of emotional situations (fear, doubt, disbelief, persecution). This variety makes it difficult to cast the whole pattern as one instance of group hysteria or a single contagious event. 3. The hypothesis of mass, coordinated hallucinations lacks independent support. To invoke rare, large-scale group hallucinations across multiple contexts without strong analogies in the psychological literature is highly speculative. A theory that multiplies unprecedented phenomena in order to avoid a resurrection is not clearly simpler or better supported than the claim that the disciples experienced something objectively real.
+ People in many cultures report seeing or sensing deceased loved ones. The resurrection appearances could just be ordinary grief-visions interpreted through a religious lens.
1. Ordinary “visions of the dead” are usually taken as signs that the person is still dead. Across cultures, when someone reports seeing a deceased friend or relative, this is commonly understood as evidence that the person has passed on to another realm, not that the person is bodily alive again. Ancient Jews would not have taken a mere vision of Jesus as proof of a physical resurrection. 2. The early Christian claim goes far beyond typical after-death experiences. The disciples preached that Jesus’ tomb was empty, that He had been raised bodily, and that He was the firstfruits of the eschatological resurrection. This is a precise, bold theological claim, not just a generic sense that “His spirit lives on.” Simple grief-visions do not naturally generate this kind of robust resurrection theology. 3. Explaining away the appearances as generic visions still leaves multiple other facts untouched. Even if some experiences were visionary, the hypothesis does not explain the empty tomb, the early and structured resurrection creed in 1 Corinthians 15, or the conversions of figures like James and Paul under hostile or skeptical starting conditions. Reducing all the appearances to ordinary “visions of the deceased” underestimates the scope and specificity of the historical data.
+ If the empty tomb narrative developed later, then hallucinations or visions alone might be enough to explain the earliest resurrection belief.
1. There are strong reasons to regard the empty tomb as an early tradition. The empty tomb account is embedded in multiple, independent strands of tradition and presupposed by early preaching in Jerusalem. The Jewish accusation that the disciples stole the body assumes that the tomb was known to be empty. These factors point to the emptiness of the tomb being part of the historical core, not a late legend tacked on. 2. Early resurrection proclamation already reflects a bodily and historical emphasis. From the beginning, Christian preaching centers on what God did in history to Jesus’ body, not merely on inward experiences. Paul’s language in 1 Corinthians 15, for example, stresses that Jesus “was buried” and “was raised” and that the risen Christ appeared to many witnesses, implying continuity between the buried body and the raised one. 3. A theory that removes a major piece of evidence to save a hypothesis is methodologically suspect. To preserve the hallucination theory, this defeater must downplay or discard the empty tomb data rather than integrate it. A more balanced historical approach considers all the main lines of evidence together and asks what best explains them as a whole, not what hypothesis can be made to work if important data are set aside.
+ Perhaps no single hallucination theory fits perfectly, but a mix of visions, misremembered events, and gradual story development is still more reasonable than a supernatural resurrection.
1. Multiplying speculative elements does not necessarily increase explanatory power. A hybrid theory that combines hallucinations, memory distortions, and legendary embellishment may sound flexible, but it quickly becomes complex and difficult to test. By contrast, the claim that Jesus truly rose and appeared to many provides a single, coherent explanation for the empty tomb, the variety of appearances, and the rapid, unified resurrection proclamation. 2. The time frame and structure of early tradition limit room for slow legendary growth. The creed in 1 Corinthians 15 and other early texts show that, within a few years, the church already had a definite list of resurrection appearances and a strong bodily-resurrection message. This compresses the window for a gradual, uncontrolled evolution of stories into something approaching what we actually see. 3. If God exists, a resurrection can be a more reasonable explanation than an elaborate, low-probability natural mosaic. If one already has good reason to believe in God’s existence, then a miraculous act at a pivotal moment in salvation history is not arbitrary. In that context, positing that God raised Jesus may be more rational than postulating a complex set of rare psychological and sociological events that happen to mimic all the marks of a real resurrection without one actually occurring.

Contra Legend Hypothesis

(P1) The legend hypothesis claims that resurrection stories gradually developed over time as pious fiction rather than stemming from early eyewitness testimony. According to this view, the earliest followers of Jesus may have had some kind of vague conviction that He was vindicated by God, but detailed accounts of an empty tomb and bodily appearances to many people arose much later as stories were retold and embellished. On this account, the resurrection narratives represent a long process of legendary development rather than reliable early memory of what actually happened.

(P2) Key resurrection traditions (especially the 1 Corinthians 15 creed) are extremely early and rooted in the eyewitness generation, leaving little time for a purely legendary process to create the core claims. Most scholars date the creed Paul quotes in 1 Corinthians 15:3–7 to within a few years of Jesus’ death, drawing on testimony from figures like Peter, James, and the Jerusalem apostles. This early formula already includes the claims that Christ died, was buried, was raised, and appeared to named individuals and groups, including more than five hundred people at once. Such a structured, resurrection-centered tradition so close to the events is difficult to explain if the core resurrection belief were a much later legendary invention.

(P3) The character of the Gospel resurrection narratives shows restraint and proximity to eyewitnesses, not the extravagance typical of late legends and apocryphal stories. Compared to later apocryphal gospels, the canonical resurrection accounts are relatively sober. They lack the outlandish, highly embellished details found in some second-century writings (such as talking crosses or wildly fantastical scenes). The Gospels also preserve numerous “embarrassing” features, like women as the first witnesses, the disciples’ fear and doubt, and the initial unbelief of some followers...features that legendary story-tellers aiming to glorify their heroes would be unlikely to invent. These marks support the claim that the narratives are anchored in genuine early memory rather than free-floating legend.

(P4) The legend hypothesis cannot easily account for the rapid, widespread, and unified proclamation of bodily resurrection in the very first Christian communities. From the earliest documents we possess (such as Paul’s letters), Christians across different cities are already proclaiming the bodily resurrection of Jesus as the central message of the faith. Paul assumes that his audiences have already been taught this and treats it as non-negotiable. This rapid, geographically broad agreement is implausible if the resurrection stories were slowly evolving legends that only emerged after a long period of theological reflection and story growth removed from the eyewitness generation.

(P5) Because the legend hypothesis fits poorly with the early dating and nature of the sources, many scholars...even critical ones...accept the core facts (empty tomb, appearances, early belief) while rejecting a purely legendary origin. A number of non-Christian or skeptical scholars are willing to grant, as historical facts, that the tomb was found empty (by someone), that various individuals and groups had experiences they interpreted as appearances of the risen Jesus, and that the earliest disciples came quickly to believe in His resurrection. They may explain these facts differently, but they generally do not dismiss them as mere legend. This broad acknowledgment reflects the inadequacy of a simple “it’s all legend” approach to the historical data.

(C) Therefore, the legend hypothesis is not an adequate explanation of the origin and content of the early Christian resurrection proclamation.

Craig, William Lane. Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus. Revised edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2024. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004.
+ In some cultures, legends and miracle stories can arise very quickly. The resurrection narratives might be early and still largely legendary.
1. Rapid legendary growth is possible, but it still requires space between the events and firm, stable tradition. For a legend to take hold, there typically needs to be a period of retelling in which eyewitness checks fade, details become flexible, and communities accept embellishments without effective correction. In the case of Jesus’ resurrection, however, the key claims are already fixed in creeds and preaching within a few years, while many witnesses are still alive and active. 2. The central resurrection claim is not a minor embellishment but the heart of the earliest message. Delivering Jesus from death and exalting Him as risen Lord is not an optional flourish added to an otherwise complete religion; it is the foundation of Christian preaching from the very beginning. This central role is difficult to reconcile with the idea that it emerged only as an early legend, rather than as the core conviction of the first believers. 3. The early presence of named witnesses suggests ongoing accountability, not free legendary invention. Traditions like 1 Corinthians 15 explicitly name Peter, James, the Twelve, and the five hundred, many of whom Paul implies are still alive. Inviting appeal to living witnesses is inconsistent with an unconstrained legendary process in which no one can check or correct what is being claimed.
+ The written Gospels come from decades after the events. That is plenty of time for resurrection legends to form and be written down as if they were history.
1. Decades are not necessarily enough for core, publicly contested facts to become pure legend. The Gospels were written roughly 30–60 years after Jesus’ death, within living memory. In that time frame, eyewitnesses and their close associates were still around to confirm or dispute major claims, especially about a public execution and subsequent appearances. 2. The Gospel writers are drawing on earlier, already fixed traditions. Luke explicitly states that he is compiling accounts from earlier witnesses and written sources. The resurrection narratives he records are thus not being invented for the first time around AD 70–90; they reflect longstanding beliefs and stories that predate the written texts, anchored in the earliest church. 3. The canonical Gospels compare favorably to known examples of later legendary writings. When we contrast them with clearly legendary apocryphal gospels from the second century, we see a marked difference in tone and style. The canonical texts are more restrained and historically situated, which is what we would expect if they rest on genuine early testimony rather than on fully developed legend cycles.
+ Differences among the Gospel accounts (number of women, angels, specific details) indicate that the stories became legendary as they were retold.
1. Minor variations are what we expect from multiple witnesses to real events. When independent accounts describe the same event, especially in ancient historiography, they often differ in secondary details (such as order of mention, number of people highlighted, or circumstantial specifics) while agreeing on the main points. This pattern is consistent with independent testimony, not necessarily with fabrication. 2. The core facts remain consistent across the Gospels. All four canonical Gospels affirm that Jesus was crucified, buried, that the tomb was discovered empty on the first day of the week by followers (including women), and that Jesus appeared alive afterward. The alleged discrepancies concern peripheral matters, not the central resurrection claim. 3. Full legendary fabrication often produces harmonized, not divergent, accounts. Where stories are consciously crafted as fiction or theological allegory, authors can and do smooth over difficult details. The presence of unresolved tensions and minor differences may actually signal that the evangelists were preserving traditions they received, rather than inventing or harmonizing them to create a seamless legend.
+ Ancient religions featured myths of dying and rising gods. The resurrection stories about Jesus could be one more version of this widespread legendary pattern.
1. The supposed parallels are often superficial or based on questionable reconstructions. Many “dying and rising god” figures differ significantly from Jesus: their stories are cyclical nature myths, symbolic dramas, or non-historical mythologies tied to fertility and seasons, not claims about a specific historical individual executed under a known Roman governor and raised within a particular cultural context. 2. First-century Jews were resistant to pagan mythological categories. The early Christian movement emerged from a strict monotheistic Jewish environment that rejected pagan gods and myths. It is historically implausible that these Jews would straightforwardly adopt a pagan “dying and rising god” pattern and overlay it on their Messiah, especially when they were highly sensitive to idolatry and doctrinal purity. 3. The earliest sources insist on a concrete, historical resurrection in space and time. The New Testament writers locate Jesus’ death and resurrection in specific places, under specific rulers, and tie them to Israel’s Scriptures and history. This historical framing is a poor fit with generic myth cycles and speaks instead to claims about real events God has brought about in the world.
+ Perhaps there were some initial visionary or spiritual experiences, and then legendary development filled in the rest. That combination might be more plausible than a literal resurrection.
1. A mixed theory must still explain the early, strong, bodily-resurrection language. Even if some experiences were visionary, the earliest Christian proclamation insists that Jesus was raised from the dead in a way that involved His body, not merely His ongoing spiritual presence. This physical emphasis appears too early and too centrally to be a late legendary overlay. 2. Combining partial visions, partial legend, and partial misremembering quickly becomes complex and speculative. A hybrid theory often attempts to account for each piece of data with a different ad hoc explanation...some hallucinations here, some legend there, some confusion elsewhere. This mosaic lacks the simplicity and coherence of the hypothesis that Jesus truly rose and appeared to many, which straightforwardly unites the empty tomb and appearances. 3. If God’s existence is already reasonably supported, the resurrection is not less rational than a layered, low-probability natural story. Given independent arguments for theism, a divine act at the heart of salvation history fits naturally within a theistic worldview. In this light, the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead can be more reasonable than a complicated scenario in which partial experiences and rapid legend-formation combine to mimic all the features of a genuine resurrection without one having actually taken place.

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

Prophecy Fulfillment

Messianic Prophecy in the Old Testament Fulfilled in Jesus

New Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the NT Bible

Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P1) Historical documents written within living memory of the events they describe, and drawing on eyewitness testimony, are generally more reliable than late, anonymous legends. In ordinary historical practice, sources that are: (1) Close in time to the events, (2) Connected to identifiable eyewitnesses or close associates, and (3) Embedded in a community that cares about those events, are given greater weight than sources that arise much later, far from the original setting, and with no clear link to witnesses. The shorter the gap between event and record, the less opportunity there is for wholesale legend to displace core historical memory, especially when other knowledgeable parties are still alive to correct falsehoods. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P2) Key New Testament writings (especially Paul’s letters, the Gospels, and Acts) are best dated to within a few decades of Jesus’ death, squarely within the lifetime of eyewitnesses and contemporaries. Multiple lines of mainstream scholarship...across a wide spectrum of views...support relatively early dates for major New Testament documents: (1) Paul’s undisputed letters (c. AD 48–60). 1 Corinthians, Galatians, 1 Thessalonians, Romans, and others are widely dated to the 50s AD, roughly 20–30 years after Jesus’ crucifixion (c. AD 30). In 1 Corinthians 15:3–7, Paul quotes a pre-existing creed about Jesus’ death, burial, resurrection, and appearances that most scholars date to within a few years of the events it describes. (2) Acts likely before the mid-60s AD. Acts ends with Paul alive and under house arrest in Rome, with no mention of his trial or death (c. mid-60s), the deaths of Peter and James, or the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in AD 70. The most natural explanation is that Acts was written before these major events, placing it in the early-to-mid 60s. (3) Luke before Acts, Mark and Matthew earlier still. Since Acts is the sequel to Luke (Acts 1:1–2), Luke must be earlier than Acts. Many scholars date Luke to the 60s, with Mark and Matthew in the 50s–60s. This puts at least one and probably multiple Gospels within 30–40 years of the crucifixion, when many eyewitnesses and contemporaries were still alive. (4) John within living memory as well. Even relatively later datings for John (e.g., 80s–90s AD) still place it within the lifetime of at least some eyewitnesses and second-generation disciples. And there are good reasons, argued by some scholars, for considering an earlier date for John as well. These timeframes are well within what historians normally consider compatible with serious, historically grounded biography...especially in an oral culture that valued memorization and communal transmission. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P3) The New Testament writings explicitly and implicitly claim close contact with eyewitnesses and early participants in the events they narrate. (1) Luke’s explicit method statement. Luke begins by noting that he has followed all things “closely for some time past” and that his account is based on “those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word” (Luke 1:1–4). This is exactly the kind of historian’s preface we find in other ancient historical works. (2) John’s claim to eyewitness testimony. The Fourth Gospel grounds its narrative in the testimony of the “disciple whom Jesus loved” (John 21:24), indicating that the author is either this eyewitness or closely dependent on him: “This is the disciple who is bearing witness about these things, and who has written these things, and we know that his testimony is true.” (3) Acts’ “we” sections and proximity to Paul. Acts shifts into first-person plural (“we”) in several travel narratives (e.g., Acts 16:10–17; 20:5–15; 21:1–18; 27:1–28:16), strongly suggesting that the author was a traveling companion of Paul for parts of his ministry. This gives Acts direct access to an apostolic eyewitness and his circle. (4) Paul’s personal acquaintance with other eyewitnesses. In Galatians 1–2 and 1 Corinthians 15, Paul notes that he met Peter (Cephas), James, and other apostles, and that he received and passed on tradition that was already established in the Jerusalem church. He emphasizes that he is not preaching a message invented in isolation, but one consistent with those “who were apostles before me” (Galatians 1:17). (5) Early external testimony (e.g., Papias, Irenaeus). Early Christian writers like Papias and Irenaeus report that Mark wrote down Peter’s preaching and that Matthew compiled sayings or a Gospel in the “Hebrew dialect.” While details are debated, this tradition supports a close connection between the canonical Gospels and the apostolic eyewitness circle. Taken together, these internal and external indications present the New Testament authors not as distant, anonymous compilers, but as individuals personally connected to eyewitnesses or being eyewitnesses themselves. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P4) Late, anonymous, and legendary gospels stand in sharp contrast to the canonical Gospels, both in date and in historical character, and therefore do not undermine the early and eyewitness-based nature of the New Testament accounts. (1) Apocryphal gospels generally arise in the 2nd century or later. Documents such as the Gospel of Thomas, Gospel of Peter, Gospel of Judas, and others typically date to well after the first century...often 100–200 years after Jesus. They emerge from later theological movements (e.g., Gnosticism) rather than from the original Palestinian context. (2) Their style and content are markedly different. These later writings tend to lack the dense geographical, political, and cultural specificity found in the canonical Gospels. They often present Jesus delivering abstract, esoteric sayings or performing fantastical, unhistorical miracles, with little concern for realistic narrative setting. (3) Early Christians did not “suppress” equal competitors. The earliest church fathers, when they discuss the four canonical Gospels, treat them as long-established and widely used. The later apocryphal writings are often explicitly rejected or ignored. The pattern is not of powerful bishops excluding rival early accounts, but of the church recognizing, and continuing to use, the earliest texts connected to apostles and their close associates. Thus, appeals to “other gospels” do not weaken the case for early, eyewitness-connected canonical Gospels; they actually highlight how different the canonical four are from the genuinely late and legendary material. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P5) Given their early dates and close connection to eyewitnesses, the New Testament documents deserve a presumption of historical reliability, especially regarding central events like Jesus’ ministry, crucifixion, burial, and post-mortem appearances. When the major New Testament writings are: (1) Written within living memory of the events, (2) Produced by or in close contact with eyewitnesses, (3) Internally coherent and realistic, and (4) Supported by undesigned coincidences and external corroboration, the burden of proof shifts. Skeptics cannot simply dismiss them as “late legends” or “anonymous myths.” Instead, they must offer careful, evidence-based reasons to override the strong initial presumption that such sources are at least broadly reliable historical witnesses. This presumption does not require believing that every minor detail is beyond question. It does, however, justify trusting their main lines of testimony...particularly about Jesus’ public ministry, His crucifixion under Pontius Pilate, and the experiences that His earliest followers interpreted as encounters with the risen Christ. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, the early dating and eyewitness proximity of the New Testament writings strongly support their general historical reliability and undercut skeptical claims that they are late, legendary, or detached from the real Jesus of history.

Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, various editions. Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels. 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. Lydia McGrew, The Mirror or the Mask: Liberating the Gospels from Literary Devices. DeWard, 2019.
+ Isn’t early dating just an apologetic move? Critical scholars usually date the Gospels late, so your early dates are biased and unreliable.
1. Even many critical scholars place the Gospels within 40–60 years of the events. A common critical dating scheme (Mark ~70, Matthew and Luke ~80s, John ~90s) still puts all four Gospels within roughly a generation or two of Jesus’ life...far earlier than the “centuries-later legend” caricature. That is already close enough for serious historical work, especially in an oral culture. 2. There are strong positive arguments for somewhat earlier dates. The abrupt ending of Acts, the portrayal of the Temple as still standing in the Synoptics, the lack of clear awareness of post-70 church controversies in some texts, and other considerations give good reason to consider dates in the 50s–60s for Mark, Matthew, Luke-Acts, and not too long after for John. These are not arbitrary apologetic assertions but arguments that can be evaluated on historical grounds. 3. “Critical consensus” is not static or unanimous. Scholarly opinion has shifted over time and is often divided. There are well-qualified scholars (not just conservative apologists) who defend earlier datings and strong connections to eyewitness testimony. The key question is not how many hold a view, but what the evidence supports. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions
+ Even if the texts are from the first century, oral tradition can change stories rapidly. So early dating doesn’t guarantee historical reliability.
1. Early Christian communities were not casual about the content they preached. The New Testament portrays the apostles and early teachers as deliberately “delivering” and “receiving” specific traditions (1 Corinthians 11:23; 15:3). Repetition in liturgy, catechesis, and preaching would naturally stabilize key narratives and sayings. 2. The presence of living eyewitnesses restrains wild distortion. When people who were actually present at the events are still alive and active in the community, there is a natural check on extreme alterations. This is especially true for public events like Jesus’ crucifixion and the early proclamation of His resurrection. 3. The pattern of undesigned coincidences suggests preservation, not radical reshaping. The many interlocking details across Gospels, Acts, and Paul’s letters indicate a consistent core being transmitted, not stories being freely invented and re-invented. Oral transmission can preserve information with remarkable fidelity, particularly when the community values that information and has mechanisms for guarding it. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude
+ Since the Gospels are technically anonymous in the text and modern scholars dispute traditional authorship, we cannot treat them as eyewitness-related documents.
1. Ancient biography often omitted explicit author names within the text. It was common in antiquity for titles and author attributions to be carried by the book’s opening page, cover, or accompanying tradition rather than by a signature in the main text. The absence of “by Matthew” inside the Gospel does not mean the early church had no idea who wrote it. 2. The uniform early tradition about Gospel authorship is significant. From the second century onward, sources like Papias, Irenaeus, and the Muratorian Fragment consistently attribute the Gospels to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, with no competing names offered. This stability is unusual if these attributions were late inventions, especially for figures like Mark and Luke who were not apostles and would not be obvious “marketing choices.” 3. Eyewitness proximity does not require direct authorship by an apostle. Even if one adopts more cautious views about authorship, the evidence still points to the Gospels being written within communities closely linked to the apostolic eyewitnesses, drawing on their testimony. That is enough for strong historical value, just as modern historians rely on documents produced by associates of key figures. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ Being early and close to the events doesn’t guarantee truth. Other religions have early texts too, but we don’t automatically trust all of their miracle stories.
1. Early dating is one component in a cumulative case, not the whole argument. Christians do not claim that “early = true” by itself. Rather, early dating combined with eyewitness proximity, internal realism, undesigned coincidences, and external corroboration together create a strong case for reliability. 2. The New Testament’s evidential pattern is unusually rich. Compared to many other religious texts, the New Testament offers multiple independent sources, specific historical and geographical anchors, cross-checked incidental details, and strong integration with external history (Roman officials, Jewish leadership, major events like the Temple’s destruction). 3. The same historical standards apply across traditions. If other ancient religious texts meet similar criteria (early, multiple, independent, realistic, corroborated), that counts as evidence for the historical claims they make as well. Historical method is not selectively altered for Christianity. The point is that, by those fair standards, the New Testament does very well. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability
+ Legends don’t need centuries to form. They could have developed in the first few decades, so early dating doesn’t rule out heavy legendary embellishment of Jesus’ story.
1. Rapid legendary growth on a massive scale is historically implausible in a hostile environment. The early Christian message was proclaimed publicly in the very city where Jesus was crucified, in the presence of opponents who had every motive to refute false claims. The notion that a wholly unhistorical picture of Jesus’ miracles and resurrection could take over in a few short decades, without pushback from those who knew otherwise, stretches credulity. 2. The New Testament shows continuity between earliest creedal material and later narrative detail. The resurrection creed in 1 Corinthians 15, which most scholars date to within a few years of the crucifixion, already includes death, burial, resurrection “on the third day,” and appearances to named individuals and groups. The Gospels flesh out these same core claims, rather than presenting a radically different story that would suggest uncontrolled legendary explosion. 3. The internal texture of the Gospels looks like remembered history, not wild legend. The realistic dialogue, naming of minor characters, specific times and places, embarrassment of the disciples, and the presence of undesigned coincidences all point to controlled transmission of real events rather than free, mythic invention. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

Historical Development of the New Testament Canon

(P1) In general, the canon of authoritative writings in a religious community emerges gradually as believers recognize certain books as apostolic, doctrinally sound, and widely used, not by a late arbitrary decree. In both Judaism and Christianity, “canon” did not begin as a single official list handed down all at once. Rather, writings already regarded as authoritative and regularly used in teaching, worship, and doctrine were gradually recognized as a distinct set. Key factors typically include: (1) Apostolic origin or close connection to apostles. (2) Consistency with the core rule of faith (orthodoxy). (3) Widespread and continuous use in churches across different regions. On this model, councils do not create canon out of nothing; they formalize and clarify a consensus that already exists in practice. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P2) The earliest Christian writings we possess are the New Testament books themselves, while apocryphal and Gnostic writings appear later, generally in the second century or beyond. (1) The undisputed letters of Paul (1–2 Thessalonians, 1–2 Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, Philippians, Philemon) are widely dated to the AD 40s–60s. The Gospels and Acts are also first-century works. (2) By contrast, so-called “apocryphal gospels” (such as the Gospel of Thomas, Gospel of Peter, Gospel of Judas, and others) are generally dated by mainstream scholarship to the mid-to-late second century or later. They reflect later theological movements (especially various Gnostic groups) rather than the earliest Palestinian Christian context. (3) When we ask, “What are the earliest Christian writings we actually have?” the answer is: the books that ended up in the New Testament. Later apocryphal works arrive on the scene after the core apostolic witness is already established. Therefore, appeals to “other gospels” do not show that the canonical books were late or that rival first-century traditions were suppressed; they highlight that genuinely later literature exists alongside an already well-established apostolic core. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P3) From the beginning, the New Testament books that became canonical were valued because of their apostolic origins and close connection to eyewitnesses, and they were already being treated as Scripture by other New Testament authors and early Christians. (1) The New Testament books are unique among early Christian writings in that they are either written by apostles (e.g., Paul, Peter, John, Matthew) or by close associates of apostles (e.g., Mark with Peter; Luke with Paul). Early Christians explicitly valued “apostolicity” as a key mark of a book’s authority. (2) Some New Testament writers already treat other New Testament writings as Scripture. For example, 1 Timothy 5:18 appears to quote both Deuteronomy and the Gospel of Luke under the heading “Scripture,” and 2 Peter 3:15–16 refers to Paul’s letters alongside “the other Scriptures,” indicating that certain Christian writings were being placed on a par with the Old Testament. (3) By the end of the second century, the four canonical Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) are firmly established in Christian usage. Church fathers such as Irenaeus explicitly affirm “four and only four” Gospels, widely received across different regions of the Roman world. (4) The Muratorian Fragment (late second century) lists 22 of our 27 New Testament books as recognized in the churches. This shows that a very large core of the canon was already in place well before any major council such as Nicea. These facts demonstrate that the New Testament canon did not suddenly appear in the fourth century; it emerged naturally from the early church’s recognition of apostolic, eyewitness-based writings. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P4) Early Christians did read and appreciate some non-canonical writings, and they did disagree about a few border-line New Testament books, but this reflects careful discernment, not arbitrary power-play or a late invention of the canon at Nicea. (1) Early Christians often used non-canonical texts such as 1 Clement, the Didache, and the Shepherd of Hermas. They could be read in churches and valued for instruction, yet still be distinguished from apostolic Scripture. This shows that early Christians were capable of appreciating useful writings without automatically treating them as canonical. (2) Christians did disagree about the canonicity of some books (for example, Hebrews, James, 2 Peter, 2–3 John, Revelation). Eusebius and others note these “disputed” (antilegomena) books. But this disagreement was mostly at the edges; the central core...four Gospels, Acts, Paul’s letters, and more...was widely recognized very early. (3) The New Testament canon was not decided at the Council of Nicea, nor at any single council. By the time of Nicea (AD 325), the practical canon in use was already very close to our present New Testament. Later councils (such as those in the late fourth century) largely confirmed the consensus rather than inventing it. Far from undermining the canon, these facts show a community carefully sifting writings over time, recognizing those with apostolic authority and consistent use, and distinguishing them from edifying but non-canonical texts. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P5) Early Christians believed that truly canonical books bore intrinsic marks of divine authority and apostolic truth, which the Holy Spirit enabled the church to recognize over time. Alongside historical and practical criteria, early Christians held that canonical books were, in some sense, self-authenticating: (1) They exhibited a distinctive apostolic voice and consistency with the “rule of faith” taught from the beginning. (2) They had a powerful and enduring impact on the life, worship, and doctrine of the churches. (3) Believers saw in them the marks of God’s own speaking, a quality that set them apart from other useful but merely human writings. This belief did not replace historical investigation; rather, it complemented it. The same features that impressed early Christians theologically (apostolic origin, doctrinal soundness, spiritual fruit) also support, on historical grounds, the conclusion that the canonical books are the best, earliest witnesses to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, the New Testament canon is not a late, arbitrary construct decided by power politics or a fourth-century council, but the result of early, principled recognition of apostolic, eyewitness-based writings that had already been widely received and used as Scripture in the churches.

F. F. Bruce, The Canon of Scripture. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 1988. Bruce M. Metzger, The Canon of the New Testament: Its Origin, Development, and Significance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. Michael J. Kruger, Canon Revisited: Establishing the Origins and Authority of the New Testament Books. Wheaton: Crossway, 2012. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History.
+ Isn’t it the case that Emperor Constantine or the Council of Nicea decided which books would be in the New Testament, suppressing other gospels for political reasons?
1. The Council of Nicea did not address the canon of Scripture. The Council of Nicea (AD 325) focused on the divinity of Christ (especially the Arian controversy) and related issues, not on drawing up a list of biblical books. There is no historical evidence that Nicea voted books in or out of the New Testament. 2. The core New Testament canon was already widely used long before Nicea. By the early second century, the four Gospels, Acts, and Paul’s letters were standard in Christian teaching and worship. By the late second century, sources like Irenaeus and the Muratorian Fragment attest a New Testament collection very close to ours. 3. Constantine did sponsor copies of Scripture, not create it. When Constantine ordered copies of “the Scriptures” for churches in Constantinople, he was commissioning the production of texts that were already in customary use, not inventing a new canon. The idea that Constantine created the canon is a modern myth, popularized in fiction rather than grounded in historical sources. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ Maybe the four canonical Gospels won out only because the church suppressed other equally early and reliable gospels in order to consolidate power and control doctrine.
1. The so-called “other gospels” are almost all significantly later than the canonical four. Texts like the Gospel of Thomas, Gospel of Peter, and Gospel of Judas are generally dated to the mid-to-late second century or later. They do not represent independent, equally early streams of tradition but later re-interpretations of Jesus shaped by Gnostic or other theological agendas. 2. Their style and content differ markedly from the canonical Gospels. Many apocryphal gospels lack the concrete historical setting, narrative structure, and connection to first-century Palestinian Judaism that characterize Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. They often present Jesus as a dispenser of secret knowledge rather than as the figure rooted in the historical ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection proclaimed from the beginning. 3. Early Christians were aware of some of these writings and rejected them on principled grounds. Church fathers discuss and critique certain non-canonical gospels, identifying them as later, doctrinally suspect, or pseudonymous. Their exclusion from the canon was not a cover-up of equally good sources but a judgment that these texts did not meet the same criteria of apostolicity, orthodoxy, and widespread early use. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ Because early Christians disagreed about certain books (like Hebrews, Revelation, or James), the final New Testament canon looks arbitrary and unreliable.
1. Disagreement at the margins is consistent with careful discernment, not arbitrariness. The fact that some books were discussed and debated shows that the early church did not rubber-stamp every writing that claimed authority. Instead, Christians weighed evidence of authorship, theology, and usage, sometimes cautiously and over time. 2. The central core of the New Testament was recognized very early and very widely. The four Gospels, Acts, and the majority of Paul’s letters are virtually undisputed from the earliest centuries. This stable core undermines the idea that the canon as a whole is a late, arbitrary construction. 3. Borderline cases do not undermine the overall reliability of the canon. Uncertainty about a few books does not make the entire collection suspect, any more than a few debated historical details invalidate our knowledge of the larger shape of ancient history. The overwhelming agreement on most of the New Testament gives strong reason to trust that the church largely got it right regarding the foundational apostolic writings. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence for the New Testament
+ Since early Christians quoted and used non-canonical writings, doesn’t that show that the distinction between Scripture and other books is artificial or late?
1. Using a book does not automatically make it Scripture. Churches today may use creeds, catechisms, and devotional works without confusing them with the Bible. Similarly, early Christians could read and respect works like 1 Clement or the Shepherd of Hermas without granting them the same status as apostolic writings. 2. Early writers explicitly distinguish between canonical and non-canonical texts. Some church fathers clearly differentiate between books that are authoritative for doctrine and those that are merely helpful. This shows that they were aware of a hierarchy of authority, not operating with a vague and undifferentiated mass of “Christian literature.” 3. The presence of valuable non-canonical material does not weaken the case for the canon; it strengthens it. The fact that early Christians carefully distinguished between what was apostolic Scripture and what was merely edifying shows a concern for accuracy and fidelity to the original witnesses, which supports, rather than undermines, confidence in the resulting canon. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ When Christians say that canonical books are ‘self-authenticating’ and recognized by the Holy Spirit, isn’t that just circular reasoning and personal feeling?
1. Historical and theological reasoning can work together. Christians do not rely solely on an inner feeling to identify canonical books. They also appeal to historical factors: apostolic origin, early and widespread use, doctrinal consistency, and the testimony of early church fathers. The claim of self-authentication is not a replacement for evidence, but a theological interpretation of why the evidence points in a particular direction. 2. The “marks” of canonicity are publicly accessible. Features like early dating, apostolic connection, and doctrinal coherence can be examined by any historian, regardless of personal faith. The church’s sense that these writings “ring true” is rooted in concrete characteristics that can be described and evaluated. 3. All ultimate authorities involve some form of circularity; the question is whether it is vicious. If Scripture is to function as the highest authority for Christians, it cannot be validated by a still higher standard without ceasing to be ultimate. Recognizing Scripture’s authority partly by Scripture’s own claims is a kind of circularity, but it is not arbitrary; it is supported by the convergence of internal and external evidence and by the lived experience of the Christian community over centuries. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence

(P1) In general, the reliability of an ancient text's transmission is established by the number of manuscript copies, the earliness of those copies, and the degree of agreement among them. Textual critics use three main criteria to assess how well an ancient document has been preserved: (1) Number of manuscripts: The more copies we have, the easier it is to identify scribal errors and reconstruct the original text through comparison. (2) Earliness of manuscripts: The closer the copies are in time to the original composition, the fewer opportunities there are for corruption or legendary development to creep in. (3) Textual agreement: High agreement among independent manuscript traditions indicates that the text has been faithfully copied and that we can be confident about what the original said. By these standards, historians can determine whether we possess a reliable text of works by Homer, Plato, Tacitus, and other ancient authors. The same criteria apply to the New Testament. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P2) The New Testament is supported by vastly more manuscript evidence than any other work of ancient literature, with over 5,800 Greek manuscripts, plus thousands of early translations and patristic quotations. (1) Greek manuscripts: We possess more than 5,800 Greek manuscripts of the New Testament, ranging from small fragments to complete copies. This includes papyri, uncials (capital-letter manuscripts), and minuscules (lowercase manuscripts). (2) Early translations: The New Testament was translated into Latin, Syriac, Coptic, and other languages very early (some as early as the second and third centuries). These ancient versions provide independent witnesses to the Greek text and help confirm its accuracy. (3) Patristic quotations: Church fathers from the second century onward quoted the New Testament so extensively in their writings that nearly the entire New Testament could be reconstructed from their quotations alone. This provides yet another independent line of evidence for the text. (4) Comparison with other ancient works: By contrast, most classical works survive in only a handful of manuscripts. For example, we have about 10 good manuscripts of Caesar's Gallic Wars, and the earliest copy is about 900 years after Caesar wrote it. Homer's Iliad, the best-attested work of ancient Greek literature after the New Testament, has around 1,800 manuscripts. The New Testament's manuscript support dwarfs all other ancient literature. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P3) The earliest New Testament manuscripts date to within a few decades of the original writings, and substantial portions of the New Testament are attested in manuscripts from the second and third centuries. (1) P52 (Rylands Papyrus): A fragment of the Gospel of John (John 18:31–33, 37–38) dated to around AD 125–150, only about 30–50 years after John was written. This is the earliest known fragment of any New Testament book and demonstrates that John's Gospel was circulating in Egypt very early. (2) P46 (Chester Beatty Papyrus II): Contains most of Paul's letters and is dated to around AD 200 (some scholars date it even earlier, to the late first or early second century). This shows that a collection of Paul's letters was already in wide circulation within 150 years of his death. (3) P66 and P75: Early papyri of the Gospel of John and Luke, dated to around AD 175–225. P75 is especially important because it is nearly identical to the text found in Codex Vaticanus (fourth century), showing remarkable stability in transmission. (4) Comparison with other ancient works: The gap between the original composition and our earliest manuscripts for most classical authors is 500–1,000 years or more. For the New Testament, that gap is often less than 100 years, and in some cases as little as a few decades. This early and abundant manuscript evidence means we can be highly confident that the New Testament text we have today accurately reflects what the original authors wrote. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P4) The vast majority of textual variants in New Testament manuscripts are minor (spelling, word order, synonyms) and do not affect any major doctrine or historical claim; where significant variants exist, they are well-known and can be identified through standard textual-critical methods. (1) Nature of variants: Textual critics estimate there are around 400,000 textual variants among all New Testament manuscripts. This sounds alarming until you realize that: - Most are trivial: differences in spelling, word order, or the use of synonyms that do not change meaning. - The more manuscripts you have, the more variants you will count (each spelling difference in each manuscript counts as a separate variant). - The vast majority do not affect translation or meaning at all. (2) Insignificant variants: Examples include "Jesus Christ" vs. "Christ Jesus," "and" vs. "but," movable nu (a Greek grammatical particle), and other minor scribal habits. These make up the overwhelming majority of variants. (3) Significant variants are well-documented: Textual critics are fully aware of the small number of variants that do affect meaning (such as the longer ending of Mark, the Pericope Adulterae in John 7:53–8:11, and the Comma Johanneum in 1 John 5:7–8). Modern translations note these in footnotes, and scholars can reconstruct the history of how these variants arose. (4) No core doctrine is affected: Importantly, no major Christian doctrine depends on a disputed text. The deity of Christ, the Trinity, the atonement, the resurrection, and other central teachings are affirmed in multiple, undisputed passages throughout the New Testament. (5) Textual criticism is a mature science: Through careful comparison of manuscripts, early translations, and patristic quotations, scholars can reconstruct the original text with a very high degree of confidence...far higher than for any other work of ancient literature. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization

(P5) The careful and consistent transmission of the New Testament text, even across different geographical regions and linguistic traditions, demonstrates that early Christians treated these writings with great reverence and fidelity. (1) Geographical distribution: New Testament manuscripts come from widely separated regions...Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, North Africa, and Syria. Despite this geographical spread, the texts show remarkable agreement, indicating that early Christians were not freely altering the text to suit local agendas. (2) Linguistic consistency: Early translations into Latin, Syriac, Coptic, and other languages were made independently in different regions, yet they agree closely with the Greek manuscripts and with each other. This cross-linguistic consistency further confirms the stability of the text. (3) Scribal care: While scribes did make errors (as is inevitable in hand-copying), the overall pattern is one of careful preservation. Many manuscripts include notes from scribes asking for prayers or expressing concern about accuracy, showing a reverence for the text. (4) Early Christian attitude toward Scripture: The New Testament itself and early Christian writings show that believers regarded these texts as sacred Scripture from a very early date. This attitude naturally led to careful copying and transmission. The result is that we can be confident the New Testament we read today is essentially the same as what the apostles and their associates wrote in the first century. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

(C) Therefore, the New Testament is the best-attested document from the ancient world, and we can be highly confident that the text we possess today accurately represents what the original authors wrote.

Bruce M. Metzger and Bart D. Ehrman, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. Daniel B. Wallace, "The Number of Textual Variants: An Evangelical Miscalculation," in Revisiting the Corruption of the New Testament, ed. Daniel B. Wallace. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2011. J. Ed Komoszewski, M. James Sawyer, and Daniel B. Wallace, Reinventing Jesus: How Contemporary Skeptics Miss the Real Jesus and Mislead Popular Culture. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2006. Peter J. Williams, Can We Trust the Gospels? Wheaton: Crossway, 2018.
+ The Bible has been copied and recopied so many times over the centuries...it's like a game of telephone. We can't possibly know what the original said.
1. More copies make reconstruction easier, not harder. The "telephone game" analogy fails because in that game, you only have access to the final person's version. With manuscripts, we have access to thousands of independent "players" at different stages. When you can compare thousands of manuscripts from different times and places, scribal errors become easy to identify and correct. 2. The New Testament has far more manuscript evidence than any other ancient work. With over 5,800 Greek manuscripts, plus thousands of early translations and patristic quotations, textual critics can cross-check and verify the text with extraordinary precision. No other ancient document comes close to this level of attestation. 3. Early manuscripts confirm the text's stability. We have manuscripts dating to within decades of the originals, and they match later manuscripts very closely. This shows that the text was not significantly altered over time. 4. Textual criticism is a rigorous science. Scholars use established methods to compare manuscripts, identify scribal habits, and reconstruct the original text. The result is that we can be more confident about the text of the New Testament than about the text of any other ancient work. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon
+ Scholars admit there are hundreds of thousands of textual variants in the New Testament manuscripts. Doesn't that prove the text is hopelessly corrupted?
1. The number of variants is a function of the number of manuscripts. The more manuscripts you have, the more variants you will count. If we had only one manuscript, there would be zero variants...but we would have no way to check for errors. The large number of variants is actually evidence of the wealth of manuscript evidence, not a problem. 2. The vast majority of variants are trivial. Most variants involve spelling differences, word order, or the use of synonyms that do not change the meaning of the text at all. For example, "Jesus Christ" vs. "Christ Jesus" or "and" vs. "but" are counted as variants but have no impact on translation or doctrine. 3. Significant variants are well-known and documented. Textual critics are fully aware of the small number of variants that do affect meaning (such as the longer ending of Mark or the woman caught in adultery in John 8). These are noted in modern translations and do not affect any core Christian doctrine. 4. No major doctrine is in doubt. Every essential Christian teaching...the deity of Christ, the Trinity, the atonement, the resurrection...is affirmed in multiple, undisputed passages. Even if we removed every disputed verse, Christian theology would remain intact. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization
+ Even the earliest New Testament manuscripts are from the second century or later...decades or even centuries after Jesus. That's too long for the text to be reliable.
1. The earliest New Testament manuscripts are far closer to the originals than those of any other ancient work. The earliest fragment of the New Testament (P52, a portion of John's Gospel) dates to around AD 125–150, only 30–50 years after John was written. By contrast, the earliest manuscripts of most classical works are 500–1,000 years removed from the originals. 2. Substantial portions of the New Testament are attested in second- and third-century manuscripts. Papyri such as P46 (Paul's letters, c. AD 200), P66 and P75 (Gospels, c. AD 175–225) give us access to large portions of the New Testament text very early. This is an extraordinarily short gap by the standards of ancient history. 3. Early patristic quotations push the evidence even earlier. Church fathers in the late first and early second centuries (such as Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp) quote the New Testament extensively. This shows that the text was already in circulation and being treated as authoritative within the lifetimes of people who knew the apostles. 4. The New Testament documents themselves are first-century writings. The original composition of the New Testament books is dated by most scholars to the first century (roughly AD 50–100). The manuscript evidence confirms that what we have today matches those first-century originals. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources
+ Scribes intentionally changed the text to support their own theological agendas, so we can't trust that we have the original.
1. Intentional changes are rare and can be identified. While some scribes did occasionally make theologically motivated changes (such as harmonizing parallel passages or clarifying ambiguous wording), these changes are well-documented and can be identified through comparison of manuscripts. They represent a tiny fraction of all variants. 2. The manuscript tradition is too diverse for systematic corruption. New Testament manuscripts come from widely separated geographical regions and different time periods. For a scribe to successfully alter the text in a way that would affect all later copies, the change would have had to be made very early and universally accepted...something that is extremely unlikely and would leave clear evidence in the manuscript record. 3. Early Christians treated the text with great reverence. The New Testament was regarded as sacred Scripture from a very early date. This attitude naturally led to careful copying. While errors occurred (as they do in any hand-copying process), the overall pattern is one of fidelity to the text. 4. Cross-checking with translations and quotations confirms the text. Early translations into Latin, Syriac, and Coptic, as well as extensive quotations by church fathers, provide independent witnesses to the Greek text. These sources agree closely with the Greek manuscripts, confirming that the text was not systematically altered. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions
+ We don't have any of the original manuscripts (autographs) of the New Testament, so how can we be sure what they said?
1. We don't have the originals of any ancient work...yet we trust them. No one possesses the original manuscript of Homer's Iliad, Plato's Republic, or any work by Tacitus or Josephus. Yet historians confidently use these texts because we have reliable copies. The same standard applies to the New Testament...and the New Testament has far better manuscript evidence than any of these works. 2. The abundance and earliness of copies allow us to reconstruct the originals with high confidence. With over 5,800 Greek manuscripts, thousands of early translations, and extensive patristic quotations, textual critics can compare and cross-check to determine what the original text said. The result is a reconstructed text that scholars believe is 99%+ accurate to the originals. 3. Early manuscripts are very close in time to the originals. Some New Testament manuscripts date to within a few decades of the original composition. This short time gap means there was little opportunity for significant corruption to occur. 4. The consistency across manuscripts confirms the text's reliability. Despite being copied by hand over centuries and across different regions, New Testament manuscripts show remarkable agreement. This consistency is strong evidence that the text we have today accurately reflects what the original authors wrote. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence for the New Testament
+ Bart Ehrman, a leading New Testament scholar, says the text has been corrupted and we can't know what the originals said.
1. Ehrman's popular-level claims are more sensational than his academic work. In his scholarly work (such as his textbook The Text of the New Testament, co-authored with Bruce Metzger), Ehrman acknowledges that the vast majority of textual variants are insignificant and that we can reconstruct the original text with a high degree of confidence. His popular books, however, tend to emphasize doubts and uncertainties in a way that goes beyond the consensus of textual scholars. 2. Ehrman himself admits no core doctrine is affected by textual variants. In debates and interviews, Ehrman has acknowledged that no essential Christian belief depends on a disputed text. The deity of Christ, the resurrection, and other central doctrines are affirmed in multiple, undisputed passages. 3. Most textual scholars, including non-Christians, disagree with Ehrman's more extreme claims. Scholars across the theological spectrum...including agnostics and non-Christians...affirm that the New Testament text is remarkably well-preserved and that we can be confident about what the original authors wrote. Ehrman's skepticism is not representative of the field as a whole. 4. Ehrman's loss of faith was not primarily due to textual issues. Ehrman himself has stated that his departure from Christianity was more about the problem of suffering than about textual criticism. His popular books on textual issues reflect his broader skepticism, not a consensus view among textual critics. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization

Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P1) In general, when multiple independent sources agree on core historical claims, especially when those sources arise from different contexts and perspectives, this agreement provides strong evidence that the claims are historically reliable. Historians use the criterion of "multiple attestation" or "independent corroboration" as a key test for historical reliability. The logic is straightforward: (1) If several independent witnesses report the same core events, it is unlikely that they all invented or fabricated the same story. (2) The more independent the sources (different authors, different times, different locations, different audiences), the stronger the case for historicity. (3) Agreement on core facts, even with variation in details, is exactly what we expect from genuine independent testimony, as opposed to collusion or copying. This principle is used across all historical inquiry...ancient history, legal testimony, journalism, etc. When independent sources converge on the same basic narrative, historians take that convergence as powerful evidence for the underlying events. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P2) The New Testament contains multiple independent streams of tradition: Paul's letters, the Synoptic Gospels (Mark, Matthew, Luke), the Gospel of John, Acts, and other writings, each with distinct sources, styles, emphases, and audiences. (1) Paul's letters (c. AD 48–65): Paul writes as an apostle who had direct encounters with the risen Jesus and contact with the original apostles in Jerusalem. His letters are the earliest New Testament documents and contain early creeds and traditions (e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:3–7) that predate his writing. (2) The Gospel of Mark (c. AD 65–70): Widely regarded as the earliest Gospel, Mark presents a fast-paced, vivid narrative. Early church tradition identifies Mark as the interpreter of Peter, giving us access to Peter's eyewitness testimony. (3) The Gospel of Matthew (c. AD 70–85): Written for a Jewish-Christian audience, Matthew emphasizes Jesus as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy. While Matthew uses Mark as a source, he also includes material unique to his Gospel (often called "M" material), representing an independent tradition. (4) The Gospel of Luke and Acts (c. AD 70–85): Luke writes as a careful historian, explicitly stating that he investigated eyewitness accounts (Luke 1:1–4). Luke includes substantial unique material ("L" material) and provides a second volume (Acts) that traces the early church's history. Luke's sources are independent of Mark and Matthew in many places. (5) The Gospel of John (c. AD 85–95): John's Gospel is strikingly different in style, structure, and content from the Synoptics, yet it agrees with them on the core story: Jesus' ministry, miracles, death, and resurrection. John explicitly claims to be based on eyewitness testimony (John 21:24). (6) Other New Testament writings: Hebrews, James, 1 Peter, and other letters provide additional independent witnesses to Jesus' life, teaching, death, and resurrection. These sources were written by different authors, in different locations, for different audiences, and yet they converge on the same essential narrative about Jesus. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P3) These independent New Testament traditions agree on the core historical facts about Jesus: His public ministry, His teaching and miracles, His crucifixion under Pontius Pilate, His burial, and His resurrection appearances to multiple witnesses. Despite their differences in style, emphasis, and audience, all major New Testament sources agree on the following core facts: (1) Jesus' public ministry: Jesus was a Jewish teacher and miracle-worker who gathered disciples, taught with authority, and attracted large crowds in Galilee and Judea. - Attested in: Paul (implicitly), Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, Acts. (2) Jesus' teaching and miracles: Jesus taught about the kingdom of God, performed healings and exorcisms, and was known for His parables and authoritative interpretation of the Law. - Attested in: Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, Acts, and alluded to in Paul. (3) Jesus' crucifixion under Pontius Pilate: Jesus was arrested, tried, and crucified by Roman authorities during the governorship of Pontius Pilate. - Attested in: Paul (1 Corinthians 15:3; 1 Thessalonians 2:15; Galatians 3:1), Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, Acts, 1 Peter, and implicitly in other letters. (4) Jesus' burial: After His death, Jesus was buried (in a tomb, according to the Gospels). - Attested in: Paul (1 Corinthians 15:4), Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, Acts. (5) Jesus' resurrection and appearances: Jesus rose from the dead and appeared to multiple witnesses, including Peter, the Twelve, James, Paul, and others. - Attested in: Paul (1 Corinthians 15:3–8; Romans 1:4; 1 Thessalonians 1:10), Mark (16:1–8, and the longer ending), Matthew, Luke, John, Acts, 1 Peter. This convergence is all the more striking because these sources were not written in collusion. Paul's letters predate the Gospels, and John's Gospel is independent of the Synoptic tradition in many respects. Yet all agree on the essential story. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(P4) The differences in detail and emphasis among these sources actually strengthen the case for their independence and reliability, as they reflect the natural variation expected from genuine, non-collusive testimony. (1) Variation in details is a mark of independent testimony: When witnesses agree on every detail, it suggests collusion or copying. When they agree on the core but differ in specifics, it suggests independent observation of the same events. (2) Examples of variation that confirm independence: - The Synoptic Gospels share a common outline and some verbatim agreement (suggesting literary relationship), but each includes unique material and perspectives. - John's Gospel has a very different structure and includes events not found in the Synoptics (e.g., the wedding at Cana, the raising of Lazarus, extended discourses), yet agrees on the core narrative. - Paul's letters focus on theological interpretation of Jesus' death and resurrection, but they presuppose the basic historical facts and occasionally allude to Jesus' earthly life and teaching. (3) Different emphases reflect different audiences and purposes: - Matthew emphasizes Jesus as the Jewish Messiah and fulfillment of prophecy. - Luke emphasizes Jesus' concern for the poor, outcasts, and Gentiles. - John emphasizes Jesus' divine identity and the call to believe in Him. - Paul emphasizes the theological significance of the cross and resurrection for salvation. These differences do not undermine the core agreement; they show that each author is presenting the same Jesus from his own perspective and for his own audience. (4) This pattern matches what we see in reliable historical testimony: In legal contexts, when multiple witnesses tell exactly the same story with no variation, it raises suspicion of collusion. When they agree on the main facts but differ in details, it confirms they are independent and truthful. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P5) The convergence of these independent traditions cannot be explained by late legendary development, collusion, or a single community's invention, because the sources are too early, too diverse, and too widely distributed. (1) Too early for legend: Paul's letters, written within 15–30 years of Jesus' death, already contain the core facts about Jesus' death, burial, and resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:3–7). The Gospels, written within 35–65 years of Jesus' death, are far too early for legendary embellishment to replace historical memory, especially in a culture with living eyewitnesses. (2) Too diverse for collusion: The New Testament sources come from different authors, different locations (Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Ephesus, etc.), and different communities. There is no evidence of a central authority coordinating their accounts. The best explanation for their agreement is that they are all reporting the same historical events. (3) Too widely distributed for single-community invention: If the Jesus story were invented by a single community, we would expect a single, uniform tradition. Instead, we have multiple independent streams that agree on the core but reflect different perspectives and emphases. This is exactly what we would expect if the story is rooted in real historical events witnessed by many people. (4) The criterion of embarrassment supports authenticity: Many details in these independent sources are embarrassing or difficult for the early church (e.g., Jesus' crucifixion, Peter's denial, the disciples' flight, women as the first witnesses to the resurrection). If these stories were invented, such details would likely have been omitted or softened. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(C) Therefore, the convergence of multiple independent New Testament traditions on the core facts about Jesus provides strong historical evidence that these facts are reliable and that the New Testament presents an accurate account of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection.

Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936. James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Christianity in the Making, vol. 1). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 3). Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.
+ The Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) clearly copied from each other, so they're not really independent sources. You can't count them as multiple witnesses.
1. Literary dependence does not eliminate independence of underlying traditions. Most scholars believe that Matthew and Luke used Mark as a source (the "Markan priority" view). However, this does not mean they simply copied Mark. Both Matthew and Luke include substantial material not found in Mark (called "M" and "L" material, respectively), which represents independent traditions. Additionally, even where they follow Mark's outline, they often add details, perspectives, or emphases that reflect their own sources and purposes. 2. The Synoptics still represent multiple independent streams of tradition. Even if Matthew and Luke used Mark, they also drew on other sources: - Matthew includes material unique to his Gospel (M), likely from his own knowledge or sources in the Jewish-Christian community. - Luke explicitly states he investigated multiple eyewitness accounts (Luke 1:1–4) and includes extensive unique material (L). - Mark himself is based on Peter's eyewitness testimony, according to early church tradition. So we have at least three independent streams: Mark/Peter, M (Matthew's unique material), and L (Luke's unique material). 3. John's Gospel is clearly independent of the Synoptics. John's Gospel has a completely different structure, style, and content from the Synoptics, yet it agrees on the core facts: Jesus' ministry, miracles, death, and resurrection. This provides a fourth independent stream. 4. Paul's letters predate the Gospels and are entirely independent. Paul's letters, written in the AD 50s and early 60s, contain early creeds and traditions about Jesus' death, burial, and resurrection (e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:3–7) that are independent of the Gospel accounts. This gives us a fifth independent stream. So even accounting for literary relationships among the Synoptics, we still have multiple independent traditions converging on the same core story. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ All the Gospels came from the same early Christian community, so they're just repeating the same party line. That's not real independence.
1. The Gospels come from different communities in different locations. Early church tradition and internal evidence suggest that the Gospels were written in different places for different audiences: - Mark: likely written in Rome for a Gentile audience. - Matthew: likely written in Syria or Palestine for a Jewish-Christian audience. - Luke: written for a Gentile audience, possibly in Greece or Asia Minor. - John: written in Ephesus or Asia Minor for a mixed audience. These are not the same community repeating a single story; they are different communities preserving and presenting the same core tradition. 2. The differences in emphasis and detail reflect different contexts and sources. If all the Gospels were simply repeating a single "party line," we would expect them to be much more uniform. Instead, we see significant differences in detail, structure, and emphasis, which reflect the independence of their sources and the distinct purposes of their authors. 3. Paul's letters come from a completely different context. Paul was an apostle who traveled widely and wrote to churches across the Roman Empire (Galatia, Corinth, Rome, etc.). His letters are not products of a single community but reflect his own apostolic authority and the traditions he received directly from the Jerusalem apostles and from the risen Jesus. 4. The early Christian movement was not monolithic. Early Christianity was a diverse movement spread across the Mediterranean world. The fact that different communities in different locations all preserved the same core story about Jesus is powerful evidence that the story is rooted in real historical events, not invented by a single group. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ The fact that multiple sources agree just shows that early Christians all believed the same myth or legend about Jesus. It doesn't prove the events actually happened.
1. The sources are too early for legend to develop. Legends and myths typically take generations to develop, especially when there are living eyewitnesses who can correct false claims. Paul's letters, written within 15–30 years of Jesus' death, already contain the core facts. The Gospels, written within 35–65 years, are far too early for legendary embellishment to replace historical memory. 2. The sources are too diverse and independent for coordinated myth-making. If the Jesus story were a myth invented by early Christians, we would expect a single, uniform tradition. Instead, we have multiple independent streams (Paul, Mark, M, L, John) that agree on the core but differ in details and emphasis. This pattern is consistent with genuine historical events witnessed by many people, not with coordinated myth-making. 3. The content of the story is not mythical in character. The Gospels are written in the style of ancient biography and historical narrative, not myth or legend. They include concrete historical details (names, places, dates, political figures), mundane and unflattering details, and a realistic portrayal of human behavior. This is very different from the style of ancient myths or later apocryphal gospels. 4. The criterion of embarrassment supports historicity. Many details in the New Testament are embarrassing or difficult for the early church (e.g., Jesus' crucifixion as a criminal, Peter's denial, the disciples' flight, women as the first witnesses to the resurrection). If the story were a myth invented to promote the faith, these details would likely have been omitted or softened. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ If the Gospels are independent, why do they contradict each other on so many details? Doesn't that prove they're unreliable?
1. Differences in detail are exactly what we expect from independent testimony. When multiple witnesses describe the same event, they naturally focus on different aspects, use different wording, and include or omit different details based on their perspective and purpose. Perfect agreement on every detail would actually suggest collusion or copying, not independent testimony. 2. The Gospels agree on all the core facts. Despite differences in detail and emphasis, the Gospels agree on the essential story: Jesus' ministry, teaching, miracles, crucifixion, burial, and resurrection. The differences are in secondary details, not in the main narrative. 3. Many alleged "contradictions" can be harmonized. When examined carefully, most apparent contradictions in the Gospels can be explained as differences in perspective, selection of material, or emphasis. For example, different Gospels may report different words spoken at the same event (paraphrase vs. direct quotation), or they may arrange events thematically rather than strictly chronologically. 4. Ancient biographies were not expected to be verbatim transcripts. Ancient historians and biographers had different conventions than modern journalists. They were allowed to paraphrase, arrange material thematically, and focus on the aspects most relevant to their purpose, as long as they faithfully represented the substance of what happened. The Gospels follow these ancient conventions. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ Paul hardly mentions any details of Jesus' earthly life in his letters. Doesn't that show he didn't know about them, or that they were invented later?
1. Paul's letters are occasional writings, not biographies. Paul wrote letters to address specific issues in specific churches. He was not trying to give a comprehensive account of Jesus' life. His purpose was to explain the theological significance of Jesus' death and resurrection and to apply it to the situations his readers faced. 2. Paul does refer to key facts about Jesus' life. Even though Paul's focus is theological, he does mention or allude to important facts about Jesus: - Jesus was born of a woman, under the law (Galatians 4:4). - Jesus was a descendant of David (Romans 1:3). - Jesus had a brother named James (Galatians 1:19). - Jesus instituted the Lord's Supper on the night He was betrayed (1 Corinthians 11:23–25). - Jesus was crucified under earthly authorities (1 Corinthians 2:8; 1 Thessalonians 2:15). - Jesus was buried and rose on the third day (1 Corinthians 15:3–4). - Jesus appeared to many witnesses after His resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:5–8). 3. Paul assumes his readers already know the basic story. Paul's letters were written to churches he had already taught in person. He could assume they knew the basic facts about Jesus' life and ministry. His letters build on that foundation rather than repeating it. 4. Paul's early testimony confirms the core facts. The fact that Paul, writing in the AD 50s and early 60s, already knows and teaches the core facts about Jesus' death, burial, and resurrection shows that these facts were established very early and were not later inventions. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument

Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P1) Undesigned coincidences are subtle, interlocking details between independent accounts that fit together in a natural way, best explained if the authors are reporting real events. An “undesigned coincidence” occurs when one document mentions a detail that raises a natural question, and another document...without apparent design to answer it...provides just the right incidental information that makes sense of the first. The fit is too casual and unforced to look like copying or collusion. Such patterns are exactly what we expect if multiple witnesses (or those drawing on witnesses) are independently describing the same real events from different angles. Examples include: (1) One Gospel mentioning an event or saying without explanation, while another quietly supplies the background that makes it intelligible. (2) Acts explaining personal details about a character that clarify brief remarks in Paul’s letters, and vice versa. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P2) The Gospels and Acts contain numerous and varied undesigned coincidences, both among themselves and with Paul’s letters, which strongly indicate independent access to a shared historical reality. Across the New Testament, we find many instances where one book casually illuminates another: (1) John mentions Jesus asking Philip where to buy bread (John 6:5), but gives no reason. Luke earlier notes that Philip is from Bethsaida (John 1:44), the very region where the feeding of the five thousand takes place (Luke 9:10), explaining why Jesus would ask Philip in particular. (2) Mark notes that many were “coming and going” so that the disciples had no leisure even to eat (Mark 6:31), but does not say why Galilee would be unusually crowded. John explains that “the Passover, the feast of the Jews, was at hand” (John 6:4), naturally accounting for the influx of people. (3) Acts mentions that the proconsul Sergius Paulus believed after Paul’s miracle on Cyprus (Acts 13:7–12). Inscriptions and other evidence independently confirm the historical existence of a Lucius Sergius Paulus as a Roman official, matching the sort of incidental realism we find in undesigned coincidences. (4) Multiple examples link the Gospels with Acts and with Paul’s letters: personal names, travel plans, local customs, and offhand remarks in one text that are neatly clarified in another, without any sign of deliberate harmonization. These patterns are cumulative and cross-cut different authors (e.g., John with the Synoptics, Acts with Paul), reinforcing the conclusion that we are dealing with overlapping, historically grounded testimony, not a single late literary construction. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P3) Fiction, collusion, or late legendary development are unlikely to produce this pattern of casual, cross-document fit, especially when the details often appear minor or even theologically irrelevant. If the Gospel writers and other New Testament authors were inventing stories or freely reshaping traditions, we would expect: (1) Either obvious literary artistry that draws attention to the connections, or (2) Contrived harmonization where one author clearly borrows another’s distinctive details in a heavy-handed way. Instead, many coincidences are: (1) Quiet and easily overlooked, suggesting the authors were not trying to engineer them. (2) Involving incidental details (geography, names, offhand motives) that serve no clear theological agenda but fit like pieces of a puzzle when texts are compared. (3) Spread across works traditionally linked to different lines of transmission (e.g., Johannine vs. Synoptic; Pauline letters vs. Acts), making coordinated fabrication increasingly implausible. A forger or late legendary redactor would have little reason to plant dozens of subtle, easily-missed interlocks that only emerge when texts are read side by side with historical attention. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P4) Therefore, the presence of many undesigned coincidences across the New Testament provides strong, positive evidence that the Gospel and Acts narratives are rooted in truthful, historically reliable testimony rather than in late legend or theological fiction. Undesigned coincidences function like independent lines of cross-examination in a courtroom: separate witnesses, with different emphases and memories, nonetheless “fit” together in ways best explained if they are each in contact with the same set of real events. This pattern: (1) Undermines skeptical claims that the Gospels are late, derivative, and largely legendary. (2) Supports treating the New Testament as broadly trustworthy when it reports events, settings, and persons. (3) Lends particular credibility to the central claims...such as the crucifixion, burial, empty tomb, and post-resurrection appearances...for which we see similar interlocking patterns. Thus, undesigned coincidences undergird a maximal-data approach to the resurrection by strengthening the case that the New Testament writers are sober, informed witnesses rather than theological novelists. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Three Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, undesigned coincidences across the New Testament are best explained if the Gospels and Acts are generally reliable historical documents grounded in real events and genuine eyewitness (or close-up) testimony.

Lydia McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017. Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection,” in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. J. J. Blunt, Undesigned Coincidences in the Writings both of the Old and New Testament. London: John Murray, 1847.
+ Apologists are simply seeing patterns where none exist. The supposed ‘undesigned coincidences’ are cherry-picked and based on reading too much into small details.
1. Many coincidences involve precise, content-rich interlocks, not vague similarities. In a typical undesigned coincidence, one text contains an unexplained or slightly puzzling feature, and another text...often in a different genre or by a different author...gives a specific detail that neatly answers the puzzle. These are not mere thematic parallels but tightly keyed fits (for example, explaining why a particular person is addressed, why a location is crowded, or why a particular term is used). 2. The pattern is cumulative across dozens of examples. Any single coincidence might be dismissed as chance. But when we have many such interlocking cases across multiple documents (Gospels and Acts with Paul’s letters), the probability of random pattern-spotting becomes small. A cumulative, structured pattern is more naturally explained by a shared historical reality. 3. The explanatory power of the coincidences is testable and concrete. Skeptics can examine specific proposed examples and ask: Does the second text really provide a natural explanation for the first? Are there clear cases where one text fills in a specific gap in another? This is not a purely subjective impression but something that can be critically evaluated case by case. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions
+ The Gospel writers were using each other’s material or drawing on common traditions. Apparent coincidences just reflect dependence, not independence or historicity.
1. Many coincidences occur precisely where dependence theories predict sameness, not complementary detail. If one Evangelist were simply copying another in a straightforward way, we would expect close verbal overlap, not subtle filling-in of unexplained details. Instead, we often find one Gospel mentioning a fact without comment and another independently including a different detail that incidentally explains the first, in a way not easily reducible to simple copying. 2. Some of the strongest cases link different literary strata (e.g., Paul and Acts, John and the Synoptics). Undesigned coincidences do not only occur among the Synoptics. They also appear between Acts and Paul’s letters, and between John and the Synoptics...texts with different styles, purposes, and probable sources. This cross-genre, cross-author interlocking is harder to explain by a single line of literary dependence. 3. Shared tradition itself is more likely to preserve real events than pure legend. Even if some dependence or shared oral tradition is granted, undesigned coincidences still show that these traditions preserve consistent, interlocking factual content. That is evidence for the reliability of the underlying historical core, not against it. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ Skilled authors may have intentionally woven these interlocking details into their narratives to give an impression of realism, even if the stories are not historically true.
1. The coincidences are typically obscure and not highlighted for the reader. If the authors wanted to impress readers with clever interconnections, they would likely draw attention to them or structure them more obviously. Instead, many undesigned coincidences are only noticed when comparing texts carefully, often across centuries of scholarship. This subtlety points away from deliberate literary artistry aimed at persuasion. 2. The details involved are often theologically neutral or even awkward. Some coincidences revolve around geographically or biographical minutiae that do little to support a doctrinal point: hometowns, travel routes, side comments about crowds or minor characters. Investing effort to fabricate such details purely to create hidden connections is implausible, especially when many early readers would never detect them. 3. Coordinated fabrication across multiple authors and decades would require an implausible level of planning. To engineer a network of interlocking details across different books, with different authors, styles, and audiences, would demand extraordinary coordination and foresight. The more modest and historically grounded explanation is that the authors are drawing on overlapping knowledge of real events. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ At best, undesigned coincidences show that some non-miraculous details are accurate. That does not mean we should trust the miraculous claims like the resurrection.
1. Establishing general reliability is exactly how historical arguments proceed. In legal and historical reasoning, a source that repeatedly proves trustworthy on ordinary matters earns a presumption of credibility on more significant matters, unless there is strong reason to think otherwise. Undesigned coincidences contribute to that presumption for the New Testament writers. 2. The same narrative texture that supports mundane details also surrounds the miracle claims. The Gospels do not switch styles between non-miraculous and miraculous episodes. The same realism, geographical specificity, and interlocking with other accounts continue when they describe Jesus’ miracles and resurrection appearances. If the authors are careful and well-informed about crucifixion, people, and places, it is less plausible that they become careless fabricators only at the miracle points. 3. Miracles can be historically supported if a theistic background is independently plausible. If God exists (as argued by cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments), then miracles are not ruled out in principle. In that context, showing that we have strong, reliable testimony for a purported miracle (such as the resurrection) becomes highly relevant and evidentially weighty. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument • Natural Theology Arguments
+ You could probably find similar interlocking details in other religious writings. Undesigned coincidences are not unique to the New Testament, so they do not prove anything special.
1. If undesigned coincidences appear in other texts, they also count as evidence for reliability there. The argument form is general: where multiple sources exhibit genuine undesigned coincidences, that raises the probability that they are connected to real events. This is not special pleading for Christianity; it is a general historical principle. 2. The question is comparative strength and density of the pattern. The New Testament (especially Gospels and Acts with Paul’s letters) shows a rich network of such coincidences across multiple books, genres, and authors. To undercut their force, one would need to show a comparable, carefully-documented network in rival religious texts, not just assert that such a thing “could” exist. 3. In Christianity’s case, undesigned coincidences feed into a larger cumulative case. These coincidences do not stand alone. They join archaeological confirmation, early dating, external references, and the transformation of witnesses to support the reliability of the New Testament at precisely the points where the resurrection claim is anchored. The strength of the case lies in the convergence of all these lines of evidence. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P1) In general, narratives that stem from genuine eyewitness testimony tend to display internal marks of verisimilitude: realistic and incidental detail, unflattering or “embarrassing” material, unexplained or passing references, and a lack of obvious smoothing or systematizing. When historians evaluate whether a narrative is likely based on eyewitness testimony rather than on legend or fiction, they look for certain internal features: (1) Incidental and unnecessary details: Eyewitness-type accounts often include specific, concrete details (names, places, times, small actions) that are not obviously serving a theological or literary agenda. (2) Embarrassing or counterproductive material: Genuine memories frequently preserve unflattering facts about key figures, because real history is messy. Invented propaganda normally omits or airbrushes such material. (3) Unexplained or “casually dropped” references: Real eyewitness testimony often alludes to people, customs, and events without pausing to explain them, because the audience is assumed to know them. Fabricated tales tend to over-explain or artificially connect everything. (4) Lack of systematic harmonization: Independent testimonies agree on the main story but differ in small details, order, and emphasis. Fictional accounts or heavily edited propaganda tend to look too smooth and uniform. These criteria are not unique to biblical studies; they are standard tools of historical and legal analysis. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability

(P2) The New Testament Gospels and Acts contain a wealth of realistic, incidental details that are unlikely to be the product of later legend or fiction, but are exactly what we would expect from eyewitness-based testimony. (1) Concrete geographical and topographical detail: - The Gospels and Acts accurately describe towns, roads, distances, and physical settings in first-century Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome. - Examples include: the pool of Bethesda with five porticoes (John 5:2), the descent from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10:30), the “brow of the hill” at Nazareth (Luke 4:29), the detailed travel routes in Acts (Acts 13–28). (2) Correct local names and social structures: - The Gospels use the correct mix and frequency of personal names for first-century Palestine (e.g., Simon, Joseph, Mary, Judas), matching what we know from ossuaries and other sources. - They reflect accurate knowledge of local institutions (synagogues, Sanhedrin, temple officials) and social realities (tax collectors, centurions, Pharisees, Sadducees). (3) Specific times and numerical details: - The accounts sometimes give apparently unnecessary numbers (e.g., about 5,000 men fed, 153 fish, about 2,000 pigs, “about the tenth hour”), which bear no obvious symbolic meaning but are exactly the sort of detail that sticks in memory. (4) Casual and vivid descriptive touches: - Details such as Jesus writing on the ground (John 8:6), the green grass at the feeding of the 5,000 (Mark 6:39), or Peter jumping into the sea and dragging a net full of fish ashore (John 21:7–11) contribute nothing obvious to a theological motif but greatly enhance the realism of the narratives. Such features are characteristic of accounts rooted in lived experience rather than carefully crafted myth. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P3) The New Testament preserves numerous embarrassing, awkward, and counterproductive details about Jesus and His followers that are unlikely to have been invented by a church seeking to enhance its own prestige or create a flawless hero figure. (1) Embarrassing facts about the disciples: - The disciples often come across as slow to understand, fearful, and self-seeking (e.g., arguing about who is the greatest, misunderstanding parables, rebuked by Jesus). - Peter, the leading apostle, denies Jesus three times and is sharply rebuked (“Get behind me, Satan,” Mark 8:33). - The male disciples flee at Jesus’ arrest and are absent at the burial; women are the first to discover the empty tomb. (2) Hard sayings and difficult teachings of Jesus: - The Gospels preserve sayings that were difficult or offensive to early audiences (e.g., “Love your enemies,” “Take up your cross,” “Eat my flesh and drink my blood,” “Whoever does not hate father and mother…”). - Many disciples are said to have left Jesus because of His hard teaching (John 6:60–66). (3) Embarrassing circumstances of Jesus’ death: - Jesus is executed as a criminal by crucifixion, a form of death that was a scandal to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles (1 Corinthians 1:23). - There is no attempt to sanitize the shame of crucifixion; the Gospels frankly describe His mockery, beating, and public humiliation. (4) Honest admission of ignorance and limitation: - The evangelists sometimes present themselves or their sources as not understanding things at the time (e.g., “they did not understand this saying,” “they did not know the Scripture that He must rise from the dead”). - Such admissions are not what we would expect from authors inventing a flawless origin story to bolster authority. These features fit well with the preservation of honest, sometimes awkward memory, and poorly with the idea of polished, legendary propaganda. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument

(P4) The Gospels and Acts frequently include “undersigned” or unexplained details, as well as partial and fragmentary narratives, that make best sense if the authors were close to real events and eyewitnesses, not crafting carefully controlled fiction. (1) Unexplained references to people and customs: - Individuals such as Simon of Cyrene and his sons Alexander and Rufus (Mark 15:21) are mentioned in passing, with no explanation of who they are, suggesting that the original audience might have known them. - Customs like the “stone water jars for the Jewish rites of purification” (John 2:6) or the “Preparation Day” (Mark 15:42) are mentioned casually, not explained as if invented for literary effect. (2) Partial or “open-ended” narratives: - Mark’s Gospel ends abruptly at 16:8 in the earliest manuscripts, with the women afraid and silent. This is a very strange ending if the story were a later invention designed to persuade skeptics, but it fits the pattern of a raw and early narrative. - Acts breaks off with Paul under house arrest in Rome, without resolving his fate. If Acts were fiction, we would expect a more rounded conclusion; as history, it simply stops where Luke’s knowledge or purpose ends. (3) Undesigned coincidences and interlocking details: - As Lydia McGrew and others have emphasized, the Gospels and Acts contain many cases where one text casually explains a detail mentioned in another, in ways that are hard to attribute to deliberate design. - For example, John mentions Jesus asking Philip about feeding the 5,000 (John 6:5), but only Luke notes that the event occurred near Bethsaida (Luke 9:10), which was Philip’s home region (John 1:44). This interlocking pattern strongly suggests real events and real geography remembered by real people. (4) Lack of theological smoothing: - The narratives sometimes contain tensions or awkward juxtapositions (e.g., apparent chronological roughness, differing emphases) that have not been ironed out. This is far more consistent with multiple eyewitness-based accounts than with a late editorial creation. These features are exactly the kind of “rough edges” that historians value as indicators of authenticity. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization

(P5) Taken together, these internal marks of realism and eyewitness character in the New Testament fit poorly with the hypothesis of late, legendary development or doctrinally driven fabrication, and fit well with the hypothesis that the authors were close to the events and to those who witnessed them. (1) Late legends tend to look different: - Later apocryphal gospels often have highly stylized, obviously symbolic, or fantastical stories (e.g., a talking cross, a boy Jesus striking others dead and raising them again). - They lack the mundane, realistic, and sometimes awkward details so characteristic of the canonical Gospels and Acts. (2) Doctrinal propaganda is usually smoother and more idealized: - When groups invent stories to promote a cause, they typically present their leaders as wise, brave, and consistent, and they eliminate or explain away embarrassing episodes. - The New Testament does the opposite: it candidly records failures, doubts, and sins of major figures, while also presenting a coherent core message about Jesus’ identity and mission. (3) The pattern matches what we expect in real eyewitness-based history: - Multiple, partially overlapping accounts. - Agreement on the core, variation in detail. - Incidental realism and rough edges. - Embarrassing and difficult material retained rather than suppressed. (4) Therefore, the best explanation of these internal features is that the New Testament writers were either eyewitnesses themselves or in direct contact with eyewitnesses, faithfully preserving what they had seen and heard. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

(C) Therefore, the internal marks of eyewitness testimony and verisimilitude in the New Testament Gospels and Acts provide strong evidence that these writings are grounded in genuine historical memories of Jesus and the early Christian movement, not in late legend or fabrication.

Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Lydia McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017. Lydia McGrew, Testimonies to the Truth: Why You Can Trust the Gospels. North Charleston, SC: DeWard, 2022. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007.
+ Just because a story has lots of realistic details doesn’t mean it’s true. Modern novels are full of vivid, lifelike description but are completely fictional.
1. There is a difference between literary realism and historically anchored realism. Modern novelists can research places and customs in great detail, but first-century authors did not have Google or modern reference tools. The Gospels and Acts display detailed, correct knowledge of first-century Palestinian, Greco-Roman, and Jewish contexts that matches what we know from archaeology and other ancient sources. 2. The realism in the New Testament is embedded, not showy. Fictional realism often calls attention to itself with elaborate description. The New Testament’s realistic details are typically incidental and unadorned...dropped in passing and not exploited for dramatic effect, which is what we expect from genuine reminiscence. 3. Correct “undesigned” realism across multiple documents is hard to fake. Many of the Gospels’ realistic details interlock with each other and with external history in subtle ways (e.g., place names, local politics, social customs). Fabricating this kind of cross-consistent realism across multiple authors and decades would be extraordinarily difficult. 4. The question is not whether realistic detail could in principle be faked, but whether that is the best explanation of this particular pattern of data. Given the early date, multiple authors, geographical spread, and corroboration from non-Christian sources, the hypothesis of widespread, skillful fabrication is far less plausible than the hypothesis of genuine memory. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Undesigned Coincidences as Evidence of Gospel Reliability
+ Maybe the so-called ‘embarrassing’ details are just literary or theological devices, not signs of authenticity. The authors might have invented them to make a point.
1. Many embarrassing details undercut the prestige of key leaders without serving an obvious theological purpose. Stories like Peter’s thrice denial, the disciples’ cowardice, their repeated misunderstanding of Jesus, and their failure to believe the women’s testimony damage the reputation of the church’s foundational leaders. These are not the kinds of stories we would expect later church propagandists to invent. 2. Some hard sayings drive people away from Jesus in the narrative. Passages like John 6, where many disciples leave because of Jesus’ teaching, would not naturally be invented if the goal were to portray Him in the most appealing or easily acceptable way. They make sense as memories of a real teacher whose words sometimes shocked and offended. 3. The crucifixion itself is a massive embarrassment. A crucified Messiah was a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles (1 Corinthians 1:23). If the early church had been inventing a messianic story, a shameful execution by Rome is the last detail one would choose. Its central role strongly suggests historical constraint. 4. While some embarrassing elements may also serve theological purposes, their overall pattern fits the criterion of embarrassment. It is possible that God used even humiliating events to teach spiritual lessons, but from a purely historical standpoint, their presence in the narratives is best explained by the authors’ commitment to reporting what actually happened, not by free invention. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument
+ Even if the Gospels have realistic details now, later editors could have added those touches to make the stories sound more convincing.
1. Our earliest manuscripts already show the same core narratives and details. The pattern of realistic detail and verisimilitude appears in our earliest Gospel manuscripts and in early patristic quotations. There is no manuscript evidence of a more “bare” earlier version later augmented with realistic detail. 2. Adding realistic detail across multiple documents without leaving traces would be extremely difficult. To retrofit the Gospels with realistic local color in a way that also creates dozens of undesigned coincidences across independent books would require broad editorial control and extraordinary coordination across different regions and centuries...something for which we have no evidence. 3. The early circulation and acceptance of the Gospels argues against extensive later editing. By the second century, the four Gospels are already widely used and quoted across the Mediterranean world. Widespread, coordinated textual embellishment after this point is historically implausible, and earlier wholesale editing would likely have left traceable variants. 4. The church’s reverence for the texts works against the hypothesis of free editorial invention. From an early stage, Christians treated the Gospels as sacred Scripture. This reverence would have discouraged deliberate embellishment and encouraged careful copying, which is confirmed by the manuscript tradition. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence for the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon
+ Some apocryphal gospels also have vivid stories and emotional content. So realism can’t be used to distinguish the canonical Gospels from later, less reliable texts.
1. The character of detail in apocryphal gospels is often very different. Later apocryphal texts tend to feature fantastical, clearly legendary stories (e.g., the child Jesus cursing and killing playmates, bizarre talking crosses, or over-the-top miracles). This is not the same kind of grounded, historically textured realism we find in the canonical Gospels. 2. Apocryphal gospels often lack accurate local and historical knowledge. They frequently get names, places, customs, and chronology wrong, or they reflect concerns of later theological movements (like Gnosticism) rather than first-century Judaism. By contrast, the canonical Gospels and Acts repeatedly show detailed and accurate knowledge of first-century settings. 3. Apocryphal texts generally post-date the canonical Gospels by many decades. Even critical scholars typically date most apocryphal gospels to the mid-to-late second century or later. They are far removed from the events they purport to describe and therefore more likely to reflect legendary development. 4. Internal realism must be weighed together with external evidence. We do not base our judgment solely on whether a text feels vivid; we also consider date, authorship, manuscript evidence, theological content, and how it matches external history. On this holistic assessment, the canonical Gospels and Acts fare far better than later apocrypha. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ Ancient writers didn’t care about historical accuracy the way modern historians do. The Gospels are more like theological narratives than real history, so these internal marks don’t count for much.
1. Ancient historians did care about truth, even if their methods differed from ours. Writers like Thucydides, Polybius, and Josephus explicitly claim to be reporting what actually happened, based on investigation and eyewitness testimony. They used speeches, paraphrase, and thematic arrangement, but they still aimed at factual reliability. 2. The Gospels look much more like ancient biographies than like allegories or myths. Scholars across the spectrum increasingly recognize the Gospels as belonging to the genre of ancient bioi (lives), which were intended to convey the real deeds and character of a person, not just symbolic stories. 3. Luke explicitly presents himself as a careful historian. Luke 1:1–4 states that he has followed all things closely, consulted eyewitnesses, and written an orderly account so that his reader may know the certainty of what he has been taught. This is precisely the kind of preface we find in serious ancient historical works. 4. Internal marks of verisimilitude are still relevant within ancient conventions. Even granting that ancient writers paraphrased and arranged material thematically, the question remains: are they anchored in real events? The internal realism, embarrassing material, and rough edges in the New Testament strongly indicate that they are. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P1) In general, when independent archaeological data and non-partisan historical sources corroborate key people, places, events, and cultural details in a text, this strongly supports the text’s overall historical reliability. Historians routinely test the reliability of ancient texts by asking: (1) Do external sources...inscriptions, coins, official documents, and other historians...confirm the existence of the people, places, offices, and events mentioned? (2) Does archaeology fit the social, political, and geographical world described in the text? (3) Are there cases where the text was doubted, but later discoveries vindicated it? When a document repeatedly passes these tests, it earns a strong presumption of reliability in matters where it cannot be independently checked, unless there is specific reason to doubt it. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P2) Archaeology and ancient inscriptions have confirmed a wide range of political, geographical, and cultural details mentioned in the New Testament, often in matters that were once criticized as errors. (1) Political titles and offices: - Luke’s use of titles (proconsul, politarch, asiarch, etc.) in Acts matches what we now know from inscriptions in each respective region, even when scholars once thought Luke was inaccurate. - Example: The title “politarchs” for Thessalonian city officials (Acts 17:6) was long doubted until multiple inscriptions were found using this exact term in Macedonia. (2) Persons confirmed by archaeology and non-biblical records: - Pontius Pilate: Confirmed by the “Pilate Stone” inscription at Caesarea and by the Jewish historian Josephus and the Roman historian Tacitus. - Herod the Great, Herod Antipas, Caiaphas the high priest, Gallio the proconsul of Achaia, Lysanius, Sergius Paulus, and many others are all attested in inscriptions or other ancient sources. - Gallio’s proconsulship is confirmed by the Delphi inscription, helping date Paul’s time in Corinth (Acts 18). (3) Places and topography: - Archaeology has confirmed locations such as the pool of Bethesda with five porticoes (John 5:2), the pool of Siloam (John 9:7), the synagogue at Capernaum, and numerous other sites described in the Gospels and Acts. - The general layout of Jerusalem, Galilee, and the broader eastern Mediterranean world in the first century fits what the New Testament describes. (4) Local customs and practices: - Discoveries such as ossuaries (bone boxes), synagogue ruins, and inscriptions relating to Sabbath regulations, temple practices, and burial customs all cohere with the New Testament’s portrayal of first-century Judaism. Again and again, archaeological findings have moved from “the New Testament must be wrong here” to “the New Testament was right after all.” See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Textual Transmission and Manuscript Evidence

(P3) Major non-Christian sources from the first and early second centuries...such as Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny the Younger...independently corroborate key elements of the New Testament’s picture of Jesus, early Christianity, and the events surrounding them. (1) Josephus (late first century, Jewish historian): - Refers to Jesus as a wise teacher who performed “surprising deeds,” was crucified under Pontius Pilate during the reign of Tiberius, and had followers who continued to be devoted to Him after His death (Antiquities 18.3.3; 18.3.4; 20.9.1). - Mentions James, “the brother of Jesus who is called Messiah,” being martyred (Antiquities 20.9.1). (2) Tacitus (early second century, Roman historian): - In Annals 15.44, Tacitus states that “Christus,” the founder of the Christian movement, was executed during the reign of Tiberius by the procurator (or prefect) Pontius Pilate, and that this movement, originating in Judea, had spread to Rome by Nero’s time. (3) Suetonius (early second century, Roman biographer): - Refers to disturbances among Jews in Rome “at the instigation of Chrestus” (Claudius 25), consistent with the spread of the Christian message among Jews. - Mentions Christians as a group in Rome punished for their beliefs (Nero 16). (4) Pliny the Younger (early second century, Roman governor): - In a letter to Emperor Trajan (Pliny, Letters 10.96–97), Pliny describes Christians in Bithynia who worship Christ “as a god,” meet on a fixed day, sing hymns to Christ, bind themselves to moral conduct, and refuse to worship the emperor’s image. (5) Other non-Christian references: - The Talmud and other Jewish sources refer to Jesus (often negatively), confirming that He was a real figure whose execution and influence were remembered. - Mara bar Serapion (a Syrian writer) may allude to Jesus as a wise king whose execution brought judgment on the Jews. None of these sources are friendly to Christianity; yet they confirm core New Testament claims about Jesus’ existence, crucifixion, and the rapid, widespread growth of the Christian movement. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P4) In multiple cases, the New Testament has been vindicated by later discoveries after being accused of error, demonstrating a consistent pattern of factual accuracy rather than legendary embellishment or careless reporting. (1) Luke’s accuracy in Acts: - Sir William Ramsay, a skeptical classical scholar, originally believed Acts to be historically unreliable. After extensive archaeological fieldwork in Asia Minor, he concluded that Luke is a first-rate historian who gets local titles, routes, and details consistently correct. - Titles like “asiarchs” (Acts 19:31), “proconsul” in Cyprus (Acts 13:7), and “first man of the island” in Malta (Acts 28:7) have been confirmed by inscriptions. (2) The pool of Bethesda and other once-doubted sites: - John’s mention of the pool of Bethesda with five porticoes (John 5:2) was long regarded as fictitious. Excavations in Jerusalem uncovered exactly such a pool with five colonnaded walkways. - Similar stories can be told about the pool of Siloam and other locations. (3) The census and Quirinius questions: - While some chronological questions about Luke’s census account remain debated, discoveries of imperial census practices and inscriptions relating to Quirinius have shown that empire-wide registration and multiple periods of administrative authority were historically plausible, undermining earlier simplistic objections. (4) General pattern of “earned trust”: - Time and again, where the New Testament could be checked, it has turned out to be accurate. This repeated vindication creates a strong presumption that the authors were careful and well-informed, not prone to inventing historical details. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P5) This extensive external corroboration supports not only isolated details but the broader narrative context in which the central claims of Christianity...especially the death and resurrection of Jesus...are set, making legendary or purely mythic explanations of the New Testament accounts highly implausible. (1) The political and religious context matches the New Testament picture. - Archaeology and non-Christian sources confirm the tensions among Jews, Romans, and emerging Christians, the existence of synagogues, temple worship, Passover crowds, Roman crucifixion practices, and more. The Gospels’ setting is not a vague, mythical “once upon a time,” but a specific, corroborated historical world. (2) The pattern of persecution and growth fits external evidence. - Non-Christian writers acknowledge that Christians were persecuted (e.g., under Nero and Pliny) and that the movement grew rapidly, spreading from Judea to Rome within a few decades...exactly as Acts portrays. (3) Core events around Jesus are independently confirmed. - That Jesus existed, taught, attracted followers, was crucified under Pontius Pilate during Tiberius’ reign, and left behind a movement convinced of His exalted status are all supported by non-Christian testimony. - This makes the New Testament’s central claims about Jesus historically anchored rather than free-floating religious ideas. (4) Given this solid external framework, it is unreasonable to treat the central New Testament claims as pure legend without very strong counter-evidence. - When a document consistently proves accurate in matters we can check, it is methodologically sound to trust it in matters we cannot directly verify, unless we have specific reasons to doubt those particular claims. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(C) Therefore, the substantial archaeological and non-Christian corroboration of the New Testament’s people, places, customs, and events provides strong evidence that the New Testament is historically reliable and that its central claims about Jesus arise from a real, well-attested historical setting rather than from legend or myth.

F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004. Paul Barnett, Jesus and the Rise of Early Christianity: A History of New Testament Times. Downers Grove: IVP, 1999. Colin J. Hemer, The Book of Acts in the Setting of Hellenistic History. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990. Edwin M. Yamauchi, Jesus, the Gospels, and the Reliability of the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980.
+ Archaeology might show that some places and people in the New Testament are real, but it can’t prove miracles or theological claims. So external corroboration doesn’t really help your case for Christianity.
1. The point is not that archaeology proves miracles directly. No one expects a dig to unearth a label saying “Here Jesus walked on water.” The role of archaeology and non-Christian sources is to confirm the historical framework in which miracle claims are embedded. 2. When the framework is solid, the miracle claims become historically serious rather than obviously legendary. If a text is repeatedly accurate about people, places, and events we can check, it is rational to take seriously what it says about events we cannot check directly...especially when those claims are multiply attested and when alternative natural explanations are weak. 3. Historical reliability and theological truth are related, though not identical. External corroboration undergirds the claim that the New Testament is telling us what the early witnesses actually said and believed. Once we know what they claimed, we can then ask whether those claims are best explained by a miracle (e.g., the resurrection) or by some natural alternative. 4. A strong historical framework is a necessary foundation for a serious case for the resurrection. The Minimal and Maximal Facts arguments for the resurrection presuppose that the New Testament is at least substantially reliable as a historical source. Archaeology and non-Christian sources give us strong reason to grant that presupposition. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument
+ Non-Christian sources only mention Jesus and Christians briefly. That’s hardly enough to build a case for the reliability of the New Testament.
1. Brief references are exactly what we expect from outsiders. Roman and Jewish historians were not writing biographies of Jesus; they mentioned Him and His followers only when relevant to their own purposes (e.g., explaining Nero’s persecution, Jewish unrest, or local legal issues). The fact that they mention Jesus and Christians at all is significant. 2. These brief references confirm core New Testament claims. Even in a few lines, Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny corroborate: - Jesus’ existence as a real historical figure. - His execution under Pontius Pilate during Tiberius’ reign. - The rapid spread of the Christian movement from Judea to Rome. - The early Christian belief that Jesus was more than a mere man and worthy of worship. 3. Silence on details is not evidence against the New Testament. The fact that non-Christian writers do not retell the entire Gospel story should not surprise us; that was not their aim. Their silence about some details does not undercut the New Testament; what matters is what they do say, and that aligns with the New Testament picture. 4. External sources are part of a cumulative case. No single piece of external evidence proves everything by itself. But when combined with internal evidence, manuscript evidence, and the convergence of independent New Testament traditions, these non-Christian references significantly strengthen the case. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ The passages about Jesus in Josephus (and maybe elsewhere) are interpolated or corrupted by Christians. So we can’t really count them as independent evidence.
1. Most scholars accept a core authentic reference to Jesus in Josephus. While it is widely agreed that Christian scribes later added or modified some phrases in the “Testimonium Flavianum” (Antiquities 18.3.3), the majority of scholars...including many non-Christians...believe Josephus did mention Jesus in a more restrained form. 2. The James passage is almost universally accepted as authentic. Josephus’ reference to “James, the brother of Jesus who is called Messiah” (Antiquities 20.9.1) is widely regarded as genuine. This alone confirms that Jesus was a real figure known as “the one called Messiah” and that His followers were significant enough to be noted by Josephus. 3. Even with textual questions, the direction of the testimony is clear. Even stripped of probable Christian embellishments, Josephus still presents Jesus as a wise teacher who did surprising deeds, was executed under Pilate, and had followers who persisted after His death. This fits closely with the New Testament picture. 4. The case does not rest on Josephus alone. Tacitus, Pliny, Suetonius, and others provide independent corroboration of Jesus’ existence, execution, and the spread of Christianity. Even if the Josephus passages were removed entirely, the cumulative external case would remain strong. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ There are archaeological disputes about some biblical claims. Doesn’t that show we shouldn’t trust the New Testament unless archaeology confirms it directly?
1. Archaeology is an incomplete and developing record. The absence of evidence for a specific detail is not evidence of its absence in history, especially when only a fraction of ancient sites have been excavated and many artifacts are lost. Archaeological conclusions are often revised as new discoveries are made. 2. In many cases, archaeology has moved from apparent disconfirmation to confirmation. Examples include: - The existence of “politarchs” in Thessalonica. - The details of certain city layouts and buildings. - The pool of Bethesda and the pool of Siloam in Jerusalem. In each case, the New Testament was vindicated after being doubted. 3. Occasional open questions do not overturn a strong pattern of accuracy. No ancient text aligns with archaeology perfectly in every possible detail; our knowledge is too fragmentary. What matters is the overall pattern. In the New Testament’s case, that pattern is one of repeated confirmation, not repeated falsification. 4. Methodologically, we should start from the preponderance of evidence. Given how often the New Testament has been shown to be accurate where it can be checked, it is reasonable to give it the benefit of the doubt in areas where the archaeological record is silent or ambiguous, unless there is strong positive evidence to the contrary. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels
+ Pagans and Jews mentioning Christians doesn’t make Christianity true; it only proves that Christians existed and believed certain things. That’s trivial.
1. It is historically important to know that Christianity is rooted in real first-century events. If external sources showed that Christianity arose centuries later or in a completely different context than the New Testament claims, that would be devastating to its credibility. Instead, they confirm that Christianity began in Judea in the first century, centered around a real Jesus who was crucified under Pilate. 2. External sources confirm that early Christians believed in the resurrection and worshiped Jesus as divine from the start. Pliny’s letter and other references show that Christians honored Christ “as a god” very early. This undermines theories that high Christology or the resurrection belief were late doctrinal developments. 3. Establishing what the earliest Christians believed is a crucial step in evaluating those beliefs. The resurrection case, for example, begins by asking: what did the earliest Christians claim happened? External sources help answer that question in a way that is independent of Christian testimony, strengthening the historical basis for further evaluation. 4. The significance of external sources lies in the cumulative case. While it is “trivial” in one sense to say that Christians existed and believed things, it is not trivial when this is combined with internal evidence, manuscript evidence, archaeological corroboration, and the failure of naturalistic alternatives to explain the data. All of this together makes the central claims of Christianity historically serious and worthy of belief. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P1) In general, the literary features and authorial claims of a work...its genre, style, use of sources, and stated intentions...are key indicators of whether it aims to report real history or to convey fiction, myth, or purely symbolic theology. Historians do not treat all ancient texts alike. They ask: (1) What genre does this text most closely resemble? - Ancient biography (bios) and history (historia) are primarily concerned with real persons and events. - Myths, allegories, and philosophical dialogues have different aims and conventions. (2) Does the author explicitly claim to be reporting what actually happened? - Prefaces, appeals to eyewitnesses, and references to investigation and sources point toward historical intent. (3) How does the text handle time, place, and verifiable details? - Concrete references to rulers, cities, geography, and chronology are typical of historical and biographical writing, not of purely symbolic tales. (4) How does the text compare to other literature of its time? - Genre comparison helps us see whether a text fits the pattern of history/biography or of myth and legend. If a text walks, talks, and behaves like ancient history/biography, the default historical approach is to treat it as such unless strong reasons suggest otherwise. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P2) The Gospels, especially Luke–Acts, explicitly adopt the stance and methods of ancient historical and biographical writing, presenting themselves as accounts of real events grounded in eyewitness testimony and careful investigation. (1) Luke’s explicit historical preface: - Luke 1:1–4 closely parallels the prefaces of recognized ancient historians (e.g., Thucydides, Polybius), emphasizing: • Many prior accounts exist. • The author has “followed all things closely for some time past.” • He has consulted “eyewitnesses and ministers of the word.” • He is writing an “orderly account” so his reader may “know the certainty” of what he has been taught. - This is a clear, first-century statement of historical intent. (2) Acts as a historical monograph: - Acts continues Luke’s project with extensive geographical and political detail, travel narratives, speeches, and named individuals...typical features of ancient historical works. - Its narrative structure (origins, expansion, key turning points) resembles other works of historia in the Greco-Roman world. (3) The Gospels as ancient biographies (bioi): - Scholarly consensus, including many non-evangelicals, now recognizes the canonical Gospels as belonging to the genre of Greco-Roman biography. - Like other bioi, they focus on: • A real person’s actions and teachings. • His character and significance. • The circumstances of his death. - They are not allegories detached from history, but narratives about a particular, datable individual. (4) Claims to eyewitness connection: - John emphasizes, “He who saw it has borne witness...his testimony is true… that you also may believe” (John 19:35; 21:24). - Luke stresses his use of eyewitnesses. - Early Christian tradition consistently associates Mark with Peter, Matthew with one of the Twelve, Luke with Paul’s circle, and John with the beloved disciple. Taken at face value, the Gospels and Acts present themselves as serious historical and biographical works rooted in eyewitness testimony. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon

(P3) The narrative style and content of the Gospels fit the pattern of realistic historical biography...anchored in real time and place...rather than the style of mythic or symbolic literature detached from concrete history. (1) Concrete historical anchoring: - The Gospels repeatedly locate events in: • Specific times (“in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar…” Luke 3:1). • Under specific rulers (Herod, Pilate, Caiaphas). • In specific towns, roads, and regions (Nazareth, Capernaum, Jericho, Bethany, the Sea of Galilee). - This is very different from vague mythical settings like “once upon a time” or unnamed lands. (2) Realistic human characters and psychology: - The disciples’ fear, confusion, ambition, rivalry, and gradual understanding are portrayed with psychological depth and nuance. - Jesus interacts with Pharisees, tax collectors, Roman soldiers, women, and children in ways that reflect real social dynamics of first-century Judaism and the Roman Empire. (3) Ordinary as well as extraordinary events: - The Gospels include large amounts of non-miraculous material: travel, conversations, teaching sessions, disputes, meals, legal proceedings, and so on. - Miracles are embedded in a wider context of ordinary life, not presented in a purely fantastical “wonder tale” environment. (4) Consistency with the broader historical context: - The political, religious, and cultural background of the Gospels matches what we know from Josephus, Philo, Roman writers, and archaeology. - This coherence suggests that the authors are writing within, and about, a real historical world. These literary and content features strongly support the classification of the Gospels as historical/biographical narratives, not as free-floating myth. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P4) The Gospels lack the characteristic marks of later apocryphal gospels and mythic literature, which are often more obviously legendary, doctrinaire, or fantastical, and less concerned with concrete historical setting and eyewitness detail. (1) Contrast with later apocryphal gospels: - Texts like the Infancy Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of Peter: • Include bizarre, obviously legendary episodes (e.g., the child Jesus striking children dead and raising them, a talking cross). • Often lack precise historical anchoring in time, place, and political context. • Show strong theological or ideological agendas (e.g., Gnostic teaching) that drive the narrative. (2) Canonical Gospels are comparatively restrained. - Miracles in the canonical Gospels, while extraordinary, are purposeful and integrated into a coherent ministry...healings, exorcisms, nature miracles, and the resurrection...performed in recognizable settings, not arbitrary magical feats. - The narratives do not indulge in the kind of wild embellishments seen in later legendary material. (3) Apocryphal texts are typically later and derivative. - Even critical scholars generally date most apocryphal gospels to the mid-second century or later. - They presuppose the basic Gospel story and often rework or “spin” it, indicating dependence on earlier, more historically oriented accounts. (4) Canonical Gospels align with known ancient biographical conventions. - Their focus on birth, public ministry, teaching, and death of a central figure parallels other ancient bioi. - They are not presented as esoteric revelations or purely symbolic myths, but as public events witnessed by many. The difference in tone, content, and genre between the canonical and apocryphal gospels underscores the former’s historical/biographical character. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Historical Development of the New Testament Canon • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources

(P5) The combination of historical intent, biographical genre, realistic narrative style, and external corroboration makes it methodologically unwarranted to treat the Gospels as non-historical myth or mere theological fiction, even while recognizing that they also have theological aims. (1) The presence of theology does not negate history. - Ancient historians and biographers often had ideological or moral aims, yet still intended to report what actually happened. - The fact that the evangelists interpret Jesus’ life theologically does not mean they invented the underlying events. (2) Genre and intent constrain how we read the texts. - If a text presents itself as grounded in eyewitness testimony, set in a specific time and place, and concerned with what actually occurred, it is special pleading to dismiss it as myth simply because it reports miracles or theological claims. (3) The Gospels pass multiple independent tests of historical reliability. - Early dating and proximity to eyewitnesses. - Convergence of independent traditions. - Internal marks of verisimilitude. - External corroboration from archaeology and non-Christian sources. - A literary character matching ancient biography and history rather than myth. (4) Therefore, the most reasonable reading of the Gospels is as historically rooted biographies of Jesus. - To treat them instead as late, free-floating legends or symbolic myths requires ignoring or downplaying the strong literary-historical evidence to the contrary. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization

(C) Therefore, given their genre, explicit historical intent, realistic narrative style, and coherence with known history, the canonical Gospels should be treated as serious ancient historical/biographical sources about Jesus of Nazareth, not as mere myth or theological fiction detached from real events.

Richard Burridge, What are the Gospels? A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004. Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017. Lydia McGrew, Testimonies to the Truth: Why You Can Trust the Gospels. North Charleston, SC: DeWard, 2022. Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 2). Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996.
+ The Gospels are clearly theological documents written to promote faith in Jesus. That means we shouldn’t treat them as serious history.
1. Many ancient historical works have theological or ideological aims. Thucydides, Josephus, and other ancient historians wrote with moral, political, or religious agendas, yet modern scholars still treat them as vital historical sources. Motive alone does not invalidate historical content. 2. The Gospels integrate theology with concrete historical claims. They proclaim theological truths (who Jesus is) precisely by narrating concrete events (what He said and did in time and space). Theology is not a replacement for history but an interpretation of it. 3. The evangelists could have written pure sermons or allegories if they wished. Instead, they chose to anchor their message in specific historical narratives, naming rulers, cities, and eyewitnesses. This choice itself is evidence of historical intent. 4. The relevant question is whether they tell the truth about the events they report. The presence of a theological purpose means we must read carefully; it does not mean we may dismiss their historical claims out of hand...especially when those claims are corroborated and display strong marks of eyewitness testimony. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources
+ Ancient biographers weren’t concerned with strict factual accuracy. They rearranged events and invented speeches. So we shouldn’t expect the Gospels to be historically reliable.
1. Ancient historians and biographers used different conventions, but they still aimed at truth. Writers like Thucydides admit to composing speeches in their own words, but they also stress that they are representing what was “most appropriate” to what was actually said and done. They are not writing historical fiction. 2. Rearrangement and paraphrase do not equal invention of events. Ancient authors might arrange episodes thematically or paraphrase speeches, but this is compatible with faithful reporting of real actions and words. The question is whether the core events are historical, not whether every quotation is verbatim. 3. The Gospels fit within the more careful end of ancient biographical practice. Compared with some ancient bioi, the Gospels are restrained, consistently anchored in time and place, and show concern for eyewitness testimony (especially Luke–Acts and John). 4. Genre awareness refines our expectations without erasing reliability. Recognizing the Gospels as ancient biographies means we should not impose anachronistic journalistic standards, but it does not justify skepticism about their basic historical trustworthiness...especially in light of corroborating evidence. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization
+ The Gospels are full of miracle stories. That alone shows they belong to the realm of myth and legend, not serious history.
1. The presence of miracle claims does not determine genre. Ancient historical works sometimes record events their authors regard as supernatural (e.g., omens, portents), but scholars do not automatically reclassify those works as “myth.” The key question is whether the authors believed they were reporting real events. 2. The Gospels treat miracles as historical occurrences. Jesus’ miracles are located in specific towns, witnessed by crowds, and often resisted or disputed by opponents...features that fit historical narrative rather than symbolic fables. 3. The decision to exclude miracles is often philosophical, not historical. If one assumes in advance that miracles cannot occur, then any text reporting miracles will be labeled “myth.” But that is a metaphysical judgment, not a literary-historical one. From a historical standpoint, we must start with the sources themselves and their context. 4. The broader historical credibility of the Gospels gives weight to their miracle reports. If the Gospels consistently prove reliable on non-miraculous matters (people, places, events), it is not methodologically sound to cherry-pick and dismiss their miracle reports simply because they are inconvenient to a naturalistic worldview. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources
+ Each Gospel has its own theological agenda and portrait of Jesus. These differences show that the authors were shaping the story to fit their theology, not reporting straightforward history.
1. Different perspectives do not negate historical core. Multiple eyewitnesses or reporters often emphasize different aspects of the same person or event. A legal case or biography can have varied portrayals without implying fabrication. 2. The Gospels agree on the central narrative and identity of Jesus. Despite differences in emphasis (e.g., Matthew’s focus on fulfillment of prophecy, Luke’s concern for the marginalized, John’s emphasis on Jesus’ divine identity), all four Gospels: - Present Jesus as a real first-century Jew. - Record His public ministry, teaching, miracles, crucifixion under Pilate, and resurrection. - Portray Him as Messiah/Christ and Lord. 3. Theological interpretation presupposes a common historical core. The fact that each evangelist interprets Jesus’ life theologically presupposes that there is a shared story to interpret. Theology is layered onto, not substituted for, the historical narrative. 4. Diversity of portraits is what we expect from independent historical witnesses. If all four Gospels sounded identical in tone, emphasis, and structure, we would worry about collusion. The actual pattern...unity in core facts, diversity in presentation...is a mark of authenticity, not fabrication. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude
+ Some scholars say the Gospels are a unique genre, neither history nor myth. If that’s true, genre comparisons don’t show that they are historically reliable.
1. The “unique genre” claim is overstated. While the Gospels have distinctive features (e.g., strong theological focus), detailed genre studies...such as Burridge’s work...show substantial overlap with recognized Greco-Roman biographies. 2. Overlap with biography is what matters for historical evaluation. Even if the Gospels are not identical to every other bios, their structural and functional similarities (focus on a real person’s life and death, public deeds, teachings, and character) justify reading them as biographical/historical in intent. 3. A “unique” genre does not automatically imply non-historical. A work can be distinctive yet still be anchored in real events. The burden of proof lies on those who would claim that the Gospels, despite their historical signals, should be read as something fundamentally non-historical. 4. The cumulative evidence from genre, intent, style, and corroboration all point in the same direction. Even if one prefers to call the Gospels a “sui generis” genre, the question remains: Do they behave like texts trying to tell us what actually happened, or not? The answer, on balanced examination, is yes. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

Alleged Gospel Contradictions and Historical Harmonization

(P1) In general, apparent discrepancies between multiple historical accounts do not automatically imply genuine contradictions; careful analysis and reasonable harmonization are standard historical methods for evaluating multiple testimonies about the same events. Historians, journalists, and courts of law routinely work with multiple testimonies that: (1) Emphasize different details or sequences of events. (2) Report partial information, omitting things others include. (3) Paraphrase or summarize speech rather than quote verbatim. (4) Reflect different perspectives, purposes, or audiences. These factors create apparent tensions, but careful analysis often shows that: (a) The accounts can be reasonably harmonized (i.e., both/and rather than either/or). (b) Differences are compatible with independent, truthful testimony. (c) Minor discrepancies in secondary details do not undermine agreement on major facts. Therefore, the existence of alleged contradictions is not, by itself, evidence of unreliability; what matters is whether responsible harmonization is plausible, not whether we can instantly see it at first glance. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(P2) The Gospels exhibit exactly the kind of partial, perspective-driven variation we expect from independent testimonies, while still agreeing on the core events of Jesus’ ministry, death, and resurrection. (1) Differences in selection and arrangement: - Each evangelist selects and arranges material according to his purpose: • John omits many exorcisms and parables but includes long discourses not found in the Synoptics. • Luke emphasizes certain parables and miracles connected to the poor and marginalized. • Matthew structures teaching into five major discourses, reflecting a didactic agenda. - This selective emphasis is normal in biography and does not imply contradiction. (2) Differences in wording and summarization: - Jesus’ sayings are frequently reported with slight verbal variation (e.g., the wording of the inscription on the cross, the wording of certain teachings). - Such variation is consistent with paraphrase and summary, not necessarily with disagreement on substance. (3) Differences in order: - Some events or teachings appear in a different sequence in different Gospels. - Ancient biographical conventions allowed thematic rather than strictly chronological arrangement. This does not entail that the authors are inventing events, only that they are grouping material purposefully. (4) Substantial agreement on the major story line: - All four Gospels agree that: • Jesus was baptized by John, conducted a public ministry in Galilee and Judea, taught about the kingdom of God, worked miracles, clashed with religious authorities, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, died, was buried, and was reported alive again by His followers. - The presence of minor tensions in details does not erase this strong narrative convergence. Such patterns are precisely what we expect from multiple, independent testimonies about real events. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P3) Many frequently cited “contradictions” in the Gospels admit of straightforward, historically plausible harmonizations once we distinguish between logical impossibility and incomplete or differently framed reporting. (1) Example: The centurion and his servants (Matthew 8 / Luke 7): - Matthew 8:5–13 presents the centurion as coming personally to Jesus. - Luke 7:1–10 presents Jewish elders and then friends as intermediaries. - Harmonization: It was common to ascribe to a person actions carried out by authorized representatives (a known phenomenon of “agency”). Saying “the centurion came” can naturally summarize “the centurion sent trusted emissaries on his behalf.” There is no logical contradiction. (2) Example: The angels at the empty tomb: - Matthew and Mark mention one angel (or “a young man”) at the tomb; Luke and John mention two. - Harmonization: “One angel” language does not state “only one.” If two angels were present and one was the principal speaker, one account may highlight that figure while another notes both. “At least one” is consistent with “two.” (3) Example: The wording on the cross inscription: - Each Gospel reports slightly different wording of the titulus (e.g., “This is Jesus, the King of the Jews” vs. “The King of the Jews”). - Harmonization: Inscriptions were often multilingual and could be summarized differently. Each evangelist may be giving an accurate, condensed version of the same fuller inscription. (4) Example: The order of temptations (Matthew 4 / Luke 4): - Matthew and Luke list the three temptations in a different order. - Harmonization: Both agree on the three temptations themselves. The difference in order can be explained by thematic arrangement, a standard ancient practice. Neither claims to present an explicit temporal sequence marked by “first, second, third” in a rigid modern sense. These examples illustrate that once we distinguish between real logical contradiction and ordinary narrative variation, many alleged inconsistencies lose their force. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P4) In cases where detailed harmonization is not obvious, the combination of genre, authors’ intentions, and the demonstrated reliability of the Gospels in other areas gives strong reason to treat remaining tensions as unresolved puzzles rather than as decisive falsifications. (1) An honest historian does not demand omniscience or perfect surface harmony. - In secular history, we often live with unresolved puzzles (e.g., differing ancient accounts of a battle) without concluding that the entire corpus is worthless. - The proper stance is: “We do not yet know exactly how these accounts fit together,” not “they cannot possibly fit together.” (2) The Gospels repeatedly show accuracy where they can be checked. - On geography, political titles, cultural practices, and external events, the Gospels (especially Luke–Acts) are confirmed by archaeology and non-Christian sources. - This track record justifies a presumption of reliability even for passages where we cannot fully reconstruct every detail. (3) Genre expectations allow for paraphrase and compression. - As ancient biographies, the Gospels have latitude in compressing time, summarizing dialogue, and arranging material thematically. - Expecting them to read like modern stenographic transcripts is anachronistic. (4) Reasonable doubt vs. hyper-skeptical doubt. - Reasonable doubt acknowledges that minor unresolved tensions may exist without overturning a strong cumulative case. - Hyper-skeptical doubt insists that any unresolved difficulty justifies rejecting the whole narrative. This is not how historians normally operate with other ancient sources. Therefore, unexplained differences in some details do not nullify the substantial historical credibility established by the Gospels’ overall character and corroboration. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P5) The presence of apparent contradictions, coupled with a strong pattern of harmonizability and independent corroboration, actually supports rather than undermines the claim that the Gospels preserve multiple, truthful testimonies to a common historical core centered on Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection. (1) If the Gospels were collusive fabrications, we would expect smoother uniformity. - Conspirators or literary fabricators tend to iron out differences to avoid looking inconsistent. - The fact that the Gospels retain rough edges and differences suggests that the authors were not engaged in tight collusion but were independently reporting what they believed to be true. (2) The pattern resembles real-world witness testimony. - In legal contexts, judges and juries expect: • Agreement on the main events. • Differences in minor details. - This pattern, which we see in the Gospels, is considered a mark of genuine witness testimony. (3) Where the Gospels can be compared with archaeology and external history, they perform well. - This “earned trust” means that, absent strong counterevidence, we should be inclined to accept their testimony even in complex narratives (such as the resurrection accounts) where harmonization is challenging. (4) Therefore, alleged contradictions do not defeat the historical case for Jesus’ resurrection and identity; at most, they raise localized questions of detail. - The central claims...the crucifixion, burial, empty tomb, post-mortem appearances, and the rise of the Christian movement...remain strongly attested across independent sources and lines of evidence. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(C) Therefore, the presence of alleged Gospel contradictions, when evaluated using standard historical methods of harmonization and weighed against the strong internal and external evidence for reliability, does not undermine the historical credibility of the Gospels or their central claims about Jesus; rather, it fits the pattern of multiple, independent, truthful testimonies to real events.

Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Lydia McGrew, Testimonies to the Truth: Why You Can Trust the Gospels. North Charleston, SC: DeWard, 2022. Lydia McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. John Wenham, Easter Enigma: Are the Resurrection Accounts in Conflict? Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992. John Warwick Montgomery, History and Christianity. Downers Grove: IVP, 1965.
+ If the Gospels have even one real contradiction, that disproves inerrancy. And if they’re not inerrant, we can’t trust anything they say.
1. Historical reliability and a specific doctrine of inerrancy are distinct questions. A historian can judge a text highly reliable...even if not perfect in every detail...without adopting a particular theological view of inerrancy. Many non-evangelical scholars regard the Gospels as broadly trustworthy sources for Jesus’ life. 2. The resurrection case does not require proving absolute inerrancy. To show that it is reasonable to believe Jesus rose from the dead, we need to show that: - The Gospels and related sources are generally reliable. - The core resurrection facts are strongly attested. - Competing naturalistic explanations fail. This cumulative case does not collapse even if some minor errors were conceded. 3. The “all-or-nothing” approach is historically unrealistic. No ancient document is flawless by modern standards. Yet we still rely on Thucydides, Tacitus, and Josephus as indispensable sources. It would be irrational to discard the Gospels entirely if a few minor mistakes were proven. 4. Many alleged contradictions dissolve under careful analysis. Before concluding that a genuine contradiction exists, responsible study requires examining context, genre, and harmonization possibilities. In many cases, confident claims of contradiction have not stood up well under scrutiny. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude
+ The resurrection narratives especially are full of contradictions about who went to the tomb, what they saw, when it happened, and where Jesus appeared. That makes the central Christian claim unreliable.
1. All four Gospels agree on the core resurrection facts. They all affirm that: - Jesus died and was buried. - Women followers discovered the empty tomb early on the first day of the week. - They encountered angelic messengers announcing that Jesus had risen. - Jesus appeared alive again to His followers. - The disciples became convinced that He had truly risen. 2. Differences in secondary details are to be expected in multiple eyewitness-based reports. Questions about: - Exactly which women were present. - The precise sequence of visits. - The number and location of appearances. are the kinds of variations that naturally arise when different witnesses emphasize different aspects of a complex, emotionally charged series of events. 3. Plausible harmonizations exist, even if they are complex. Scholars like John Wenham and others have mapped out coherent reconstructions that reconcile the accounts without special pleading. Whether or not one endorses a specific harmonization, their very plausibility undercuts the claim of logical impossibility. 4. The resurrection case rests on more than line-by-line harmony. Independent evidence from Paul (1 Corinthians 15:3–8), early creeds, and the explosive rise of the Christian movement all support the conclusion that the disciples genuinely believed they had seen the risen Jesus. The existence of some unresolved details does not overturn that powerful historical datum. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument
+ All these harmonizations are just ad hoc attempts to rescue the Bible. If the text weren’t sacred, no one would work that hard to make the accounts fit.
1. Harmonization is a normal, non-religious historical practice. Secular historians regularly attempt to reconcile divergent accounts (e.g., ancient accounts of battles, political events) rather than immediately declaring them hopelessly contradictory. This is not unique to biblical studies. 2. The key question is whether a harmonization is reasonable, not whether it is easy. Some events are complex and multi-staged; reconstructing them can be challenging. Difficulty alone does not make a harmonization ad hoc. A proposal is ad hoc if it is contrived and conflicts with known facts, not simply because it requires careful thought. 3. The Gospels’ established reliability justifies effort. Given the strong evidence that the evangelists are generally trustworthy (early date, external corroboration, eyewitness character), it is rational to invest effort in understanding how their accounts fit together, rather than assuming error at the first sign of tension. 4. Skeptical reconstructions can be just as ad hoc. Some skeptical “solutions” posit sources, redactions, or community inventions for which we have no direct evidence, simply to avoid the straightforward historical reading. Methodological consistency requires evaluating both harmonizing and skeptical theories by the same standards of simplicity and evidential support. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources
+ Since the Gospels sometimes arrange events differently (for example, John versus the Synoptics), that proves they weren’t interested in actual chronology and were just making theological points.
1. Ancient biographical conventions allowed thematic arrangement. Writers could group sayings or episodes by topic rather than strict time sequence, while still being committed to reporting real events. This does not imply indifference to history. 2. The evangelists signal real historical sequence when it matters. They use time markers (e.g., Passover, Sabbath, “after three days,” “on the first day of the week”) and link events causally and sequentially, especially around major events like the crucifixion. 3. Some chronological differences may be only apparent. For example, debates about the exact timing of the Last Supper involve complex Jewish calendrical issues and different ways of describing the feast days. Multiple scholarly proposals reconcile Gospel statements without denying the authors’ concern for real chronology. 4. Chronological flexibility does not equal fictional invention. Even modern historians occasionally rearrange material for narrative clarity while signaling the general time frame. The existence of thematic ordering in the Gospels does not justify the conclusion that they disregard actual history. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ If the Gospels are inspired by God, there shouldn’t be any apparent contradictions at all. The very existence of these difficulties shows they’re just human, error-prone writings.
1. This objection targets a particular expectation of inspiration, not the historical evidence itself. Even if someone holds a high doctrine of Scripture, how God chose to inspire the authors is a theological question. Historical reliability can be assessed on historical grounds without settling all theological issues about inspiration. 2. God could choose to inspire Scripture through ordinary human testimony. On a Christian view, God often works through normal human processes. He may allow ordinary features of testimony...partial perspectives, paraphrase, non-technical language...while still ensuring that the resulting writings truthfully convey what He intends. 3. Apparent difficulties can have beneficial effects. They: - Invite careful study rather than superficial reading. - Reveal the independence of the accounts. - Guard against simplistic, mechanical views of inspiration that treat the authors as passive dictation machines. 4. Historical reliability is established by positive evidence. The key historical question is whether the Gospels faithfully report the main events of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection. On that question, the convergence of evidence from multiple arguments in NT criticism is strongly positive, regardless of how one nuances a doctrine of inspiration. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

Transformation and Conduct of the Key Witnesses

(P1) In general, when multiple witnesses consistently maintain a costly testimony over time...enduring persecution, hardship, and even death without recanting...this strongly supports the sincerity and seriousness of their belief that what they proclaim is true. (1) Costly testimony is a standard evidential consideration. - In courts and historical analysis, the willingness of a witness to suffer loss (reputation, freedom, life) rather than renounce a claim is taken as strong evidence of sincerity. - While sincerity alone does not guarantee truth, it significantly reduces the likelihood of deliberate deceit or coordinated fraud. (2) Long-term, public consistency under pressure is especially significant. - A one-time profession can be impulsive; a life-long, public witness under hostile scrutiny is different. - When individuals have repeated opportunities to deny or soften their claims to avoid suffering but persist instead, their sincerity is hard to doubt. (3) Group transformation around a shared testimony is evidentially weighty. - When a group with first-hand knowledge of events undergoes a profound, coordinated change in behavior and public activity centered on a common claim, historians rightly ask: What best explains this transformation? Therefore, where we see persistent, unified, and costly witness, we have strong grounds to affirm the sincerity of the witnesses and to treat their core claims as historically serious, not as obvious fraud or legend. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument

(P2) The New Testament and early Christian sources depict a dramatic transformation in the behavior and convictions of the key witnesses...especially the apostles...from fear and despair to bold, public proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection in the face of persecution and death. (1) Before the crucifixion: fear, confusion, and failure. - The disciples frequently misunderstand Jesus’ mission, vie for status, and show little courage (e.g., Mark 9:32–34; Luke 9:46–48). - At Jesus’ arrest, they flee (Mark 14:50). - Peter, the leading disciple, denies even knowing Jesus three times (Mark 14:66–72; John 18:15–27). - After the crucifixion, they are depicted as hiding in fear and despair (Luke 24:11; John 20:19). (2) After the claimed resurrection appearances: bold, public witness. - The same individuals now proclaim openly in Jerusalem that God has raised Jesus from the dead (Acts 2–4). - Peter, who previously denied Jesus before servants, now confronts the Sanhedrin and declares, “We cannot but speak of what we have seen and heard” (Acts 4:20). - The apostles rejoice that they are counted worthy to suffer dishonor for Jesus’ name (Acts 5:41). (3) Persistent proclamation despite threats and suffering. - The apostles are beaten, imprisoned, and threatened but continue preaching (Acts 4–5, 12, 16). - Paul, initially a persecutor of Christians, becomes one of their boldest advocates, enduring shipwrecks, beatings, stoning, imprisonment, and eventual execution (Acts 9; 2 Corinthians 11:23–28; 2 Timothy 4:6–8). (4) Transformation anchored in a specific claimed event. - The New Testament consistently attributes this transformation to encounters with the risen Jesus (e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:3–8; Acts 2–4; Acts 9). - The earliest Christian preaching centers on the resurrection as a historical event, not merely as a vague spiritual symbol. This dramatic and enduring change in the witnesses’ conduct demands explanation. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

(P3) Historical and traditional evidence indicates that many of the key witnesses faced severe persecution and, in several cases, martyrdom for their testimony that Jesus was risen and exalted, yet there is no record of them recanting this core claim to save themselves. (1) New Testament evidence of persecution. - Acts records: • The martyrdom of Stephen (Acts 7). • The execution of James the son of Zebedee by Herod Agrippa I (Acts 12:1–2). • Repeated imprisonments, beatings, and threats against Peter, John, Paul, and others. - Paul writes of his many sufferings for the gospel (2 Corinthians 11:23–28). (2) Early extra-biblical testimony to apostolic martyrdom. - Clement of Rome (c. AD 95) refers to the sufferings and deaths of Peter and Paul in Rome for the sake of the gospel (1 Clement 5). - Ignatius of Antioch (early 2nd century) writes of his own impending martyrdom and refers to the apostles as examples. - Other early traditions (while varying in detail) consistently present the apostles as willing to suffer and die for their proclamation of the risen Christ. (3) No evidence of retraction of the core resurrection claim. - There is no early report that any apostle, under pressure, denied having seen the risen Jesus or retracted the resurrection message. - On the contrary, their sufferings are repeatedly tied specifically to their insistence on proclaiming Jesus as risen Lord (Acts 4–5; 1 Peter 3–4). (4) Martyrdom of first-generation witnesses is evidentially stronger than later martyrdoms. - Many people have died for beliefs inherited from others; that shows sincerity but not necessarily truth. - What is distinctive here is that the first-generation leaders claim to have direct knowledge of the central event (the resurrection appearances) and yet willingly suffer for that claim. This pattern makes it extremely unlikely that the apostles were knowingly perpetrating a hoax. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament

(P4) The specific content and focus of the early Christian proclamation...centered on the bodily resurrection and lordship of Jesus...are not well explained by mere moral enthusiasm, vague mystical experiences, or slow legendary development, but fit best with the claim that the witnesses believed they had encountered the risen Jesus in a concrete, public way. (1) The earliest preaching is resurrection-centered and concrete. - In Acts’ summaries of apostolic preaching (Acts 2, 3, 4, 10, 13), the resurrection is central: “This Jesus God raised up, and of that we all are witnesses” (Acts 2:32). - Paul’s letters (e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:3–8; Romans 10:9) show that from the beginning, Christian faith focused on Jesus’ bodily resurrection, not merely on His moral teachings or a general “hope beyond death.” (2) Early Christian worship and practice reflect strong resurrection conviction. - The shift from Sabbath (Saturday) to the first day of the week (Sunday) is historically striking in a Jewish context and is consistently associated with the day of Jesus’ resurrection. - Baptism and the Lord’s Supper symbolically reenact Jesus’ death and resurrection and the believer’s union with Him. (3) Alternative psychological explanations are strained. - Vague “visions” or corporate enthusiasms might produce a movement, but they do not naturally produce a sustained, concrete proclamation that “God raised Jesus from the dead” in history, when the tomb and potential contrary evidence were close at hand. - Hallucination or grief-experience hypotheses struggle to explain the diversity, number, and nature of the reported appearances (individual, group, skeptics like Paul and James). (4) The transformation is tightly tied to a specific claimed historical event. - The apostles do not present the resurrection as a mere metaphor or inner spiritual realization; they ground their boldness and mission in having “eaten and drunk with Him after He rose from the dead” (Acts 10:41). The nature of their message, coupled with their willingness to suffer for it, strongly supports the conclusion that they at least believed they had encountered the risen Jesus in reality. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels

(P5) Given the early date, the proximity of the apostles to the events, the costliness of their witness, and the lack of any plausible motive for deliberate deception, the hypothesis that the key witnesses knowingly fabricated the central claims of the New Testament is historically implausible compared to the hypothesis that they were sincere reporters of what they believed they had seen and heard. (1) Temporal and geographical proximity. - The apostles began proclaiming the resurrection in Jerusalem...the very city where Jesus was crucified and buried...within weeks of the events (Acts 2). - Their message developed and spread while many eyewitnesses, both friendly and hostile, were still alive (1 Corinthians 15:6). (2) Lack of obvious worldly incentives. - The first Christian leaders did not gain wealth, political power, or social prestige by their message. Instead, they faced hardship, rejection, and persecution. - This is not the typical profile of a successful fraud. (3) Unified but not uniform testimony. - The apostles agree on the core claims (Jesus’ death, burial, resurrection, and exaltation) while differing in emphasis and detail. This pattern matches multiple sincere witnesses rather than choreographed conspirators. (4) Fraud hypothesis fails to explain the full data. - A deliberate hoax must account for: • The dramatic change from fear to boldness. • The willingness to endure suffering and death. • The internal and external marks of reliability across multiple documents. - It strains credulity to suppose that a conspiracy to proclaim a known lie would be maintained at such cost by so many, without any recorded whistleblower from within the inner circle. Thus, historically, the fraud or conscious-deception explanation for the apostolic witness is extremely weak. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude

(C) Therefore, the transformation and conduct of the key witnesses...especially the apostles...provide strong historical evidence that the New Testament’s central claims about Jesus’ resurrection and lordship are grounded in sincere, first-hand testimony, not in deliberate fabrication or late legendary development.

Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 3). Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003. Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007. Sean McDowell, The Fate of the Apostles: Examining the Martyrdom Accounts of the Closest Followers of Jesus. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2015.
+ Lots of people die for false beliefs (like terrorists or members of other religions). So martyrdom doesn’t show that Christianity is true.
1. The key question is what the martyrs were in a position to know. Modern martyrs for any cause typically die for beliefs received secondhand...from parents, teachers, or sacred texts. They may be sincere but mistaken. The apostles’ case is different: they claimed to be eyewitnesses of the risen Jesus. 2. First-generation witnesses are evidentially special. If someone dies rather than deny what they personally claim to have seen and heard (e.g., a resurrection appearance, shared meals with the risen Christ), that is strong evidence against deliberate deceit. 3. The argument is about sincerity of testimony, not direct proof of the resurrection. The point is not “they died, therefore the resurrection is true,” but “they died rather than deny having seen the risen Jesus, therefore they were not knowingly lying about that claim.” This undercuts fraud theories and supports the historical seriousness of their testimony. 4. Once sincerity is established, other evidence weighs in. When we combine: - Sincere, first-hand testimony. - Multiple, converging witnesses. - The empty tomb and failure of alternative explanations. the cumulative case for the resurrection becomes strong. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument
+ The martyrdom accounts of the apostles are late and legendary. We don’t have solid historical proof that most of them died for their faith, so this argument collapses.
1. The argument does not require proving every traditional martyrdom story. Even if some later accounts are embellished, the core pattern is clear: - The New Testament itself records persecution and execution of key figures (Stephen, James the son of Zebedee). - Early sources like Clement of Rome and Ignatius attest to the sufferings of Peter and Paul. - The general picture of suffering leadership is well established. 2. What matters is the willingness to suffer, not only the manner of death. Even setting martyrdom aside, the apostles clearly accepted severe costs (floggings, imprisonment, exile, social rejection) rather than abandon their message. This still powerfully supports their sincerity. 3. Some individual cases are historically strong. Sean McDowell’s detailed study, for example, rates the evidence for the martyrdom of Peter, Paul, and James the brother of Jesus as very good to reasonable. These are central figures in the earliest Christian proclamation. 4. The pattern of risk and persecution is enough for the evidential point. We do not need to prove that all Twelve were executed to see that the early leaders fully expected and often experienced serious consequences for their testimony...and persisted nonetheless. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions
+ It’s still possible that the apostles were sincere but mistaken...maybe they had visions, dreams, or psychological experiences and misinterpreted them as a bodily resurrection.
1. The New Testament portrays the experiences as multi-sensory and public. The apostles claim to have: - Seen Jesus. - Heard Him speak. - Touched Him (e.g., Luke 24:39; John 20:27). - Eaten and drunk with Him (Acts 10:41). Group experiences of this kind are hard to reduce to mere private visions or dreams. 2. Hallucination-type explanations struggle with the diversity of witnesses. The reported appearances involve: - Individuals (Peter, James, Paul). - Small groups (the Twelve). - A larger group of “more than five hundred” at once (1 Corinthians 15:6). - Skeptics and enemies (James, Paul). A single psychological mechanism is unlikely to account for this pattern. 3. The empty tomb is hard to reconcile with mere “visions.” Even if individuals had visionary experiences, the continued presence of Jesus’ body in the tomb would have been a decisive counter to the resurrection claim...especially in Jerusalem, where the message was first preached. 4. Sincere misinterpretation does not fit the sustained, concrete nature of the proclamation. The apostles do not proclaim, “We had a strong sense that Jesus lives on in our hearts,” but “God raised Him from the dead” as a bodily, historical event. Their conduct and mission strategy reflect that conviction. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument • CE / Resurrection: Maximal Facts Argument
+ Religious zeal can make people do extreme things. The apostles’ transformation could just be fanatical enthusiasm, not evidence that their claims are true.
1. Zeal needs an explanatory object. We still must ask: what produced this specific zeal in these specific individuals, at this specific time, centered on this specific claim (that Jesus, whom they saw crucified, had risen bodily from the dead)? 2. The transformation runs against their prior expectations. First-century Jews did not expect an isolated individual resurrection in the middle of history, especially of a crucified messianic claimant. The apostles were not predisposed by their worldview to make up a story like this. 3. The zeal is anchored in claimed, detailed experiences. The apostles tie their boldness to having personally seen, heard, and touched the risen Jesus. They do not present a mere inner conviction or spiritual insight; they appeal to concrete encounters. 4. Zeal alone does not explain the pattern of evidence. Religious enthusiasm might explain willingness to suffer, but it does not by itself account for: - The empty tomb. - The multiple, converging traditions about appearances. - The internal and external marks of historical reliability in the New Testament. Zeal is part of the story, but not a sufficient explanation for the data. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Literary/Historical Character of the Gospels • CE / NT Criticism: External Corroboration – Archaeology and Non-Christian Sources
+ We can’t read the apostles’ minds from 2,000 years away. All this talk about their motives and sincerity is just speculation and doesn’t add anything to the historical case.
1. Historical inference about motives and sincerity is standard practice. Historians routinely draw reasonable conclusions about people’s beliefs and intentions from: - Their actions. - Their words (in multiple sources). - The costs they incur for their stances. We cannot have direct access to their minds, but we can make well-grounded inferences. 2. The apostles’ conduct is public, repeated, and multi-sourced. We see: - Their preaching in Acts. - Their letters (e.g., Paul’s epistles). - Early external testimony (Clement, Ignatius, etc.). - A coherent pattern of willingness to suffer for the same core message. This is not a matter of guessing from one ambiguous remark; it is a pattern of life. 3. We make similar inferences about many historical figures. Our judgments about the sincerity of Socrates, Luther, or civil rights leaders are also based on historical evidence about their actions and writings, not on direct mental access. The apostles are no different in this respect. 4. While not mathematically demonstrative, the evidence significantly shifts probabilities. Historical arguments rarely yield absolute certainty, but they can make one hypothesis (e.g., “the apostles knowingly lied”) extremely implausible. The transformation and conduct of the witnesses strongly favor the sincerity of their testimony. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude • CE / NT Criticism: Convergence of Independent New Testament Traditions

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

TBD1

(P1) TBD. TBD.

(C2) TBD.

TBD
+ TBD
1. TBD

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

Test

Test

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Test

Test

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Logic

Study of Reasoning and Argumentation

First Principles

(●) First principles in logic are the most basic foundational rules or assumptions upon which logical reasoning is built. These principles are considered self-evident and do not require proof within the system...they are the starting points for all logical arguments and deductions. The most commonly recognized first principles in classical logic are:

(●) The Law of Identity: Everything is identical to itself. Any object or statement is the same as itself. A=A "For the same thing to belong and not belong simultaneously to the same thing and in the same respect is impossible..." -Aristotle

(●) The Law of Non-Contradiction: A statement cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. This means that "A and not A" cannot both be true. ¬(A ∧ ¬A) "It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect." -Aristotle

(●) The Law of Excluded Middle: For any proposition, either that proposition is true, or its negation is true. This means that there is no third (middle) option between a statement being true or false. A ∨ ¬A "But on the other hand, there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate." -Aristotle

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV

Deductive Arguments

(●) What Are Deductive Arguments?
Deductive arguments are a fundamental part of logical reasoning. In a deductive argument, the conclusion is intended to follow necessarily from the premises. This means that if the premises are true and the reasoning is valid, the conclusion must also be true.

(●) Key Features of Deductive Arguments

- Certainty: Deductive arguments aim for certainty, not just probability. If the logic is valid and the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false.
- Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion logically follows from the premises, regardless of whether the premises are actually true.
- Soundness: An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are actually true.

(●) Multiple Premises in Deductive Arguments
Unlike syllogisms, which always have exactly two premises, deductive arguments can have any number of premises. For example, a mathematical proof might use several established facts (premises) to reach a conclusion. The key is that the conclusion must logically follow from all the premises taken together.

Example with Multiple Premises:

(P1) All mammals are warm-blooded.
(P2) All whales are mammals.
(P3) All warm-blooded animals need oxygen.
(C) Therefore, all whales need oxygen.
Here, three premises are used to reach the conclusion.

So how are Syllogisms different?
What Is a Syllogism?
A syllogism is a special kind of deductive argument with a very specific structure. First formalized by Aristotle, syllogisms have been a foundation of logical thinking for centuries. They are designed to show how a conclusion necessarily follows from two premises.

The Structure of a Syllogism
A standard (categorical) syllogism consists of:

-Major premise: A general statement about a group or category.
-Minor premise: A statement about a specific member or subset of that group.
-Conclusion: A statement that follows from the two premises.

Each statement contains two of three terms:

-Major term: The predicate of the conclusion.
-Minor term: The subject of the conclusion.
-Middle term: The term that links the major and minor terms, appearing in both premises but not in the conclusion.

Example (Categorical Syllogism):
-All mammals are warm-blooded. (major premise)
-All whales are mammals. (minor premise)
-Therefore, all whales are warm-blooded. (conclusion)

-Major term: warm-blooded
-Minor term: whales
-Middle term: mammals

Rules of Syllogisms
To be valid, a syllogism must follow certain rules:
-It must have exactly three terms, each used consistently.
-The middle term must be distributed (refer to all members of its class) at least once.
-No term can be distributed in the conclusion unless it was distributed in the premises.
-It cannot have two negative premises.
-If a premise is negative, the conclusion must also be negative.
-No conclusion can be drawn from two particular premises.

(●) Types of Deductive Arguments
Deductive arguments come in several forms, each with its own rules and applications. Here are the main types:

1. Categorical Deductive Arguments
These use statements about categories or classes, such as "All A are B." Syllogisms are the classic example of categorical arguments, focusing on relationships between groups or sets.

Example:
All birds have feathers.
All robins are birds.
Therefore, all robins have feathers.

2. Propositional Deductive Arguments
These use logical connectives to relate whole statements (propositions), such as "and," "or," and "if...then." Common forms within propositional logic include:

- Modus Ponens:
If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.

- Modus Tollens:
If P, then Q.
Not Q.
Therefore, not P.

- Disjunctive Syllogism:
P or Q.
Not P.
Therefore, Q.
(Disjunctive arguments use "either...or" statements and are a subtype of propositional logic.)

- Hypothetical Syllogism:
If P, then Q.
If Q, then R.
Therefore, if P, then R.
(Hypothetical arguments use conditional "if...then" statements and are also a subtype of propositional logic.)

3. Modal Deductive Arguments
These involve concepts of necessity and possibility, using modal operators like "necessarily" and "possibly."

Example:
Necessarily, if it is a square, then it is a rectangle.
It is a square.
Therefore, it is necessarily a rectangle.

4. Mathematical Deductive Arguments
These use axioms, definitions, and theorems to reach conclusions. Mathematical arguments often employ both categorical and propositional logic, but are structured around mathematical principles.

Example:
A triangle has three sides.
Figure X is a triangle.
Therefore, Figure X has three sides.

(●) Why Are Deductive Arguments Important?
Deductive arguments are used in mathematics, science, law, computer science, and everyday reasoning. They help us build strong, reliable conclusions from established facts or principles. Understanding deductive arguments helps you think more clearly, spot errors in reasoning, and communicate your ideas more effectively.

Inductive Arguments

(●) What is Inductive Reasoning?
In an inductive argument, it's possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion still be false. The premises don't guarantee the conclusion, but instead make it more probable than its competitors. The evidence used "underdetermines" the conclusion, meaning it makes it likely or plausible, but not certain. A good inductive argument must have true premises that are more plausible than their contradictories, and be informally valid (avoiding fallacies). However, they are not assessed for formal validity because the premises don't necessitate the conclusion's truth.

Here's a key example:
- 1. Groups A, B, and C were similar people with the same disease.
- 2. Group A got a new drug, B got a placebo, C got no treatment.
- 3. Death rate was 75% lower in Group A than B and C.
- 4. Therefore, the new drug is effective.

The conclusion is likely true based on the evidence, but it's not guaranteed – perhaps luck or another factor caused the difference.

(●) How Do We Understand Inductive Reasoning?
Philosophers approach understanding inductive reasoning in different ways. Two prominent methods are:

1. Bayes's Theorem:
This approach uses the rules of probability calculus. Bayes's theorem provides formulas to calculate the probability of a hypothesis (H) given certain evidence (E), symbolized as Pr(H|E). Probabilities range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest), with values above 0.5 suggesting positive probability. The probability of a hypothesis given evidence depends on its intrinsic probability (its likelihood based on general background knowledge) and its explanatory power (how likely the evidence would be if the hypothesis were true). A challenge in philosophy is assigning precise numerical values to these probabilities, often relying on vague approximations. An "odds form" of the theorem can compare the probability of two competing hypotheses given the evidence.

2. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)
A perhaps more practically useful approach in philosophy is inference to the best explanation (Also sometimes called Abduction). This method involves starting with data that needs explaining, identifying a set of possible explanations ("a pool of live options"), and then selecting the explanation that, if true, would best explain the data. Several criteria are commonly used to determine which explanation is "best":

• Explanatory scope: Does it explain a wider range of data than rivals?
• Explanatory power: Does it make the observable data more likely than rivals?
• Plausibility: Is it implied by a greater variety of accepted truths and its negation by fewer?
• Less ad hoc: Does it involve fewer new, unsupported assumptions than rivals?
• Accord with accepted beliefs: When combined with accepted truths, does it imply fewer falsehoods than rivals?
• Comparative superiority: Does it significantly outperform its rivals across these criteria?

The neo-Darwinian theory of biological evolution is presented as a good example of IBE. Supporters argue that even though the evidence (like micro-evolutionary change) doesn't prove macro-evolutionary development, the theory is the best explanation for the data due to its scope, power, and other factors. Critics, however, argue that the perceived superiority of Darwinism only holds if the pool of possible explanations is artificially limited (e.g., to only naturalistic ones). If other hypotheses, such as intelligent design, are allowed, the picture changes. This debate itself illustrates how IBE works and how disagreements about the criteria or the pool of options can arise.

Moreland, James Porter. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2017.

Symbolic Logic

(●) Symbolic logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy akin to mathematics that deals with the rules of reasoning. In symbolic logic, letters and symbols are used to stand for sentences and the words that connect them. This approach helps to make the logical form of a sentence clear without being distracted by its grammatical form, as sentences with different grammatical structures may still have the same logical form.

Here is a legend of some common symbols:

Letters (P, Q, R, S, etc.)
Meaning: These capital letters stand for any arbitrary sentences.
Example: In the argument "If today is Sunday, the library is closed. Today is Sunday. Therefore, the library is closed," we can let P = "Today is Sunday" and Q = "the library is closed".

Arrow (→)
Meaning: The arrow stands for the connecting words, "if . . . , then . . ." or it can be read as "implies". In a sentence of the form P → Q, P is the antecedent clause and states a sufficient condition of the consequent clause Q. Q is the consequent clause and states a necessary condition of the antecedent clause P. The clause that follows a simple "if" is symbolized P (sufficient condition), and the clause that follows "only if" is symbolized Q (necessary condition).
Example: The sentence "If John studies hard, then he will get a good grade in logic" can be symbolized as P → Q, where P = "John studies hard" and Q = "he will get a good grade in logic". The sentence "Extra credit will be permitted only if you have completed all the required work" can be symbolized as P → Q, where P = "You may do extra credit work" and Q = "You have completed the required work".

Negation (¬)
Meaning: This symbol stands for "not" and is the sign of negation.
Example: ¬Q is read as "Not-Q". If Q is the sentence "My roommate is sleeping in," then ¬Q is "My roommate is not sleeping in". ¬¬Q is logically equivalent to Q.

Conjunction (&)
Meaning: This symbol is read as "and". It symbolizes any conjunction, including words like but, while, although, whereas, and many other words when they function as conjunctions. For a conjunction P & Q to be true, both P and Q must be true.
Example: The sentence "Charity is playing the piano, and Jimmy is trying to play the piano" can be symbolized as P & Q, where P = "Charity is playing the piano" and Q = "Jimmy is trying to play the piano". The sentence "They ate their spinach, even though they didn’t like it" would be symbolized P & Q, where P symbolizes "They ate their spinach" and Q symbolizes "they didn’t like it".

Disjunction (v)
Meaning: This symbol is read as "or". A sentence composed of two sentences connected by "or" is called a disjunction. In order for a disjunction to be true, only one part has to be true (or both).
Example: The sentence "Either Mallory will carefully work on decorating their new apartment, or she will allow it to degenerate into a pigsty" can be symbolized as P v Q, where P = "Mallory will carefully work on decorating their new apartment" and Q = "she will allow it to degenerate into a pigsty". Note that in logic, both parts of a disjunction can be true.

Universal Quantification ((x))
Meaning: This symbol is used in first-order predicate logic to deal with quantified sentences, specifically those about all or none of a group. It can be read as "For any x, . . .". Universally quantified statements turn out to be disguised "if . . . , then . . ." statements. The variable 'x' can be replaced by any individual thing.
Example: The statement "All bears are mammals" can be symbolized as (x) (Bx → Mx), where Bx = "x is a bear" and Mx = "x is a mammal". This is read as "For any x, if x is a bear, then x is a mammal". A negative universal statement like "No goose is hairy" is symbolized by negating the consequent: (x) (Gx → ¬Hx), read as "For any x, if x is a goose, then x is not hairy".

Existential Quantification (∃x)
Meaning: This symbol is used in first-order predicate logic for statements about only some members of a group. It tells us that there really exists at least one thing that has the property in question. It may be read as "There is at least one ___ such that . . .". Existentially quantified statements are typically symbolized using & (conjunction), not → (conditional).
Example: The statement "Some bears are white" can be symbolized as (∃x) (Bx & Wx), where Bx = "x is a bear" and Wx = "x is white". This is read as "There is at least one x such that x is a bear and x is white". The statement "Some bears are not white" is symbolized as (∃x) (Bx & ¬Wx).

Necessity (□)
Meaning: This symbol is used in modal logic to stand for the mode of necessity. □P is read as "Necessarily, P" and indicates that the statement P is necessarily true (true in every possible world). □¬P indicates that P is necessarily false (false in every possible world).
Example: □P is read as "Necessarily, P". □¬P is read as "Necessarily, not-P".

Possibility (◊)
Meaning: This symbol is used in modal logic to stand for the mode of possibility. ◊P is read as "Possibly, P" and indicates that the statement P is possible (true in at least one possible world). ¬◊P is read as "Not-possibly, P," meaning it is impossible for P to be true.
Example: ◊P is read as "Possibly, P".

"Would" Counterfactual (□→)
Meaning: This symbol is used in counterfactual logic for conditional statements in the subjunctive mood that state what would happen if the antecedent were true. P □→ Q is read as "If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q".
Example: The conditional "If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, then somebody else would have" is a "would" counterfactual. It would be symbolized using □→.

"Might" Counterfactual (◊→)
Meaning: This symbol is used in counterfactual logic for conditional statements in the subjunctive mood that state what might happen if the antecedent were true. P ◊→ Q is read as "If it were the case that P, then it might be the case that Q". It is defined as the contradictory of P □→ ¬Q. "Might" indicates a genuine, live option under the circumstances.

Moreland, James Porter. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2017.

Logic: Common Fallacies

Invalid Reasoning in Logical Arguments

Epistemology

Study of Knowledge

Three Types of Knowledge

(●) Acquaintance Knowledge (Knowing-by-acquaintance): Knowing something because the object of knowledge is directly present to one’s consciousness. For example, Dan knows the ball in front of him because he sees it and is directly aware of it...he knows it by sensory intuition. In this context, intuition does not mean a guess or irrational hunch, but rather a direct awareness of something present to consciousness. People know many things by acquaintance or intuition, such as their own mental states (thoughts, feelings, sensations), physical objects they perceive through the five senses, and, according to some, even basic principles of mathematics. When asked how people know that 2 + 2 = 4 or that if it is raining outside then it must be wet outside, the answer seems to be that people can simply “see” these truths. This kind of “seeing” is often thought to involve an intuitional form of awareness or perception of abstract, immaterial objects and the relationships among them...such as numbers, mathematical relations, propositions, and the laws of logic. Thus, all these examples are arguably cases of knowledge by acquaintance.

(●) Procedural Knowledge (Knowing-how): The ability or skill to behave in a certain way and perform some task or set of behaviors. One can know how to speak Greek, play golf, ride a bicycle, or perform a number of other skills. Know-how does not always involve conscious awareness of what one is doing. Someone can learn how to do something by repeated practice without being consciously aware that one is doing the activity in question or without having any idea of the theory behind the practice. For example, one can know how to adjust one’s swing for a curve ball without consciously being aware that one’s stride is changing or without knowing any background theory of hitting technique.

(●) Propositional Knowledge (Knowing-by-description): This is knowledge of facts or truths, expressed in declarative sentences. For example, "I know that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius." It is the most discussed type in philosophy and is often analyzed as "justified true belief."

Moreland, James Porter. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2017.

Justified True Belief (JTB)

(●) The Quest to Define Knowledge
Since the time of Plato, philosophers have debated the nature of propositional knowledge...what it means to truly "know" something. In his dialogue Theaetetus, Plato explored the idea that knowledge might be "true belief with an account," a view that later evolved into the well-known "justified true belief" (JTB) analysis.
"true judgment with an account"...is the closest to what later philosophers called "justified true belief." However, Plato ultimately finds problems with each definition and does not endorse any as a final answer in the dialogue.

(●) The Standard Definition: Justified True Belief (JTB)
The standard definition states that knowledge consists of three essential components: justification, truth, and belief. To say someone knows a proposition (for example, "milk is in the refrigerator") means that three conditions must be met: the proposition must be true, the person must believe it, and the belief must be justified.

(●) Truth as a Necessary Condition
For someone to know something, it must be true. It would be nonsensical to claim that someone knows a falsehood. However, truth alone is not enough for knowledge. There are countless truths that no one knows or has even considered.

(●) Belief as a Necessary Condition
In addition to truth, belief is required. If a person does not believe a proposition, it cannot be said that they know it. However, simply believing something does not make it knowledge, since people can believe many things that are not true.

(●) The Insufficiency of True Belief
Even when a belief is true, that alone does not guarantee knowledge. A person might believe something that happens to be true purely by chance, without any justification. For example, if someone randomly thinks, "It is raining in Moscow right now," and it happens to be true, this is not knowledge...just a lucky guess.

(●) The Role of Justification
What distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief is justification or warrant. Justification means having sufficient evidence, forming beliefs in a reliable way (such as through the senses or expert testimony), and having properly functioning intellectual faculties in a suitable environment. The difference between a true belief and knowledge is that knowledge requires this additional element of justification or warrant.

(●) The Tripartite Analysis
The traditional or standard definition of propositional knowledge can be summarized as follows:
A person S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P.
2. P is true.
3. S is justified in believing that P at the time S believes it.
This tripartite analysis remains a foundational concept in the philosophical study of knowledge.

Plato, Theaetetus, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Hackett, 1997). Moreland, James Porter. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2017. Plantinga, Alvin. "Warrant and Accidentally True Belief." Analysis 57, no. 2 (1997): 140–145.
+ The Gettier Problem: You walk into your living room, look at the wall clock, see “3:43,” and form the belief “It’s 3:43.” Under normal circumstances, that’s a reliable way to tell the time, and in this case the belief is in fact true: it *is* 3:43. However, you don’t know that the clock actually stopped exactly 24 hours ago at 3:43 and has been frozen ever since. Had it stopped at 3:17 or 8:02, your “method” (glancing at the clock) would have delivered a false belief. So you have a "justified true belief" that still seems wrong to call “knowledge,” because the truth of your belief is heavily dependent on coincidence.
Alvin Plantinga’s diagnosis: proper function, maxi‑ vs mini‑environment, and warrant. Plantinga agrees that luck is the problem, but he gives a more fine‑grained account of where the luck enters. He says our cognitive faculties (vision, memory, basic reasoning, etc.) have a design plan: when they are functioning properly in the broad kind of world they were made for (call this the "maxi‑environment," our normal Earth‑like world), they tend to produce true beliefs. When those conditions are met, a belief has "warrant": the special positive status that, when present in enough degree, turns true belief into knowledge. However, each particular act of forming a belief also occurs in a much more specific "mini‑environment": not just "on Earth," but “looking at this particular clock, in this particular condition, at this particular moment.” Even inside a good maxi‑environment, some mini‑environments are "epistemically misleading": they are such that, given that very specific setup, your properly functioning faculties cannot be relied on to produce a true belief. Now compare two mini‑environments that share the same maxi‑environment and the same cognitive functioning: (1) the clock is working normally, and (2) the clock is stopped at 3:43. In both, you use the same cognitive process by glancing at the clock and reading the time. In (1), that process is 'reliably truth‑producing' in that mini‑environment: in nearby situations just like it (if you looked again, if you came in a minute earlier or later, etc.), the same method would very likely yield a true belief. So here your belief is not only justified and true; it also has a 'degree of warrant high enough' to qualify as knowledge. In (2), by contrast, the mini‑environment is misleading: in nearby situations where you use the same method on that same stopped clock, you mostly get false beliefs about the time. Plantinga’s added "Resolution Condition" says that in such a misleading mini‑environment your belief cannot have warrant in the degree required for knowledge, even if it happens to turn out true once. Thus, on his revised view, the same everyday method (checking a clock) yields 'knowledge' when the local environment supports its reliability, and yields only 'lucky true belief' when the local environment is epistemically hostile...even though your inner mental life may look the same in both cases. See also: • Philosophy / Epistemology: Warrant

Warrant

(●) From Justification to Warrant
Twentieth century epistemology was dominated by the “justified true belief” (JTB) model of knowledge. But after Gettier style counterexamples showed that justified true belief can still fall short of knowledge, many philosophers argued that something crucial was missing from the analysis. Alvin Plantinga’s notion of warrant is one influential attempt to supply that missing ingredient and to explain what, in addition to truth and belief, turns a mere true belief into knowledge.
Plantinga reserves the term “justification” for deontological or duty related notions (being blameless or responsible in believing), and uses “warrant” for the quality that actually makes a true belief into knowledge. On his view, a person can be justified yet still lack warrant if their faculties are not functioning in the right way or the environment is misleading.

(●) What Is Warrant?
Plantinga uses “warrant” for that special positive quality which, when added to truth and belief in sufficient degree, yields knowledge. True belief without warrant might be lucky, accidental, or unsupported. True belief with enough warrant is not just accidentally right; it is produced in the right way, by the right kinds of cognitive processes, in the right sort of situation.

(●) Proper Function and the Design Plan
On Plantinga’s account, a belief has warrant when it is produced by cognitive faculties (such as memory, perception, and reason) that are functioning properly, that is, according to a design plan, under conditions for which those faculties were designed. Proper function rules out malfunction (as in hallucination, severe cognitive damage, or pathological bias) and anchors knowledge in the normal operation of our intellectual equipment.

(●) The Right Environment
Proper function alone is not enough. Our faculties must also be operating in an environment similar to the one for which they were designed. Human vision, for example, is made for a world with normal lighting, ordinary distances, and reliable objects, not for distorted fun house mirrors or systematically deceptive laboratory setups. When the environment is too different from the one anticipated by the design plan, even properly functioning faculties may no longer reliably yield true beliefs.

(●) Aim at Truth and Sufficient Success
The design plan of our cognitive faculties is also aimed at truth. Under the right conditions, these faculties are successfully truth orientated. Warrant comes in degrees, depending on how well the faculties are functioning, how appropriate the environment is, and how truth conducive the processes are in that setting. When a belief is formed by properly functioning, truth aimed faculties in an appropriate environment and enjoys enough of this positive status, that belief is warranted.

(●) Maxi Environment and Mini Environment
Plantinga distinguishes between a broad “maxi environment” (the general kind of world in which our faculties are meant to operate) and the more specific “mini environments” in which particular beliefs are formed (for example, this specific room, this particular test, that specific instrument). A belief can be formed in the right kind of world overall yet still arise in a misleading local setup, a mini environment in which the usual methods are no longer reliably truth producing.

(●) Resolving Gettier Style Luck
Gettier examples show that justified true belief can occur in situations where the truth of the belief depends heavily on coincidence. Plantinga diagnoses these as cases where proper function and the broad environment may be fine, but the specific mini environment is epistemically hostile or deceptive. In such cases, the belief does not achieve the degree of warrant required for knowledge, even if it happens to be true and justified by the subject’s lights.

(●) Warrant and Knowledge
On Plantinga’s proposal, we can summarize knowledge as follows:
A person S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P.
2. P is true.
3. S’s belief that P has enough warrant (is formed by properly functioning, truth aimed faculties, operating according to a good design plan, in an appropriate environment).
Warrant thus replaces bare “justification” as the crucial fourth factor that explains why some true beliefs are merely lucky while others rise to the level of genuine knowledge.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Moreland, J. P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 2017.
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Philosophical Theology

Philosophical Analyses of Christian Theology

Meta-Apologetics

Methodologies used to defend Christian Theism

The Trinity

Analysis of God in Three Persons

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Systematic Theology

Structured Analyses of Christian Doctrines

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Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

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Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Ancient History

3000 BC – 500 BC

Classical Antiquity

500 BC – 500 AD

Socrates of Athens 470 – 399 BC

(●) Socrates was an Athenian philosopher who is widely regarded as one of the founders of Western philosophy. He wrote no philosophical texts himself; instead, his ideas and methods are known through the works of his students, especially Plato and Xenophon, as well as the playwright Aristophanes. Socrates is famous for his method of questioning (the Socratic method or elenchus), which sought to expose contradictions in his interlocutors’ beliefs and to stimulate critical thinking and self-examination. He focused on ethical questions and the pursuit of virtue, famously claiming that he knew nothing except his own ignorance. Socrates was tried and executed by the city of Athens on charges of impiety and corrupting the youth, choosing to die rather than renounce his philosophical mission.

(Q) "The unexamined life is not worth living." Source: Plato, Apology 38a

(Q) "I know that I know nothing." Source: Plato, Apology 21d (paraphrased; the exact phrase is "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know.")

Plato, Apology – Socrates’ defense speech at his trial, as recorded by Plato. Plato, Crito – A dialogue about justice and Socrates’ reasons for refusing to escape from prison. Xenophon, Memorabilia – A collection of recollections about Socrates’ conversations and character.

Plato of Athens 427 – 347 BC

(●) Plato was an Athenian philosopher, a student of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle, whose dialogues shaped the entire subsequent tradition of Western philosophy. Through dramatic conversations, he argued that beyond the changing world of sense experience there exists an intelligible, eternal order of Forms (or Ideas), culminating in the Form of the Good, which grounds truth, beauty, and moral value. He defended the immortality and accountability of the soul, the objectivity of moral norms, and the idea that a well‑ordered society must be governed by wisdom rather than mere power. Plato’s vision of a transcendent Good, his distinction between the visible and invisible realms, and his insistence that the soul is ordered to truth and righteousness provided powerful conceptual scaffolding later used by Christian thinkers (especially Augustine) to articulate doctrines of God as the supreme Good, the created/uncreated distinction, the immortality of the soul, and the moral structure of reality.

(Q) "This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth, and to the knower his power of knowing, you must say is the idea of the Good." Source: Plato, Republic VI, 508e–509a.

(Q) "When the soul inquires alone and by itself, it departs to that which is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to it, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; then it ceases from its wandering and remains always the same with that which is the same." Source: Plato, Phaedo 79d–e.

(Q) "Evil cannot be done away with, for there must always remain something opposite to good; but it never has a place among the gods, only among mortal nature and this world of ours." Source: Plato, Timaeus 29e–30a (on the goodness of the divine craftsman and the disorder of the material world).

(Q) "The just man does not allow the diverse elements in his soul to meddle with one another, but he sets his own house in order and rules himself; he becomes his own friend and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three terms in a musical scale, the lowest and the highest and the middle, and all together he binds them into a unity." Source: Plato, Republic IV, 443d–e.

Plato, Republic – Especially Books VI–VII on the Form of the Good and the allegory of the cave, and Book IV on the just soul. Plato, Phaedo – Arguments for the immortality and purity of the soul and its orientation to the invisible, unchanging realm. Plato, Timaeus – A theologically suggestive account of a good divine craftsman ordering the cosmos. Plato, Symposium – Reflections on the ascent of love from bodily desire to contemplation of eternal Beauty.

Aristotle of Stagira 384 – 322 BC

(●) Aristotle, a student of Plato from the city of Stagira, became one of the most comprehensive and systematic thinkers in history. He developed formal logic, a detailed account of causality and change, and an ethics centered on virtue and human flourishing (eudaimonia). In metaphysics he distinguished between act and potency, substance and accidents, and argued for the existence of an unmoved mover: a necessary, eternal, immaterial source of all motion and order in the universe. In ethics and politics, he taught that human beings have a natural end and that moral and civic life should be ordered toward the cultivation of virtue. Aristotelian ideas about being, causality, teleology, and the highest good became foundational for classical Christian theism and natural law theory; theologians such as Thomas Aquinas drew extensively on Aristotle’s concepts of first cause, final causality, and virtue to articulate philosophical arguments for God’s existence, providence, and the objective moral law.

(Q) "There is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance and actuality; and this is what we call God." Source: Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7 (1072a24–26).

(Q) "The good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most complete." Source: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1098a16–18).

(Q) "Nature does nothing in vain." Source: Aristotle, Politics I.2 (1253a8–9) and throughout his works, expressing his teleological view that natural beings act for ends.

(Q) "One must begin by observing that the law is a rule of reason, and the function of the law is to prescribe the right education that makes us good." Source: Paraphrase of Aristotle’s teaching in Nicomachean Ethics II.1–2 and X.9, where he describes law as a rational guide ordered to virtue and the common good.

Aristotle, Metaphysics XII – On the unmoved mover, a necessary and eternal divine intellect. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics – On eudaimonia, virtue, and the role of reason and law in forming character. Aristotle, Politics – On the polis, natural sociability, and law as ordered to the good life. Aristotle, Physics – On nature, motion, and causality, laying the groundwork for classical arguments from change to a first cause.

Epicurus of Samos 341 – 270 BC

(●) Epicurus was a Greek philosopher who founded one of the most influential schools of Hellenistic philosophy, Epicureanism. He taught that the highest good is pleasure, understood not as indulgence but as the absence of pain (aponia) and mental disturbance (ataraxia). To achieve this tranquility, Epicurus advocated a materialist metaphysics: the universe consists only of atoms and void, the soul is material and mortal, and the gods (if they exist) are distant and uninvolved in human affairs. He denied divine providence, final causality, and life after death, arguing that fear of the gods and death are the chief sources of human anxiety and should be dispelled through reason. Epicureanism represents a direct challenge to core Christian doctrines: it denies creation by a personal God, divine providence and judgment, the immortality of the soul, and the resurrection of the body. The Apostle Paul encountered Epicurean philosophers in Athens (Acts 17:18), and early Christian apologists consistently refuted Epicurean materialism, arguing instead for a rational Creator, moral accountability, and the hope of eternal life.

(Q) "Death is nothing to us. When we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist." Source: Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 125.

(Q) "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?" Source: Attributed to Epicurus in later tradition (especially by Lactantius, On the Anger of God 13.20–21); the formulation is not found verbatim in Epicurus' surviving writings but reflects his argument that divine providence is incompatible with the existence of evil.

(Q) "The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. All such things are found only in what is weak." Source: Epicurus, Principal Doctrines 1 (from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.139).

(Q) "We must free ourselves from the prison of everyday affairs and politics." Source: Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 58; reflects his teaching to "live hidden" (lathe biōsas) and withdraw from public life to cultivate tranquility.

Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus – A summary of Epicurean ethics, the nature of pleasure, and the proper attitude toward death and the gods. Epicurus, Principal Doctrines – Forty key teachings on physics, ethics, and theology, preserved by Diogenes Laertius. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura) – A Roman Epicurean poem expounding Epicurus' atomism, mortality of the soul, and critique of religion. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book X – The primary ancient source for Epicurus' life and teachings.

Philo of Alexandria 20 BC – 50 AD

(●) Philo of Alexandria was a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher who lived in the city of Alexandria, Egypt. Born into a wealthy diaspora family and educated in both Jewish Scripture and Greek paideia, he developed a distinctive synthesis of Jewish scriptural exegesis with Greek philosophical traditions, especially Platonism and Stoicism, chiefly through allegorical interpretation of the Pentateuch. Philo treated the narratives of the Torah as veils for universal truths about God, the soul, and virtue, insisting that Moses is the “summit of philosophy” and that Greek philosophers only glimpsed what the Law reveals more fully. Central to his thought is the doctrine of the divine Logos: the Logos is God’s Word, Wisdom, and mediating power, the intelligible pattern of creation and the bridge between the utterly transcendent God and the created order. His use of Logos language, his account of an utterly transcendent yet provident God, and his attempt to show the rationality of biblical faith later provided early Christian theologians with categories for articulating the doctrine of the Logos.

(Q) "For God, being one, has many powers; and the chief of them all is the Logos, by whom the whole world was fashioned." Source: Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues 146–147 (summarizing his description of the Logos as God’s chief power and instrument of creation).

(Q) "Let us learn that there is one world, one God, one providence, and one law, the common reason of all intellectual and rational beings." Source: Philo, On the Creation of the World 3–4 and related passages, where he stresses the unity of God, world, and rational law (logos) imprinted on creation.

(Q) "The Logos is the image of God, by whom the whole universe was formed." Source: Philo, On the Creation of the World 25–27 (paraphrasing his teaching that the visible cosmos is made after the intelligible pattern in the divine Logos, the image of God).

(Q) "The soul that loves God desires to flee from the body and the senses, and to dwell with Him alone who is incorporeal and invisible, apprehended only by the pure mind." Source: Philo, On the Migration of Abraham 10–12 and related allegorical passages on the soul’s journey from sense to contemplation of God through the Logos.

Grokipedia, "Philo" – Overview of Philo’s life, allegorical method, Logos doctrine, and influence on Christian Logos theology. Philo, On the Creation of the World (De Opificio Mundi) – A philosophical exposition of Genesis 1, presenting the Logos as the archetypal pattern of creation and affirming God’s transcendence and providence. Philo, On the Confusion of Tongues – Contains rich teaching about the Logos as God’s “firstborn,” image, and chief power. Philo, Allegorical Interpretation (Legum Allegoriae) and related treatises – Early examples of allegorical exegesis integrating Mosaic revelation with Platonic and Stoic concepts, influential for later Christian exegesis.

Jesus of Nazareth 6–4 BC – 30 AD

(●) According to the disciples and eye-witness biblical authors of the New Testament gospels, Jesus of Nazareth is the eternal Son of God who entered history as the long‑promised Messiah of Israel. Born in Bethlehem to the virgin Mary during the reign of Herod the Great, He grew up in Nazareth, worked as a carpenter, and began His public ministry around age thirty after being baptized by John the Baptist and affirmed by the Father and the Holy Spirit. Proclaiming the kingdom of God, Jesus taught with unique authority, performed miracles, healings, exorcisms, and gathered disciples, especially the twelve apostles, while calling people to repentance and faith in Him. He fulfilled Old Testament prophecy in His life, death, and resurrection, and confronted both legalistic religion and spiritual hypocrisy of the Jewish religious leaders. Under the Roman governor Pontius Pilate, Jesus was crucified outside Jerusalem as a substitutionary sacrifice for human sin, foretold in Scripture and grounded in real space‑time history as true historical event. On the third day, He physically rose bodily from the dead, appeared to many witnesses, and commissioned His followers to proclaim the gospel to all nations, then ascended into heaven, where He reigns as Lord and will visibly return to judge the living and the dead and fully establish His kingdom.

(Q) "I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me." Source: John 14:6.

(Q) "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Source: Matthew 4:17 (cf. Mark 1:15).

(Q) "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life." Source: John 3:16.

(Q) "Come to me, all who labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Source: Matthew 11:28.

(Q) "I am the resurrection and the life. Whoever believes in me, though he die, yet shall he live." Source: John 11:25.

(Q) "For the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many." Source: Mark 10:45 (cf. Matthew 20:28).

(Q) "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Source: Matthew 22:37–39 (cf. Mark 12:29–31).

(Q) "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. [...] Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be satisfied." Source: Matthew 5:3, 6.

(Q) "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Source: Luke 23:34.

(Q) "All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you always, to the end of the age." Source: Matthew 28:18–20.

New Testament – Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, Holy Bible - English Standard Version (ESV).

Paul the Apostle 5 – 64/67 AD

(●) Saul of Tarsus, later known as the apostle Paul, was a first‑century Jew from the city of Tarsus in Cilicia, a Roman citizen and a Pharisee trained under the respected rabbi Gamaliel. Zealous for the traditions of his ancestors, he initially viewed the early Christian movement as a dangerous heresy and actively persecuted followers of Jesus, approving of the stoning of Stephen and seeking to imprison believers. While traveling to Damascus to arrest Christians, he experienced a dramatic encounter with the risen Jesus, who appeared to him in blinding light, confronted his persecution, and commissioned him as a chosen instrument to carry the gospel to Gentiles, kings, and the people of Israel. After his conversion and baptism, Paul began preaching that Jesus is the Messiah and Son of God, eventually undertaking multiple missionary journeys throughout the Roman Empire, planting churches, training leaders, and enduring intense opposition, suffering, and imprisonment. He articulated key doctrines of the faith such as justification by grace through faith, union with Christ, and the inclusion of Gentiles in God’s people in letters to various churches and individuals. Many of these letters, including Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, and others, are preserved in the New Testament and have profoundly shaped Christian theology and practice. According to early tradition, Paul was eventually martyred in Rome during the reign of Nero, having fought the good fight, finished his course, and kept the faith.

(Q) "For I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to the Greek." Source: Romans 1:16.

(Q) "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Source: Romans 3:23–24.

(Q) "But God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us." Source: Romans 5:8.

(Q) "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." Source: Romans 8:1.

(Q) "For I am sure that neither death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord." Source: Romans 8:38–39.

(Q) "I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Source: Galatians 2:20.

(Q) "For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast." Source: Ephesians 2:8–9.

(Q) "For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain." Source: Philippians 1:21.

(Q) "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the message of reconciliation. Therefore, we are ambassadors for Christ, God making his appeal through us. We implore you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God. For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God." Source: 2 Corinthians 5:17–21.

(Q) "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith." Source: 2 Timothy 4:7.

New Testament – Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon; Holy Bible - English Standard Version (ESV).

Medieval Period

500 AD – 1500 AD

Early Modern Period

1500 AD – 1800 AD

Late Modern Period

1800 AD – present
Playlist
(0.5) Antiquity Biographies; Philosophy: Logic, Epistemology
(0.4) Christian Evidence: Resurrection, NT Criticism
(0.3) Natural Theology Arguments
(0.2) Footer: Gospel Deductive
(0.1) Sections & Subsections